

THE COMING DEMOCRACY

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

BECAUSE I AM A GERMAN

BY HERMANN FERNAU

Edited, with an Introduction,
by T. W. ROLLESTON

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THE COMING DEMOCRACY

BY
HERMANN FERNAU
AUTHOR OF "BECAUSE I AM A GERMAN";

"The civil constitution of every State must be republican"
IMMANUEL KANT, *Perpetual Peace*

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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

THE American reader of "The Coming Democracy" will note in several places, for example on page 122 and page 259, that the author of this book is thinking of Russia as an empire and an aggressive autocracy, whose political aims must be guarded against. The explanation of this is of course that the original German version of this book was published in Berne, Switzerland, just before the Russian Revolution broke out, and *this fact should never be lost sight of while reading the book*. The title as published was "Durch! . . . Zur Demokratie."

The suddenness with which the Russian Revolution broke out in March upset a great many political theories and political prophecies, not only in Germany but in this country and in England. One can imagine if the author of "The Coming Democracy" had delayed publication for another three months with what joy he would have hailed the Russian Republic and what a lesson he would have read in the triumph of the Russian people for the people of his own land.

Another great and significant event which he did not foresee was the entry of America into the war on the side of the Allies. This again would certainly have given him great encouragement and a proof of

the final triumph of democracy which he could have made use of so effectually in his appeal to his own people. Written as it was before these two momentous happenings in the march towards universal democracy, the book is a remarkable piece of forward-looking and constructive work, especially considering the source from whence it comes.

As Herr Fernau's earlier book, "Because I am a German," was an appeal to his people to find out with whom lay the guilt of willing and commencing this appalling war, so this new book, "The Coming Democracy," is an appeal to them to make it forever impossible that any man or clique of men should be in a position to plunge the world into such horrors again.

Friends of democracy cannot but sympathize with this German citizen who sees, even as we see, the danger and iniquity of great hereditary privilege; and they must especially commiserate with him because those whom he accuses are of his own blood and his own speech.

It is safe to say in the days to come when Germany has recovered her senses that this courageous call by a German to Germans, this merciless yet judicial arraignment of the German dynastic political system, will be looked back to as a landmark in the history of German progress.

THE PUBLISHERS.

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THE COMING DEMOCRACY

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THE COMING DEMOCRACY

I

SOME PROBLEMS FOR FUTURE GERMAN HISTORIANS

THE task of German historians in the future will be in the highest degree both a thankless and a painful one. How will they ever be able to explain the enthusiasm, the marvellous cohesion and the bed-rock belief in the holy mission of the German cause, with which the German people embarked upon this World War? Will they, no longer under the restraint of personal liberty, *i.e.*, under the guardianship of the German General Staff, be honestly able to maintain those ideas as to the necessity for and origin of this universal conflict, which are prescribed in Germany to-day? Or, will they not, by the light of the overwhelming proofs already at hand, reject them as historically untenable? Moreover, allowing that their love of truth compels them to it, how will they, in this case, be possibly able to explain to posterity that Germany did not rush into this World War with feelings of anguish and horror, but with a shout of joy, as though marching out to a festival?

I fear that the German historians of the future will only be able to read the German newspapers (particularly the comic papers) of the first months of the war with reluctant amazement, so thoroughly un-German and barbaric will the extraordinary ideas of right and wrong, the intoxication of victory, the wrongheadedness, and, to speak plainly, the braggadocio of the leading organs of the Press and men in Germany appear to them, in view of naked, historical facts.

And their reluctant amazement will change into silent pain or sheer indignation as soon as they have studied the question: Was it necessary? Was the World War actually and really inevitable? Relieved from the thralldom of personal restraint, and now only engaged upon the unprejudiced establishment of historical truth, will it be easy for them to find an answer to this question? No! it need not have happened! It might have been otherwise!

Then, finally, why was Germany, on August 1st, 1914, obliged to declare war upon Russia? Because an heir to the Austrian throne had been assassinated at Serajevo? Nobody regards this murder as a *casus belli per se*, because no one can imagine that, in civilised Europe, people have ever lived who value the life of a prince as equal to that of millions of humbler mortals. Moreover, later German historians will never understand how this murder was made a pretext for the ultimatum to Serbia, which set the war machine rolling. When, in 1894, the French President, Carnot, was murdered in Lyons by an Italian anarchist did it occur to anyone in France to denounce the Italians as a "filthy pack" (this is how the Austro-Hungarian statesmen and newspapers described the

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Serbs) and to declare that a "punitive force" must at once be launched against them? When the Empress Elizabeth of Austria was assassinated on the Lake of Geneva in 1898 by an Italian anarchist, did a single person in Austria ever moot the idea of an ultimatum to Switzerland, on the ground that the Swiss Federal Council was intriguing against Austria and supporting the Irredentist movement in Italy? Not a bit of it. The whole world was indignant at these acts. The murderers were punished, and everyone agreed that this was the only possible expiation.

That, however, in 1914, the Serajevo murder (which was not perpetrated by Serbs, but by Austrian subjects on Austrian soil) was made the subject of diplomatic action against Serbia is a fact which deserves condemnation from a legal point of view. A State which, in consequence of such an occurrence, makes such peremptory demands cannot be regarded as pacific; it is aware, beforehand, that its action is sure to entail a risk of war.

"The assassination of this prince at Serajevo did not cause this World War," German annals will reply to later historians. "That Germany, on August 1st, 1914, was forced to declare war upon Russia was a consequence of her treaty obligations to Austria. The Serajevo murder was simply an outward and visible sign of those Serbian and Russian machinations which had long been menacing Austria's position as a World-Power. Serbia felt herself strong, owing to her protection by Russia. Since we were allied with Austria, we could not permit this threatening attitude, and were forced, since Russia wilfully interfered in the Austro-Serbian dispute, to hurry to

our ally's aid against Russia. Thus the World War arose."

This statement can only be of intrinsic value for historical investigation if properly supported by evidence. But the historians of the future will look in vain for actual proofs of this Serbian and Russian menace. From multitudinous diplomatic papers, they will be unable to unearth a single document which unequivocally proves that Russia had actually encouraged the Serbs to hostile resistance to Austria. As little will they be able to discover any reliable document whatever showing that the Serajevo murder was planned and carried out with the cognisance of the Governments of either Russia or Serbia. On the contrary, they will have to fall back upon No. 40 of the Russian Orange Book, and the eminently conciliatory Serbian reply to the Austrian Ultimatum, as proofs that Russia recommended the Serbs to observe moderation, and that Serbia followed this advice. For a more conciliatory reply than Serbia gave to Austria it is impossible to conceive. If nearly all German accounts maintain that Austria-Hungary was most terribly menaced,¹ there are wanting, as already said: *firstly*, actual and historical proofs of this menace, and, *secondly* (and this is more important), ac-

¹ To pick out one instance from among hundreds: Prof. Herman Oncken writes ("Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," Berlin, 1915, p. 540): "It was inevitable that this cruelly wronged Great Power, after having so long and so patiently endured this menace, should rise up at this crisis. It was not a question of external prestige, no! her very existence was in jeopardy, if she suffered this attack." What legally conclusive evidence has Prof. Oncken for his statement that Austria's "existence was ever in jeopardy"?

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tually credible evidence that Austria could not, through a Court of Arbitration, have attained her rights more cheaply and more reasonably than by sacrificing millions of men.

Future German historians, who will be better versed in the psychology of the cases of Prochaska, Friedjung, etc., than we, will be forced to discredit the statements of the Austrian diplomats, who continually speak of "plots," without being able to adduce any tangible evidence in support of their statements.

On the other hand, as regards Germany's treaty-obligation towards Austria, they must allow that, as events show, she was not only loyal in her observance of it but even officious. For Germany not merely presented a twelve-hour Ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when Austria herself had already declared her readiness to reopen negotiations with Russia (Red Book Nos. 55, 56). She not only nullified this pacific attitude adopted by Austria at the eleventh hour, but declared war upon Russia full five days before Austria herself, although the latter was alleged to have been so severely threatened. Surely greater loyalty was impossible!

Unfortunately, the German historians of the future will be compelled to discount this "Nibelung-faithfulness," when they further investigate the history of the war. For when on May 23rd, 1915, Italy suddenly declared war on Austria, then Germany, with all her loyalty to her alliances, entirely ignored this new and much more dangerous threat to her ally. Was Austria's existence and her position as a Great Power less menaced by Italy than by Serbia? Who was in the sublime counsels of the diplomats of that day? The

fact remains, Germany did not declare war upon Italy. Either, then, so will our later German historians deduce, our treaty-loyalty to Austria was truly sincere, but, if so, our attitude towards Austria in May, 1915, was a breach of contract; or, perhaps after all, it was only a diplomatic lie, and, if so, our predecessors, if they genuinely desired peace, could as well have held themselves aloof from a conflict between Austria on the one hand and Serbia and Russia on the other, as they could later from one between their ally and Italy.

From the foregoing it is evident that neither the assassination at Serajevo, nor the constantly asserted, and ever unproven, Serbo-Russian intrigues, nor, even, the German treaty obligations to Austria, could be the real cause of the World War. Future German historians will exclaim: "It is impossible that our ancestors could ever have declared war upon half the globe without having been first actually assaulted and attacked. Even if they were so enamoured of war, they would scarcely be so arrogant as to attack four Powers at once. It is evident that an attack upon our country, infringement of our national dignity, in short, an armed attack upon our Fatherland, must have driven us into war."

But, ah! here we have a *bona fide casus belli*. (German White Book, p. 14.) "However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st. . . . Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory." It is plain that we could not tolerate that. Of course, the German declaration of war naturally resulted from

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this Russian invasion. Let us examine the facts. Here we find (White Book, Exhibit 26) the official German declaration of war upon Russia. What? Is it dated August 1st, 1914, 12.52 p.m.? How could it be known in Berlin at 12.52 p.m. that Russian troops had on the afternoon of that day crossed the German frontier? And what does that mean? The German declaration of war was not, of course, the result of an invasion of Russian troops! "Seeing that Russia has refused to comply with this demand (the suspension of military operations) and by this refusal has announced that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, etc. . . ." Accordingly it was not the Russian incursions (p. 14) that drove us to war with Russia, but (p. 46, Exhibits 26, 27) the disregard of the Ultimatum addressed to Russia. This contradiction in the German official documents is absolutely bewildering. Did not the German Government know why it was bound to declare war upon Russia? Did Russian forces actually violate our territory, or did we only declare war upon that country because she refused an answer to an Ultimatum, which, from the short term set for reply, was bound to be regarded as an insult? What an extraordinary contradiction in such a serious and sanguinary affair!

Our own supposition arising out of this contradiction (namely, that we did not declare war upon Russia because we were obliged, but because we wished) amounts to a certainty by the light of a semi-official article in the *Pester Lloyd* (Government organ of the Austro-Hungarian Government in Budapest) of May 27th, 1916. In replying to a speech

of the then English Cabinet Minister, Grey, in which he had emphasised the fact that the war would have been avoided had his proposals for a Diplomatic Conference (English Blue Book Nos. 67, 84, 101, 103) been adopted, the article proceeds: "how great and unswerving was our determination to settle our differences with Serbia in such a way that the criminal menace should be once and for all disposed of, Sir Edward Grey can be assured, since we can honestly state that: even had the Russian Government desisted from or suspended the mobilisation she had, despite her hypocritical assurances and avowals to the contrary, been secretly continuing, Austria-Hungary would never have gone to any Conference, but would have insisted, untrammelled by any third party, on bringing her differences with Serbia to a final issue, in accordance with the necessities of her future security."

Even had Russia desisted from or suspended its mobilisation! Now every doubt has vanished. For it is no longer Germany's enemies who assert this, but a semi-official organ of the Austro-Hungarian Government making this "statement" in "complete honesty." For us, this statement is an historical document, from which we, unfortunately, are bound with unequivocal clearness to deduce that Austria, backed up by Germany, absolutely determined upon war.

* * * * *

And what of France? It is true that we cannot understand how the German Government at that time could have become obsessed by the idea that a war with Russia was inevitable; but it is still more un-

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intelligible why she was obliged to declare war upon France (and, as a result of this, unfortunately, upon Belgium also). Here we have the speech of the German Imperial Chancellor of August 4th, 1914, in which he states: "Bombing aeroplanes, cavalry scouts, and companies violating our Alsace-Lorraine! In this way, France, although no state of war has been declared, has broken the peace and actually attacked us." There appears to be here no possible doubt: we were, as the Chancellor solemnly assures us, "actually attacked!" It certainly strikes us as curious that the Imperial Chancellor in the very next sentence of the same speech confesses that we ourselves had already crossed the French frontier before the declaration of war: "Of the French complaints as to violations of their territory on our part, we can only allow one single instance. Contrary to express orders, it appears that, on August 2nd, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps under command of an officer crossed the frontier." The Chancellor endeavours to invalidate the import of this fact by adding: "but long before this violation of territory occurred French aeroplanes penetrated into South Germany and threw bombs upon our railway communications."

We cannot be blamed if, once having established the falsity of the German representations touching the Russian violation of territory, we here again require evidence of this "actual attack." First, we place on record that the German declaration of war, delivered by Herr von Schoen in Paris at 6.45 p.m. on August 3rd, 1914, did not refer to any infringement of territory, but only to the aeroplane aggression upon which the Chancellor insisted: "the German Ad-

ministration and military authorities have established a certain number of palpably hostile acts committed on German soil by French aeroplanes. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium, by flying over the territory of that country. One of them attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel, others were observed over the Eiffel country, and another threw bombs on the railway line near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. I am commanded, and have the honour, etc. . . ." (French Yellow Book No. 147).

The Imperial German Chancellor could have greatly assisted our investigations by furnishing dates and details. But these are absolutely wanting in his speech. Hence we were obliged to scrutinize carefully the Wesel, Karlsruhe, and Nuremberg papers for the period July 25th-August 3rd, 1914. The work was all the more arduous in that our search yielded, alas! no result. Not one of these newspapers contains a single reference to the throwing of bombs. Can anyone believe that they would have remained silent in the face of such a sensational occurrence? But we have not been alone in seeking for evidence for the cause of the war as alleged by the Imperial Chancellor and the German Ambassador. Since the outbreak of this World War, honest German patriots made a like investigation and, discovering nothing, asked the German authorities for information. One of them, Dr. Schwalbe, editor of the *Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift*, received the following reply to his question in a notification from the Nuremberg Chief Magistrate (Oberbürgermeister), dated April 3rd, 1916, and published in his weekly journal of May 18th, 1916:

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"The Acting General Commandant of the 3rd Bavarian Army Corps in this city has no information that bombs were ever thrown by enemy aeroplanes upon the railway lines Nuremberg-Kissingen or Nuremberg-Anspach, either before or after the outbreak of war. All such assertions and newspaper reports have been found to be false."

Found to be false! Then the justification for the declaration of war upon France was a pure myth! Accordingly, we did not declare war upon France because she "actually attacked" us, but because we intended to attack her under trumped-up pretexts? So the whole business was a pure fiction? It is staggering to have to conceive that, in this twentieth century, there were people capable of such fabrications, and of solemnly proclaiming in the same breath: "Gentlemen, we are now on our defence!" and "Necessity knows no law!"

In the East, incursions of Russian forces; in the West, aeroplane bombs on South German railways. In the East, an awkward contradiction between the Chancellor's speech and the German official declaration of war. In the West, a still more flagrant contradiction in two sentences of the same Chancellor's speech. On the one hand, the statement made in "full honesty" by a highly official publication that it had been determined at the outset to accept no Conference (*i.e.*, war at all costs). On the other, the equally categorical statement of German officialdom, that the "actual attack" upon which the German declaration of war upon France was based is a pure fiction of the German Government.

This Imperial Chancellor is, indeed, a marvel in the world's history.

* * * * *

That, moreover, is evident from the speeches which Herr von Bethmann Hollweg has delivered since the outbreak of the war. For instance, in his celebrated speech of November 9th, 1916, he said: "The act that rendered this war inevitable was the Russian general mobilisation, ordered in the night 30th-31st July." We confess we do not understand how, after twenty-seven months of war, anyone could talk to the German people in this way. The mobilisation in Russia, Austria, Germany and France was patently the result of eight days' preliminary diplomatic negotiations, *i.e.*, the final act of the great world drama, which opened with the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia on July 23rd. As one cannot tame a horse by his tail, so a play cannot begin with the fifth act. And this is most particularly true in this connection, because in the preamble to the German White Book (p. 6) we find the ominous words: "We were fully conscious of the fact (in giving Austria our sanction to this Ultimatum) that an eventual military action on the part of Austria-Hungary might bring Russia into the field, and thus, in accordance with our treaty obligations, involve us also in war." This sentence clearly shows that in German quarters, as early as July 23rd, 1914, the risk of a European war had been carefully and advisedly considered. Long before the Russian mobilisation had been proclaimed, Austria had declared war upon Serbia and begun it by bombarding Belgrade. On its side, the German Government had rejected two English and two Russian

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proposals for mediation, and, moreover, had simply suppressed (no other word for it) a personal note from the Russian Czar (asking that the Austro-Serbian differences should be submitted to The Hague Conference).

The discussion of the question of guilt must, accordingly, if it is to proceed without prejudice and conscientiously, begin with the words "fully conscious" of the sentence cited above.¹ To single out from this series of events the Russian mobilisation, and to treat it as something standing by itself, is not permissible and would only give the impression of a deliberate disregard of the events leading up to the mobilisation.

But even if, out of courtesy to the Imperial Chancellor, we should pause and discuss the Russian mobilisation as a thing by itself, we should be unable to agree with him. The Chancellor said: "As regards the defensive character of the Russian grand mobilisation, I

¹ In my book "Because I am a German!" (London, Constable & Co.; New York, E. P. Dutton Co.) I, on pp. 96-102, formulated some of the preliminary essential questions which should be asked before the Russian mobilisation is discussed. *Vide*, in this sense also, pp. 82-8 of the same work, *re* the reply to a pamphlet of Dr. Helfferich. (Contradicting Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's assertion, his colleague Helfferich says, moreover, the Russian mobilisation was ordered on the "early morning of July 31st.") Again, in the German White Book (p. 13) it is stated that the Russian general mobilisation was ordered "as early as the morning" (of July 31st). Again, as to the question, When did the Russian general mobilisation take place? the German White Book replies: "in the forenoon" (*Vormittag*) of July 31st, Dr. Helfferich, "in the early hours (*Frühmorgens*) of July 31st," and the Imperial Chancellor, "in the night from July 30th-31st." Three German official statements contain, accordingly, three contradictions. Which is one to believe?

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will, in this place, expressly assert that, at the outbreak of the war in 1914, an instruction of the Russian Government, issued as early as 1912, contains the following sentence: 'His Majesty has given orders that proclamation of the mobilisation shall be, simultaneously, proclamation of war with Germany.'"

Here again, in order to oblige the Imperial Chancellor, we will not investigate the question why he only published this document after twenty-seven months of war, instead (as any other statesman in his position would have done) of doing so immediately, when from all sides Germany was being accused of having, of malice aforethought, brought about the war. Moreover, we will for a moment suppose with the Chancellor that the Russian mobilisation actually took place earlier than the Austrian (how very assailable this position is, and that, in any event, it can only have been a matter of a few hours, is demonstrated by Yellow Book No. 115 and Red Book No. 53¹). Despite all these extenuating presuppositions, we are, after all, in a position to demonstrate the futility of Bethmann Hollweg's assertion (that the Russian general mobilisation had rendered war inevitable, in that it was tantamount to a declaration of war) by four facts, which do not admit of any argument.

Firstly, by the following telegram of the Czar to William II., dated Petrograd, August 1st, 1914 (dispatched after the Russian and German general mobilisation had been ordered): "I have received

¹ Cf., in this connection, also the description in "J'accuse" and J. W. Headlam "The History of Twelve Days" (London, T. Fisher Unwin), p. 220.

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your telegram, and understand that you are compelled to mobilise, but I should wish to have from you the same guarantee that I have given you, namely, that these measures do *not* mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate . . ." (see German White Book, p. 12, the Czar's message of August 1st). Here we have the solemn word of the Czar repeated, that mobilisation does *not* imply war. What moral and legal international justification had the German Government for disbelieving this solemn assurance of the Czar? Why did not William II. reply to this telegram by giving the assurance requested, instead of by another demand for immediate demobilisation, and couched in the momentous words: "Until I have this reply from you, I am sorry not to be in a position to enter upon the subject of your telegram" (German White Book, p. 14)? Why?

Secondly, Russia and Austria, both in 1908 and also later, in 1912, stood for weeks fully mobilised on their frontiers and did not go to war. Why? Because at the time neither of the negotiating diplomatists was secretly resolved upon war. Therefore, in spite of mobilisation on both fronts, the negotiations were carried on and the differences peaceably adjusted. Moreover, Count Berchtold, at that time Austrian Minister, expressly (Red Book No. 17) pointed to these precedents to make it manifest to all the world that mobilisation on one or the other side does not by any means signify war.

But, *thirdly*, every child in Germany knew that a Russian general mobilisation was in itself by no means such an immediate danger for Germany as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg would lead us to

believe. In consequence of its vast territory and deficient railway communications, Russia required for the full mobilisation of its forces about four times as much time as other European military States. This very comforting circumstance for Germany ought in itself to have enabled the German Government to wait without risk for a few days—that is, to continue the *pourparlers*. But the German Government, far from regarding this slowness of the Russian mobilisation as a welcome opportunity for further negotiations, relied upon it as a factor of prospective victory in its plan of war. In fact, the German war plan (down to the battle of the Marne) was, as far as is known to us to-day, based upon the slowness of the Russian and the rapidity of its own mobilisation. That is to say, it was, at the beginning, directed not against Russia at all, but against France and Belgium. This was so much the case that, relying upon the slowness of the Russian mobilisation, the German main army was launched through Belgium upon France, the East Prussian frontier being only garrisoned by insufficient forces, with the result that Germany lost the battle of Gumbinnen, relinquished half of East Prussia, and was forced, at the beginning of September, 1914, to withdraw considerable forces from France and send them against Russia, so as to avert utter catastrophe in East Prussia. This brought about the defeat on the Marne, the bankruptcy of the German war plan, and the dismissal of its author, Moltke. The undoubted historical fact accordingly remains that the German General Staff conceived the Russian general mobilisation to be, for weeks to come, so little dangerous, and its slowness

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so certain, that it built its whole war plan upon this theory and, immediately after the declaration of war, did not turn against Russia, but launched its forces exclusively against Belgium and France. All the same, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg dared to describe that mobilisation to his contemporaries as a war-storm which was to burst in the very next second, and which compelled Germany, for the sake of her existence, to strike madly in all directions.

Fourthly, we must place on record the very extraordinary fact that Austria herself (for whose sake it was said the German Government acted with such precipitancy) had, indeed, mobilised almost simultaneously with Russia, but quietly continued its diplomatic negotiations with Petrograd (Red Books Nos. 53, 55, 56), and did not declare war upon Russia until five days later than Germany herself.

The danger of the Russian mobilisation (which, according to Herr von Bethman Hollweg's account, rendered the war inevitable) is thus refuted (1) by a solemn and reiterated assurance of the Russian Czar; (2) by historical precedents, and their quotation by the German ally, Count Berchtold; (3) by the formulation and execution of the German war plan; and (4) by the attitude of the Austrian Government itself, which deemed the Russian general mobilisation to be of such little danger that, in spite of it, it continued negotiations and did not declare war upon Russia before August 5th.

Viewed by the light of these historical facts, the statements and the logic displayed by the German Imperial Chancellor do not appear to us to hold water. That nobody in the German Empire protested against

them at the time is an extraordinary phenomenon, only explicable by the condition known as the "*Burgfrieden*." Our ancestors denoted by "*Burgfrieden*" that extraordinary institution by the aid of which the German Government could stifle every free utterance, and be in the right in any and every event.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg proceeded to say in his speech: "The Hague Tribunal, which he (Lord Grey), it is true, suggested, is, of course, apparently very momentous; but it was offered when Russian forces had already been dispatched against us." Here, again, this sentence shows us how convenient for the then German statesman (free from all responsibility towards the people) this *Burgfrieden* was.

Firstly, Lord Grey did not suggest The Hague Tribunal, but the Serbian Government did so in its reply to Austria (French Yellow Book No. 49). This proposal had been already made to Austria on July 25th, when there was nowhere any talk about Russian troops. Instead of adopting this proposal, the Austrian Government simply broke off negotiations and declared war upon Serbia. For this action of his allied Government, as precipitate as it was brutal, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg never found a single word of blame, on the contrary (German White Book, p. 7) he expressly approved it.

Secondly, The Hague Arbitration Tribunal was suggested by the Czar in a despatch to William II. This despatch bears date July 29th, 1914. Twice repeated, it was neither answered by the German Government nor made known at all to the German people. It was only when the *Moniteur Officiel* of the Russian Government (January 31st, 1915)

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indicated the existence of this despatch that the German Government condescended to admit that it had been received, and then issued it in a second edition of its White Book. This fact alone is more illustrative of the guilt for the war than all the Chancellor's utterances together, down to November 9th, 1916. Let us keep the dates clear: The Hague Arbitration Tribunal was proposed by Serbia on July 25th and by the Russian Czar on July 29th, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor stated in his speech of November 9th, 1916, that the Russian mobilisation "was ordered in the night July 30th-31st, 1914," and in his speech of August 4th, 1914, he said that "Russian troops had already crossed our frontiers in the afternoon of August 1st." Whence, it appears, in the first place, that The Hague Tribunal was twice proposed at a time when, as yet nowhere, "Russian troops were marching against us," and, in the second place, that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was compelled knowingly to represent facts differently than they historically proved to be. For only in this way could he, in apportioning the blame, get rid of the most material fact that The Hague Tribunal was twice offered him and his Vienna colleague, when no Russian troops whatever were being moved against us.

The Imperial Chancellor proceeded to lay stress in his speech on the point that he had exercised pressure in Vienna in favour of peace, and advised the acceptance of Grey's mediation proposal. He referred, in making this assertion, to two despatches. As to the first, he said: "the instructions I gave our Ambassador in Vienna on July 30th are well known." The text of these instructions the Imperial Chancellor

had already made known in his speech of August 19th, 1915. He then added that he had had this despatch published in the English Press shortly before the outbreak of the war. And it was actually printed in the *Westminster Gazette* of August 1st, 1914. But, otherwise, it is omitted from all official budgets of documents, and notably from the German White Book. The facts regarding this despatch are as follows: It was published in one single English newspaper and nowhere else. It was not until twelve months later that the German Chancellor announced this publication as his work. English historians have deduced from this remarkable fact that the so-called document was a fiction and was, at the critical moment, sent to the English paper with the sole intent of restraining England from war, that is to say, of creating the impression that the German Government had seriously recommended Grey's mediation proposal in Vienna. But whether fictitious or not, the fact yet remains that the German Government has never given any plausible explanation why this despatch is missing in all official publications. No statesman who feels he is in the right, and finds himself in such a difficult position as the German Imperial Chancellor then did, can have any motive for concealing such documents for years. For, at the very beginning of the war, the Imperial Chancellor was accused on all sides of not having worked in Vienna in the cause of moderation and mediation, and of thus having rendered the catastrophe inevitable. Why did he not publish documents which would prove the direct contrary, and at a time when no one could possibly doubt their genuineness?

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The same remark is applicable, and in a far greater degree, to the second despatch that the Chancellor, for the first time, made known in his speech in November 9th, 1916. After twenty-seven months of war, he suddenly made known a despatch to his Vienna Minister, which, *inter alia*, states: "the political prestige of Austria-Hungary and the honour of its army, as well as its justifiable claims upon Serbia, might be sufficiently safeguarded by the occupation of Belgrade, or other strongholds. We must, therefore, urgently and most emphatically ask the Vienna Cabinet to consider if it would not be advisable to accept the mediation on the conditions offered. The responsibility for the consequences which otherwise are sure to ensue would be an exceedingly heavy one for Austria-Hungary and ourselves." Unfortunately, the Imperial Chancellor does not supply us with the exact date on which he sent this important despatch to Vienna. He only says: "I telegraphed '*then*' to Vienna": Then! As if the most exact indication of the time was not of the utmost importance. And all the more so, seeing that this telegram (like the last above mentioned) is nowhere to be found in the budget of the despatches exchanged. Let anyone try to fit it in, and he will only discover that, try as he will, its contents are in sheer contradiction to other German documents that have preceded it. (See, for instance, the German White Book, exhibit 12, where the Imperial Chancellor expressly declares to his London Ambassador: "It is impossible for us to drag our ally in his dispute with Serbia before a European Court.")

But still more vital than the question why these despatches were not published earlier, and why they

stand in such glaring contradiction to other German diplomatic Notes, is that further question: What reply did Austria-Hungary make to these despatches? We are still waiting in vain for this document.

There are here only two possibilities: Either the Austrian Government did not trouble its head about these German recommendations at all, and that would be a gross insult to the allied German Cabinet; or it honestly endeavoured to comply with them, and in this case there exists no reason for withholding any documents which would clearly prove that to be the case. But such documents are wanting.¹

Consequently, the historical fact remains that the Austrian Government disregarded the advice given it from Berlin. If, then, despite the above considerations, it be for a moment assumed that the genuineness of those despatches has been proved, *i.e.*, that the German Government did actually, in the sense alleged, exercise pressure upon Vienna, then we are in this

¹The way in which the Chancellor juggled with the facts is evidenced by this: that in his speech of November 9th, 1916, he dared to represent No. 51 of the Austrian Red Book (Note of Count Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassadors at London and Petrograd) as being a reply to the instructions he despatched to Vienna. But, from this No. 51, he quoted, wisely enough, only a portion, and left out the third paragraph altogether. From the third paragraph of this No. 51 it is, however, clear that No. 51 is only the Austrian reply (and a wholly insufficient reply) to No. 84 of the English Blue Book (proposal for a Conference of four in London), and can in no wise be regarded as a reply to, or compliance with, the instructions "then" given by Berlin to Vienna. (For this refers, as its contents show, to No. 88 of the English Blue Book: Proposal of the Powers for mediation after occupation of Serbian territory by Austria.)

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case confronted by the logical deduction that those despatches sent to our Ambassador at Vienna, and with which the German Imperial Chancellor sought to justify himself, do, in fact, the more seriously incriminate both him and his allies. For since it is proved that Austria refused to entertain those proposals (*vide* also the above-cited semi-official article of the Austrian Government in the *Pester Lloyd* of May 27th, 1916), there results, first, clear evidence of the desire for war of the Austrian Government; and secondly, a disregard of the advice of the allied Berlin Cabinet, which was a direct insult to Germany. Suppose A. is allied with B.; B. enters into a quarrel with C. and A. seriously advises him not to exaggerate matters, as he has no desire to make war on his account; and then B. casts all this good advice to the winds, because he has made up his mind beforehand "to go to no Conference," even if C. has dropped or suspended his mobilisation. Is there, in this case, any obligation upon A. to come to the assistance of B.? Has he not rather now the right to be indignant at B.'s obstinacy and desire for war and leave him to his own fate?

Either the German Imperial Chancellor did seriously advocate the acceptance of Grey's mediation proposals in Vienna, in which case, when Austria shut her ears, it was his moral duty to cut adrift from such a blood-thirsty ally; or, those despatches were (even though genuine) mere make-believe.

We repeat: this Imperial Chancellor is a marvel in the world's history. At least we cannot recall another example of a statesman who, while striving to justify his actions, perpetually incriminated himself.

In his famous speech of November 9th, 1916, the

Imperial Chancellor inveighed particularly against the then English Minister Grey and the latter's speech of October 23rd, 1916. After having in the way above described proved Germany's innocence, it was a grateful task for him to refute Grey's assertion, according to which the premature announcement of the German mobilisation in the *Lokal-Anzeiger* (Berlin, July 30th, 1914 was an "Ems telegram," with which the German Government wished to force Russia to immediate mobilisation. This supposition of the English Minister was not very happy, and absolutely irrelevant as regards assigning the blame for the war. We readily believe Herr von Bethmann Hollweg that the German Government was no party to the premature announcement in the *Lokal-Anzeiger*. He was, therefore, fully entitled to say "We need not fear any tribunal," and to produce a credible refutation of Grey's allegation.

This portion of Grey's speech and of Bethmann Hollweg's reply was absolutely superfluous. There have never been in the history of the world so many and such obvious "Ems telegrams" as during the period from July 23rd till August 5th, 1914; Lord Grey had really, therefore, no need to invent another and to overlook the ones actually in existence. By an "Ems telegram," the people of Europe were wont to understand the manœuvre which Bismarck invented in 1870, and which is exhaustively dealt with in his "Reflections and Reminiscences." Its chief essentials were, by means of forged, mutilated, or even fictitious official documents, to incite the opponent to war, and win the approval of the public at home for a war already planned. In order to be con-

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vinced of the staggering fact that, in the period July 23rd-August 5th, 1914, at least a dozen of such "Ems telegrams" were concocted and published, one need only take up any German or Austrian paper at random during those dark days. It was the aim of the German and Austrian Governments, towards the end of July and the beginning of August, to persuade the people that a manifestly offensive war (also called preventive war) was a holy defensive war, and thus kindle that patriotic enthusiasm without which no modern State could wage war. This end was attained by numerous "Ems telegrams."

See, for instance, the "semi-official *communiqué*" of the Vienna Press Bureau of July 28th, 1914 (French Yellow Book No. 75 *bis*), published in all the German and Austrian newspapers, which presented the Serbian reply, for popular consumption, in such a way as to convey that therein lay a war challenge to Austria and the necessity of rushing to arms for the defence of the menaced Fatherland.

A similar "Ems telegram" lies before us in the publication of the Serbian reply in the columns of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of July 29th, 1914. This announcement, although it was dated the 25th, and, at latest, reached Berlin and Vienna early on the 26th, was only issued on July 29th. Moreover, it exhibited glosses, which are absolutely unallowable in the publication of such documents. This means, then, that the Serbian reply was only published in Germany after Austria had already declared war upon Serbia, and that the people were confronted with a *fait accompli*. And, in apprehension lest the Serbian reply should create a too favourable impression upon

the public, it was "mutilated" by "glosses," which served the obvious purpose of anticipating the judgment of the reader and awakening his belief in the villainy and dishonesty of the Serbian Government. Why these glosses? What other purpose did they serve than to disguise the submission of the Serbian Government, and to justify a declaration of war, which from an impartial reading of the Serbian reply could never for a moment have been deemed justifiable?

An "Ems telegram" of quite a different character is the following "Official Explanation of the French Action," which can be read in all German newspapers:

"Berlin, August 3rd (Official Announcement): hitherto German troops, acting under orders, have not crossed the French frontier. On the other hand, since yesterday, French forces have, without declaration of war, attacked our frontier posts. Although the French Government, only a few days ago, agreed to the keeping of a neutral zone of 10 kilometres, they have at various points crossed the German Frontier. French companies yesterday occupied German villages, bombing aeroplanes made their appearance over Baden and Bavaria, violated Belgium's neutrality by crossing her territory, penetrated into the Rhine Province and attempted to wreck our railways. France has thus first made an attack upon us. The safety of the realm demands counter measures. The Emperor has issued the necessary orders. The German Ambassador in Paris has been notified to demand his passports."

Here we have no longer to deal with a pure interpretation and mutilation of official documents, as in the two previous cases, but (as we positively know to-day) with a sheer invention. Every German of those days

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was accustomed blindly to believe the "official announcements" of his Government; on reading in all the newspapers and learning from the mouth of the Imperial Chancellor (Reichstag sitting of August 4th) that "France had actually attacked us," he rushed to arms, in holy indignation, for the defence of his Fatherland. The object of this "Ems telegram" had been brilliantly attained. But for the facts asserted in it the German Government does not only not produce a tittle of evidence, but has, on the contrary, even furnished a refutation of its own assertions (*vide* the above-cited notification from the Chief Magistrate of Nuremberg of April 3rd, 1916).

We, who without prejudice and passion only serve historical truth and have all the documentary evidence of those days at our disposal, cannot understand why the statesmen of the countries then leagued against Germany made subsidiary episodes, like the premature special edition of the *Lokal-Anzeiger*, a subject of long discussion, instead of drawing the attention of the German Imperial Chancellor to these and similar "Ems telegrams." After twenty-seven months of war, people on both sides finally arrived at the conclusion that the conditions of peace must be made dependent upon the allocation of the blame for the war. Happily, both Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and the whole German Press associated themselves with this point of view and declared themselves ready to co-operate towards a reasonable answer anent this question of liability. Under these circumstances, there ought to have been but one question for the statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance to propound to the German Imperial Chancellor: with what tangible, legally provable and proven

facts can the German Government maintain that it was "actually attacked"? By what valid documents can it show that those "official announcements" of the German and Austrian Governments, which we consider to be "Ems telegrams," were, as a matter of fact, no "Ems telegrams" at all? If it could be indisputably shown to us that Germany was, in fact, "actually attacked" and is now waging a defensive war, then we are prepared to suit our conditions of peace to this fact, and to conclude a peace that will in future secure Germany from similar attacks.

And if, on the other hand, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg "had to fear no tribunal" and was at the same time of opinion that the apportionment of the blame (which would have to be determined by the evidence of the twelve critical days) must be a condition preliminary to the opening of peace negotiations, why did he not anticipate such questions and insinuations? Why did he (just like his antagonists) discuss only the side and single issues of those eventful twelve days?

Offensive or defensive war? That is here the question. It cannot be answered by general assertions, but only by historically provable or proven facts. Thus, either Herr von Bethmann Hollweg must furnish the evidence that those "official announcements" (and his speech in the Reichstag of August 4th) were no "Ems telegrams," but incontestably truthful presentations of facts . . . then, we should be in a position to examine further how far his statement (that Germany had been maliciously assailed) is correct. Or, supposing he does not adduce this actual evidence (and, unhappily, he has not yet done so), then it is

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clear that those "official announcements" were pure fictions, which could only serve one purpose, viz., to represent to the German people a palpable war of aggression as a defensive war. But if this is proved (and it is proved to-day), then everything the German Imperial Chancellor has told me about the Russian general mobilisation, of his endeavours to exercise pressure in Vienna in favour of peace, etc., etc., is invalidated and hardly deserves any further refutation.

* * * * *

From the mass of diplomatic and generally historical testimony that lies before us to-day (as it did also then) there emerges the incontrovertible certainty that this terrible war was not fate and necessity, but design and will, and by no manner of means a holy war of defence on the part of Germany against foreign aggression.

A careful study of the German literature of those days has, moreover, forced upon us the conviction that Germany waged a palpable war of conquest. We leave entirely aside the historical fact that Prussia has never fought a victorious campaign without acquisition in land or money. Although this is a peculiarity which Prussia shares with no other State, it is not adduced here by way of evidence. But if, as was the case in the World War, an "actually assailed" country, simultaneously with its protestations that it had been grievously attacked, brings out enormous annexation projects, which find enthusiastic support among the people and the open support of its leading statesmen, that is, to some degree, a serious matter. Whoever, like the German philosophers and politicians in those days, speaks in the same breath of defence and con-

quest, is manifestly using the theory of defence only as a subterfuge.

Scarcely had the first blows been delivered upon unhappy Belgium than the most influential persons in Germany began to demand its annexation. The first thirty months of the World War had, it is true, to a certain extent run in favour of Germany, but, for good reasons, the German Government had prohibited the discussion of her war aims. Firstly, she could not, by making known her projects of conquest, stamp her elaborately constructed fable of a war of defence as pure fiction; secondly, she realised fully that the war was not at an end, and that Germany, if the first attempt miscarried, would never be in a position to annex anything whatsoever. It was no use. The more the German specious successes increased, the louder became the clamour that the miserable Imperial Chancellor should allow the discussion of the war aims. And as the most elementary wisdom compelled him to silence, because the bear, whose skin the agitators were in their assurance of victory continually dividing, was as yet not killed, they accused and abused him in the vilest manner. It was both a ludicrous and a shameful spectacle that Germany then presented to the world.

The German people thought it was waging a holy and defensive war against a ruthless attack by the "Land Partition Syndicate" (so the Triple Entente was styled in Germany), and had to look on for two whole years (as long as the war conditions were favourable for Germany) while new land partition syndicates were daily being formed in Germany. Some dreamed of a "Greater Germany," extending from Antwerp to Bagdad; others of the "emancipation" of

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the Flemings, Balts, Poles and Letts; others of the appropriation of rich coal and iron mines in the North of France, of the French colonies in North Africa, of a sea-controlling German world empire, and many other splendid things.¹ Fortunately for Europe the events of the war finally checked their greedy appetite. For had their plans been realised, then, instead of the peaceful Europe which we had known for fifty years, and which we are striving to secure for coming generations with yet firmer guarantees, we should experience once again in Europe the same gigantic armaments, the same policy of violence, which, to the distress of the nations, has continued from 1871 to 1914. For the surest way to bring about "unavoidable" wars is annexation against the will of the annexed.

¹ As early as the summer of 1915 the six chief German Industrial Associations (the Farmers' League, the German Peasants' League, the Westphalian Peasants' Union, the Central League of German Industrials, the Manufacturers League, and the Imperial German Middleclass League) demanded, in an address to the Imperial Chancellor, the annexation of Belgium, the North of France, the Baltic Provinces, etc., etc. The address of the German high school teachers made similar demands. A petition of March, 1916, to the Federal Council ("*Richtlinien für Wege zum dauernden Frieden*") demands the annexation of Belgium, the "acquisition of a favourable military frontier comprehending the for us indispensable mineral fields" lying towards France, "the forcing back of Russia as far as ever possible from territories not inhabited by the Great Russians," the "establishment of the largest possible continuous extent of colonial territory in Africa," etc., etc. A comprehensive survey of the German annexation demands is published by Payot & Co., Lausanne ("*Das annexionistische Deutschland*," compiled by S. Grumbach). The authentic material condensed into this volume is extraordinarily voluminous and enough to shame every democratically-minded German.

The schemes of conquest of the so-called Pan-Germanists of those earlier days were so monstrous that a Minister of Finance who should hit upon the idea of taxing the Pan-Germanist megalomania by levying, say, a shilling on every square yard of land those gentlemen desired to annex, could, by means of this annexation tax, cover all the German war expenses and make beggars of Rohrbach, Bassermann, Chamberlain, Reventlow, Harden and a hundred others.

The German "victories" of the first thirty months of the war were needed to lay clear before our eyes the extravagance of the German greed of territory. Certain books, which advocated the wildest annexation demands, ran into editions of 200,000 copies and more. Even numerous German Socialists, who had hitherto been regarded as level-headed, fell victims to this disease. People like Lensch, Kolb, Geck, Adelung, Quark, Landsberg, Südekum, Heine, Hänisch, and many other so-called Socialists, cynically spat upon the testaments of their great predecessors,—Marx and Bebel—and, like the crowd of Pan-Germanists, spoke of "frontier readjustments," "safeguards for our existence," "guarantees against future aggression," etc., etc.¹ At a time when the war had already entered upon a critical stage for Germany,

¹ In this strain writes, for example, the deputy Hänisch (*Vorwärts*, September 6th, 1916): "But as far as the much discussed annexations are concerned, I have for my own part never made a secret of the fact that, in the interest of the German people and especially of the working classes, I consider a considerable extension of our frontier lines towards the East, possibly as far as the Narew line, a highly desirable war aim." And, then, a few sentences further: "therefore I roundly state that, in my view, the peace aims of the Social Democratic Party will have

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royal personages, such as the King of Bavaria, influential industrial and economic societies, leading newspapers and politicians, incessantly demanded, as an understood thing, conquests and an acquisition of power, in a manner which proves that the *ridiculous* and the *barbaric* were in those days regarded in Germany as the *patriotic*.¹

To-day, when we know the fortunately unfortunate issue of this war for Germany, the whole of this immense mass of literature does not merely throw a woe-ful light upon the idiocy and bombast of the then spokesmen of the German nation, but it is before all else, as already said, the clearest refutation these people have themselves given of the official pronouncement of a holy defensive war. Anyone who, confronted with this vast mass of literature, in which robbery of land and money is treated as a perfectly natural result of the "holy defensive war forced upon us," can still for a moment entertain any doubts as to the true significance of this war must be scoffed at as a simpleton.

There was, at the time, so far as we can perceive,

to lie more or less in the same direction as those peace aims which the Imperial Chancellor laid down in his well-known speech of December 9th, 1915, and later." Similar expressions of eminent Social Democratic leaders are to be found in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, in the *Hamburger Echo*, in the *Chemnitzer Volksstimme*, and other party organs.

¹Even when the war situation had become so hopeless that the Imperial Chancellor in his above-cited speech of November 9th, 1916, had to state that he "had never declared the annexation of Belgium to be our intention," the spokesmen of the Centre, the National Liberals, and Conservatives still persisted that Belgium, politically, militarily, and economically, should remain in German hands.

in the whole of Germany but one eminent man, Maximilian Harden, who had the courage openly to confess adherence to his old opinions, that is, he called the long-desired war of conquest by its right name, as soon as it had broken out.

"Away with the miserable attempts to justify Germany's action. Finish with this vulgar abuse of our foes.

"We did not embark upon the enormous risk of this war like irresponsible fools. *We willed it*, because we were obliged and bound to will it. May the Teuton devil throttle the whiners, whose prayer for pardon makes us ridiculous amid the marvels of great events. We do not stand, we do not place ourselves before the tribunal of Europe. Our might shall create a new right in Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods shall belaud the good war. We do not wage the war in order to punish sinners, nor to free enthralled peoples and then bask in the consciousness of unselfish magnanimity. We wage it from the bed-rock of conviction, that Germany, after having completed its task, can and must demand further elbow room and further potentiality for development in the world. Spain and the Netherlands, Rome and Hapsburg, France and England have possessed, ruled and colonised vast tracts of the most fertile soil. Now the hour of German ascendancy has struck." (*Zukunft*, October 17th, 1914).

The truth is, the diplomatic origin of this World War, the contradictions and forgeries about the "actual attack" that were fabricated and confessed to by the German Government itself, the voluminous

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literature demanding annexations, and the annexation craze which infected the ranks of the German Socialists, compel us to the admission, which, though saddening for us Germans, is yet incontrovertibly true, that no war of modern days has ever borne the stamp of a war of conquest more unmistakably than that which Germany, on August 1st, 1914, embarked upon against one half of the world.

II

OF DYNASTIES IN GENERAL AND THE GERMAN IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION IN PARTICULAR

How was it possible that the German Government could conceal from its people the true character of this war and, in the way we have delineated, instil into them the conviction that warlike possibilities were actualities, infringements of rights acts of self-defence, and purely fictitious attacks "actual" ones? With what right could it demand the sacrifice of the lives of its citizens, when it is historically proven that the real causes of the war, and the war aims, were different from those for which the German citizen was prepared to lay down his life? To propound this question (and it must be propounded) involves the solution of a problem which, remarkably enough, has not hitherto been solved in Germany. I say "remarkably," because Germany is regarded as a civilised State of the first rank; and because, without a reasonable discussion and solution of this problem, it is really no civilised State at all. Since England, France, and Italy led the way in the solution of this problem, most of the other European States followed their example. Even the small, almost despised Balkan States recognised this as the most important of all political problems, and each, according to its national individuality, has furnished a solution.

This problem, practically unknown in Germany, or in any event excluded from any public discussion, can be comprehended in one word: *Dynasty*.

In my book "Because I am a German,"¹ I said in reference to the origin of wars: "War is never a 'logical consequence' or a 'necessary result'; war is a *will*. Not the will of a revengeful God, nor of any other supernatural power, but the will to power of individual men. . . . The exuberant will to power of the few individuals who still, by virtue of antiquated Constitutions, enjoy an absolute political power: that is the virus of war. That, and that alone, has the power to transform the latent war-madness existing in certain classes of the population into an acute war crisis."

It is clear that dynasties are hereby intended. As there can be no religion without gods, no art without ideals, in like manner there can be no wars² without dynasties. Dynasties are the gods of wars and the spirit of a warlike thought in the world. "Cherchez la femme," said Dumas relative to the investigation of the cause of crime. "Cherchez la dynastie!" one must exclaim to all those who are seeking the true causes of wars.

The whole world instinctively feels that there is an intimate correlation between dynasty and war, but

¹ [Constable & Co., Ltd., London; E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, p. 123.]

² The notion "war" is in this book intended to mean a bloody conflict between whole nations. This notion of war naturally, therefore, presupposes the existence and the full employment of the general obligations for national defence. Civil and colonial wars do not come within the compass of our argument.

hitherto this instinctive feeling in mankind has never found clear and practical expression. And for simple and readily intelligible reasons. For since dynasties are at once both lawgivers and judges in their own cause, and dispose, moreover, of powerful armies, all pacific, scientific, and philosophical investigations on this topic are only permitted so long as they do not run counter to the interests of the dynasties. But as the investigation of political truth is altogether against the interests of dynasties, this may well be the reason why the otherwise so versatile German scholars and politicians have until now avoided an unprejudiced approach to this problem. Particularly lamentable is, in this connection, the fact that most German "scientific" pacifists in many, far too many, books have spoken about the causes of wars, without uttering a single word about dynasties. We shall recur later to this peculiarity.

First, what is a dynasty?

The word comes from the Greek and means power-wielder, ruler. In the Greek political system, those were called dynasts who had by an act of violence gained possession of the government. In modern speech, we understand by dynasties ruling families, who preside over the destinies of a country, whose sovereign right is vouched for by the gods of the Christian, heathen, or Mahomedan faith, as being hereditary and absolute; and, thus, can neither be impugned by human powers, nor in any way compared with other human institutions.

The dynasties arose and are based upon the national necessity of defence and leadership. Everywhere in history they crop up, first as protectors, liberators,

or fortunate conquerors, then as the anointed of the Lord, and, finally, as tyrants and oppressors. The history of every dynasty begins with popular enthusiasm and ends with popular revolt. It is the history that the Brothers Grimm have so dramatically described in the legend of Frau Ilsebill: the everlasting story of growing arrogance which ends in a catastrophe.

Among primitive peoples, who have no legal or political organisation, and who love personal liberty beyond all else, their leaders were mostly chosen only for the period of the war, and afterwards again lost their power. But when the primitive peoples came to settle down, and began to exhibit political and national cohesion, then their leaders, who had been victorious in war, retained their position in time of peace. They exercised, mostly in conjunction with the medicine man and the elders of the tribe, authority over their companions; and their ruling rights gradually usurped all spheres. When such leaders were not merely strong and successful as warriors, but also shrewd as lawgivers, and gifted with organising faculties and generally ambitious, they gradually ousted the medicine man, made themselves sorcerers and priests, proclaimed themselves prophets of God, and exercised a despotic power, which was the more unlimited the more arrogantly they asserted themselves, the more absolutely they obtained the sympathies of the leading men of the tribe, and the more superstitious the race became. So Moses was not only the chief war lord of the Jews, but was at the same time a lawgiver who had intercourse with God Himself.

Their descent from and intercourse with the Divinity are the essential characteristics of every dynasty. Gods and kings are colleagues. The kings stand either, as was formerly the case among the Chinese, in direct kinship with the Divinity and call themselves sons of Heaven, or they style themselves, as is the case to-day in Germany, "by the grace of God" and exercise their functions as the chosen instruments of Heaven (speech of William II., August 25th, 1910). As is their descent, so also are their powers of a divine nature. Among the Incas, they caused the sun to rise; in the case of the Egyptians and Persians, they held sway over all the good and evil spirits of heaven and earth; among the Chinese, they controlled even the degree of bliss after death, and, among us Germans, the Lord of Hosts is the annihilator of our enemies (speech of William II., June 5th, 1916, at Bremerhaven).

Somewhat unscientifically, but with psychological subtlety, Anatole France describes in his "Penguin Island" the origin of kingship and the nation of sovereignty. An intelligent man disguised himself as a dragon, and, as such, terrified the inhabitants of the surrounding villages, stole their cattle at night, and exercised an uncanny reign of terror over the district. But as his dark, illegal existence began after a while to displease him, he hit upon the brilliant idea of regularising it. Accordingly he made his accomplices among the people ventilate the idea that the dragon was a bewitched god which could only be destroyed, that is, set free, by a virgin. He then arranged a theatrical display with the said virgin, who thereupon slays this dragon in the open and finally

frees the country from the beast. The dragon hereupon adopted human form and declared itself a higher Being. In consequence, that which he formerly stole was henceforth brought him as tribute by the grateful inhabitants of the liberated district. Thus he became king, surrounded his majesty, which had been hallowed by a virgin, with the indispensable safeguards, provided for his children by making his dignity hereditary, and ruled, beloved of all, until his blissful end.

If we leave antiquity aside and confine ourselves to the Christian era, we can also set up for dynasties a "theory of declension," similar to that taught by Marx in the realm of economics. When the victory of Christendom and the migration of nations had shattered heathen civilisation into fragments, there ensued a long period of lawlessness and arbitrary rule in Europe. Every rich, strong and adventurous chieftain, patrician, prince of his Church, landowner or bandit leader, possessed the possibility of being able by force, cunning, marriage, or inheritance, to obtain for himself by violence the absolute lordship over a territory and its inhabitants; that is, to found a dynasty. The early centuries of the Christian era were dominated by the struggles of these numerous dynasties for the hegemony. Of course, in these struggles, the small man had to give way to the big, and many a proud emissary of God had to atone for his dream of power in the dungeons of a stronger emissary of God. Well into the eleventh century the royal dignity in Europe was, in consequence of the numerous competitors, who were to be found in every feudal castle, neither surrounded by special

protective laws, nor yet hereditary. The king was elected; and, in many instances, this election required not merely the consent of the princes, the nobility, and the clergy, but of the people also.

The first country in which the royal title became hereditary and absolute, and in which accordingly the lesser princes gradually declined in favour of the greater, was France. The Merovingians, by dint of fierce struggles against the small dynasties and the nobility, laid so securely the foundations of the kingship, that their heirs, the Capets, became the first, in every sense the all-powerful, dynasty in Europe. Their originally beneficent activity (the unification of the nation, the laying of the first foundations of a system of organised administration, etc.) soon developed into disaster for the country and found, in the French Revolution, its inglorious end. In the rest of Europe, as, for instance, in Italy and Germany, the division of the dynastic power remained. A thousand and one dynasties vied with each other for the pre-eminence. The endeavours of the Hapsburgs and the Hohenstaufens to found a world power suffered shipwreck on the rocks of resistance of the Papal and the minor German dynasties, as did the struggles for world dominion of the Papacy and the struggles for independent sovereignty of the minor dynasties on the resistance of the German Empire. But, after the Reformation, and particularly after the introduction of the universal German "Peace," we perceive both in Germany and Italy the gradual declension of the minor dynasties.

In France, it is true, for the first time in modern history, the divinity and infallibility of dynasties be-

came jeopardised by a revolt of the national conscience, but this revolution only prepared the way for the new dynastic star of first magnitude, which, with Napoleon's advent, arose in the European sky. Accordingly, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, five powerful dynasties altogether held sway over the European Continent and its inhabitants: Bonaparte in France, Italy, etc., the Hohenzollerns in Prussia, the Hapsburgs in Austria-Hungary, the Romanoffs in Russia, and the Osmanlis in Turkey. The Hohenzollerns had, since the battle of Fehrbellin (1675) shown themselves powerful, adventurous conquerors. They clearly understood how continually to add to their possessions, to equip them with a new culture and rule them with economy. Since 1701 they had become kings by the grace of God, although the then holder of all divine authority, the Pope, had withheld from them his blessing. With Frederick II. the Hohenzollern dynasty had become a respected power in Germany and even in Europe. As early as 1813 the decline of the other German dynasties had proceeded so far that the German races vehemently clamoured for a centralisation of the supreme power under the leadership of the Hohenzollerns. The dynasty of the Hapsburgs opposed this German national desire, which, as we know, was only prepared and realised by the defeat of the House of Hapsburg in 1866, and in 1870-71 by the crushing of the Bonapartes.

To-day there are still three powerful dynasties in Europe which, despite all the revolutions, inventions, and progress of the last century, still wield nearly all the divine privileges and powers of the absolute dy-

nasties of antiquity. These are, first, the Hohenzollerns, who, in consequence of their brilliant victories and their first-class army, are, no doubt, at present the most powerful dynasty in Europe; next, the Hapsburgs, who, by reason of their defeats of 1866 and their attitude in this World War, are still more or less dependent upon the Hohenzollerns; and thirdly, the Romanoffs, at once Emperors and Popes, the wealthiest persons and the greatest landowners in the world. As a fourth, one might mention the Osmanlis. But their sovereignty has been so much diminished in the last century that they can be regarded as a dynasty and Great Power of the second class only.

In order to obviate any misapprehension, I must emphasise here that wherever in this work "dynasties" are spoken of, only these three, or at most four, are intended: the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs, the Romanoffs, and the Osmanlis. The remaining European dynasties, as, for instance, that of Brunswick-Lüneburg-Hanover, which rules over England, or that of Savoy, which holds sway over Italy, we exclude, in this book, from the denotation "dynasty," because, in one form or another, they stand under the control of popular parliaments—that is, they are no longer equipped with the same divine and absolute attributes as their four above-mentioned colleagues. Seeing that the dynasties ruling over England, Italy, Spain, Sweden, etc., no longer possess the divine right of deciding upon war and peace, it follows that the word "dynasty" can only here be applied to those Great Power Governments that stand under no popular control and have only to be responsible to Almighty God for their actions.

Again, I should wish here to emphasise expressly that, in this book, the word "dynasty" is not confined to single individuals and direct relations of the ruling houses. It is rather applicable to all those who, in conjunction with these "God-appointed" rulers, ordain the destinies of a people. Thus, wherever I employ the word "dynasty," an "oligarchy" or a "camarilla" can be equally substituted. As I have never lived at the Court of an absolute ruler, and cannot, therefore, know whether this or the other governmental act was ordained by an oligarchy (that is to say, to suit a privileged class) or by a camarilla (that is to say, by influential favourites in the neighbourhood of the throne), the expression "dynasty" appears to me to fit best the purpose of this investigation in every case.

For the persons of the rulers are, of course, of divine origin and fulfil the wishes of Providence upon earth, yet, all the same, they are not omnipotent and omnipresent as is the Deity.

For instance, such a rare consummation of dynastic universality as William II. could not be content merely to rule. William II. is, to be sure, at once Imperial Chancellor and Chief of the General Staff, Bishop of the State Church and clergyman in office, a final authority in all matters of science and art, an expert in industry, trade, agriculture, education, sport, architecture, etc., etc.; he is present at every laying of a foundation stone, christening of a ship, dedication of a church, statue, or barrack; musical festivals, exhibitions, automobile and horse races are for him not merely recreations, but also opportunities for the delivery of speeches displaying his expert knowledge of

the subject in question; he is constantly arousing the unbounded admiration of his associates, because, just where he might naturally have been expected to appear merely as a layman, he reveals himself an expert authority and critic; yet, none the less, in a huge country like Germany, he cannot overlook and arrange everything exactly in accordance with his views. Like all his colleagues by the grace of God, he therefore requires ministers, officials, advisers, courtiers, to whom he, wholly or partially, transfers his authority, and who administer the country in his name.

In this way, around the sun of dynastic power, circles an aristocratic satellite class of wielders of arbitrary power, who, either in conjunction with the sovereign lord, or by intrigues and the pursuit of personal interests contrary to the will of the ruler, govern land and people according to their own fancy. "The patricians formed a class of a higher order; they were descended from the gods, and were alone capable of performing the religious ceremonies and observing the omens correctly, and, hence, were ordained by the grace of God to rule the masses."¹ So it was in ancient Rome, according to Prof. Delbrück's description, and so it is still to-day in modern Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia; save and except that we do not in the modern Germany of these days speak any longer of patricians, but of Junkers.

It certainly frequently happened (as lately in Serbia) that a dynasty, in this way, quietly reared up

¹ Prof. Hans Delbrück: "Regierung und Volkswille" (Berlin, 1913, p. 96). This description by Delbrück contains the precise definition of what I, in this book, mean by "dynasty." The reader should not overlook that.

another side by side with itself, which, as soon as it felt itself strong enough, in its turn asserted its divine rights, ousted the first, and put itself in its place. The normal course of development was, however, as a rule, this: that the rulers had, in the stress of affairs, to abandon something of their power. Thus arose the very varied forms of ancient and modern political systems; from the despotism of Asiatic States, in which the person of the sovereign is so hallowed that no mortal eye may gaze upon it, and where his representatives are the sole rulers in the land, down to the feudal monarchy, which has a parliamentary constitution and ministers appointed by the Crown.

When the dynasties were not always happy in their warlike adventures and consequently lost in prestige, or when they, despite their divinity, showed themselves too human, *i.e.*, too egoistical, a conflict arose between dynasty and people (the latter, according to the characteristics of land and people, now imploring, then demanding, and finally in open revolt), and became a *Mene Tekel* for the dynasties. After the Greeks, who, in many matters, attained a degree of perfection unknown to us of these days, had given to the world the first examples of pure popular government, we nowhere find the idea of popular government entirely disappear. It existed in both Athens and Rome in the beginnings of Christendom and during the peasant and religious wars of the Middle Ages, till finally at the French Revolution it animated a whole nation and, with spontaneous force, substituted the modern State principle of a sovereign nation, that is, the government of the people by the people, for dynastic divinity and absolutism. Almost all Euro-

pean dynasties at those times rushed to arms against this attack on their divine privileges,¹ but they were only so far successful in that their attacks upon the new secular-republican State ideal aided the birth of the new dynasty of the Bonapartes, the activity of which filled the beginning and the middle of last century with wars, victories and defeats, and, finally, resulted in the European dynasties (with the exception of Russia) being compelled to accept the principle of participation in government by the people.

So after a thousand birth pangs, and against the will of the gods, the modern legal State arose upon earth, one possessing a constitution and conceding to the people, in one or other form, an influence upon the Government. But only in France, and earlier still in England, was this victory of the democratic idea a veritable one. In other countries, the dynasties overcame the revolutionary reaction, only ostensibly accommodated themselves to the new demands of a new epoch, and remained what they had hitherto been, divine, absolute and hereditary. To-day, as we have said, we have in Europe three or four dynasties, whose absolute powers, compared with the pre-revo-

¹ The well-known German historian, Heinrich von Sybel, certainly considers that the wars of the French Revolution were no crusades on the part of the dynasties against the modern idea of popular sovereignty, but, on the contrary, propaganda and conquest-wars of the then all-powerful Girondist party. But Herr von Sybel is like most other German historians in that, in consequence of having been appointed an acting Prussian Privy Councillor, he knew how to make out a case for the dynasties. That he and his official colleagues were not permitted to give any other account we can but regret, but cannot help.

lutionary period, have changed at most in form, but not in actuality.

* * * * *

That the Hohenzollern dynasty is to be classed among these will be indignantly denied by most of my countrymen. If you dare tell an average German that the Hohenzollern dynasty to-day rules Germany almost as absolutely as, for example, Louis XIV. in his day did France, then if he is polite he will calmly smile in a condescending way and, from the height of his political satisfaction, give you to understand that you would do better not to discuss matters of which you are so utterly ignorant. First, for example, in our case, the King is not absolute, but constitutional—that means that his arbitrariness is held in check by Parliament, House of Lords, Federal Council and Imperial Diet. Secondly, in the opinion of our average German, pure parliamentary government, such as France, England, Italy, etc., possess, is a “matter long since settled,” since it only leads to corruption and faction; it is just because Germany does not possess this sort of parliamentarism that it has been enabled to develop itself into the most progressive of all civilised countries. And, finally, that sort of system does not fit in everywhere; that which all civilised nations regard as the basis of their political systems does not suit the peculiarity of German civilisation.

In this fashion, our average German will prove to you, with a thousand good reasons, that our country has the most ideal of Constitutions, the most united policy, the grandest ideal of civilisation, and many

other things, which other nations so much begrudge us that we must declare war upon them.

But if, in an attack of pardonable malice, you go further and tell your average German that Germany, constitutionally regarded, is no nation at all, but is only a dynasty, which accordingly means that the German Fatherland does not belong to the German people, then, if he has been hitherto polite, he will begin to be rude and wrathful. Have not we Germans the finest freedom of the press, of speech, meeting, coalition and religion in the whole wide world? Where is there another State in existence that has democratised education in a way such as we have? Where is there a better organised national army, where a more efficient school system or a more equitable system of taxation to be found? Have we not, in the realm of science, commerce, social legislation, public sanitation, and many other things, become the pioneers of the world? What have all these German achievements to do with the form of the German government? Nothing whatsoever; they exist and develop in the sight of all in complete independence of the dynastic government. At length, this defensive speech of our average German will become so eloquent that he himself, without intending it, will stand before you as a living proof of the fact that modern Germany actually finds its embodiment in a dynasty. As often as I have discussed this same theme with my countrymen I have excited their contradiction and wrath. You can talk calmly with a Russian, a Turk, or an Asiatic about his dynasty, but hardly ever with a German. If he is not altogether speechless with amazement that one can talk about a dynasty, as

about other things, then he generally becomes frightened.

This trait goes through the whole German people. Those constitutional questions which for a hundred years past have occupied all other European civilised nations and convulsed them to their depths have never been really popular in Germany. Our constitutional struggles were, in point of fact, always decided before they properly began, and the special privileges of God-appointed dynasties have never been seriously questioned. From Privy Councillor down to artisan, from Countess to chambermaid, everyone in Germany either knows nothing of the existence of a dynastic problem, or is silent on the subject. There are certainly hundreds of thousands of Germans who would gladly welcome drastic reforms; and there are millions of socialistically inclined German labourers who instinctively feel the dynasty to be hostile to them; yet they only reluctantly discuss it, because they fear the *lèse majesté* paragraphs. But there are in Germany hardly a hundred, all told, who see the dynasty as it really is. And among those hundred there are scarcely a dozen serious democrats who have fully realised the dynastic side of this World War. Even those who only yesterday were declaring themselves opponents of the dynasty, for instance, the German Social Democrats, hurried in the hour of danger to ask pardon and to prove to the world that their former anti-dynastic attitude was only "put on."

Let us, next, in order to form a picture of the comprehensive authoritative powers of the German dynasty, make a brief survey of the German Constitution.

The law concerning the Constitution of the German Empire bears date April 16th, 1871. According to it the German Empire forms an "eternal league." The wielders of the Imperial power are the federated princes and their instrument, the Federal Council. The Federal Council is composed of the plenipotentiaries of the twenty-two German princes and of the Senates of the three Hanseatic cities. It is, in short, a sort of collective Sovereign. Its powers are, however, more of a theoretical than practical nature. The German Emperor, as President of the Council, is, in regard to it, entirely independent. He remains Emperor by heredity. And, as against the German federated princes, the Federal Council, and the German people, he is free from every legal responsibility. The chief Imperial powers, above all the military, were not delegated to him; he possesses them directly by virtue of the Constitution. The Federal Council is nothing but a deliberative body; the execution of its resolutions is the affair of the German Emperor.

Prussia, whose King bears the title of "German Emperor," is president of the "eternal league." By Article 6 of the Imperial Constitution, Prussia disposes in the Federal Council, out of 58 votes (the three Alsace-Lorraine votes have only an "advisory co-operation"), of 17. To what degree Prussia dominates the Federal Council appears from Article 78 of the Imperial Constitution: "Changes in the Constitution must be made by way of legislation. They are regarded as rejected when, in the Federal Council, 14 votes are given against them." Seeing that Prussia, as was said, disposes of 17 votes in this assembly, it follows that no constitutional change can

take place without her consent. And as, on the other hand, any important reform in political life is unthinkable without a constitutional change, we can at once realise how resolutely the president of the league has brought all the threads of the political life of the nation into his hands. This Article No. 78 is, moreover, the clearest demonstration of our above-mentioned theory of the decline of the small dynasties to the advantage of the great, for it is an act of abdication of the minor German princes into the hands of the Prussian King and German Emperor.

Altogether, the legal status of the German Imperial Monarchy is fixed neither by the Federal Council and Imperial Diet nor by the Imperial laws, but solely by the Prussian land laws. Constitutionally, then, the German Imperial Monarchy can by no manner of means be viewed as a fundamental German institution, but merely as an appendage to and extension of the Prussian kingship and Prussian political power. For instance, it is a remarkable fact that the costs of the Imperial dignity are defrayed by the King of Prussia. The Emperor has no claim upon the Imperial Exchequer for the grant of his Civil List; the Imperial budget only annually places a certain amount of funds at the Emperor's disposal.

By Article 11, the German Emperor represents the Empire internationally; he has the right to declare war and conclude peace, to enter into alliances and treaties, to accredit and appoint envoys. As far, then, as foreign intercourse is concerned, the German Empire is a purely monarchical-absolutist State. This Article 11, which consigns the conduct of the German foreign policy to the sovereign decision of the German

Emperor, is the key to the history of Germany of the past forty years. It is, moreover, the key to the World War. Whoever, as champion of this war, discusses the origin of the present catastrophe without this Article 11 is as cowardly as a surgeon who shrinks from what would be a successful operation only because he does not wish to incommode the patient. The fact that, among a thousand German writers who speak on the subject of the war, scarcely one mentions Article 11 of the German Imperial Constitution, is only a proof that our "great time" has, indeed, found but a puny race.

An absolutist complement of Article 11 is Article 68 of the German Imperial Constitution: "The Emperor can, when public security within the federal territory is threatened, declare any portion of it in a state of war." The pronouncement and putting into effect of such a state of war is provided for by the Prussian law of June 4th, 1851. This Article concedes to the German Emperor the absolute right, at any moment when it appears to him to be necessary, to extinguish the civil authorities, the liberty of the Press, speech, meeting, union, and even travel, and entrust the military authorities with the protection of the whole political life of the nation. In other words, Article 68 confers upon the German Emperor the sovereign right to invalidate all the other articles of the German Imperial Constitution for any time he pleases. Article 68 expresses the constitutional possibility of ruling the German State without a Constitution. This state of siege or state of war (called poetically "*Burgfrieden*") has prevailed in Germany since July 31st, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor did, it is true, at the

beginning of the war, give a formal assurance that the state of siege would not extend beyond the period of mobilisation, but no one can compel him to adhere to this promise; for here, as already said, everything is subservient to the sovereign pleasure of the German Emperor. It is evident in what close correlation Article 68 stands to Article 11. And, therefore, this ordinance of the German Imperial Constitution stands in direct connection with the outbreak of the World War.

Article 18 (Imperial departments and officials) makes the German Emperor head of the whole Imperial administration. He appoints the Imperial officials, has them sworn in, and, in case of need, ordains their dismissal.

Article 19 nominates the Emperor executor against members of the league who do not fulfil their constitutional federal obligations. "The execution **can** be extended to the sequestration of the land in question and its sovereign power." The German Emperor is thus absolute master in the house of each of his minor German colleagues.

The legislative bodies of the Empire are the Federal Council and the Imperial Diet (Reichstag). The Federal Council is, as we have seen, not a Parliament, but the theoretical expression of the sovereignty of the federated German princes; its deliberations are secret and are not under any public control. Laws formulated by the Reichstag are either accepted or rejected by the "Bundesrat" (Federal Council). The German Emperor himself possesses no right of sanction or veto; this means, therefore, that he can, in theory, be forced to rule by laws which appear to him

to be intolerable. But as the Bundesrat is in point of fact scarcely anything more than a gathering of nominees of the German Emperor, who would never venture to be of a different opinion from their President and executor, such a case could not arise. Articles 19 and 78 suffice in every case for the suppression of any possible tendency to opposition.

The Imperial Chancellor, appointed by the Emperor, and at once the representative of the Emperor in the Bundesrat and the embodiment of Imperial authority in the country, presides at the sittings of the Bundesrat. Both in his selection and dismissal the Emperor has an entirely free hand. Again, the Imperial Chancellor is only a servant of the Emperor. The Imperial Chancellor is, accordingly, a stranger to the German people, inasmuch as he stands in no direct constitutional relation to them whatever. He is appointed, not elected. That the ordinances and other contracts of the German Emperor require the counter-signature of the Chancellor has a purely formal value, for the Imperial Chancellor is only the executor of Imperial orders and wishes. If the Imperial Chancellor were elected by the Parliament and stood before the Emperor as representative of the popular will, then he could, if necessity demanded, oppose the Imperial will; for he would feel himself responsible to the people and its deputies and would have to base his policy upon a parliamentary majority. But, as it is, the position of the Imperial Chancellor and his counter-signature are only a secularisation of the divinity of the dynasty. As the person of the Emperor is God-appointed and above controversy, while, on the other hand, exercising a decisive influ-

ence in politics, it requires a secular representative. So the German Imperial Chancellor is, for the country, only the symbol of the Emperor; when German politicians and newspapers erroneously treat him as the responsible leader of German affairs of State, they do so only out of respect for the person of the real director of German destinies. Whoever criticises the Chancellor actually criticises the Emperor.

Responsible Imperial Ministers are unknown to the German Constitution. The Imperial Chancellor is not the German but the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The various administrative departments of the Empire have, as their chiefs, Secretaries of State who act merely as representatives of the Imperial Chancellor.

In these circumstances, naturally, the Imperial German Constitution does not contain any law establishing the responsibility of Ministers or Secretaries of State. The opinion of the Reichstag does not influence the Imperial Chancellor and his secretaries, the opinion of the Emperor is everything. As against the Imperial Chancellor and his secretaries, the Reichstag finds itself in the position of a man who every moment expects to be warned by his landlord that he is really living in a hired house. The Reichstag clearly possesses, under these circumstances, no right to censure the instruments of the Government. In practice, the German Empire has but *one* responsible Minister. Yet his responsibility is, as regards the people, purely theoretical; as a fact, he is only responsible to the Emperor; that means that he is, in fact, as irresponsible as the monarch himself, only that, in consequence of his earthly parentage, he condescends to

discuss the politics of his lord with the popular representatives. The responsible post in the German Empire is, therefore, not, as in other civilised States, occupied by a responsible statesman, but by a nominated official.

Up to Article 19 the German Imperial Constitution was, in fact, merely a summary of the absolute powers of the German Emperor. One could, in fact, cancel the first nineteen articles of the German Imperial Constitution and replace them by a single sentence: "The German Emperor is the God-appointed absolute lord of Germany," and the practical result would be the same.

With Article 20 begins a limitation of the Imperial absolutism by the Reichstag. This Reichstag, founded in 1867 by Bismarck primarily for the North German Confederation, became, after the foundation of the German Empire, the corporate representation of the German people. As it is elected by universal, direct suffrage, with secret ballot, it is such a democratic institution that Bismarck at the end of his life heartily lamented his great liberality and seriously contemplated "retrieving" the greatest mistake in his life, the creation of universal equal suffrage,¹ that is to say, again suppressing the Reichstag.

All our statesmen have lived in perpetual apprehension that they have been too liberal; they have almost always robbed us again of what they had given us a moment before. Scarcely had Bismarck by creating the Reichstag perpetrated the most liberal act that we in Prussia have experienced since Baron vom Stein, when he with his Socialist law committed

¹ *Vide*, Delbrück, "Regierung und Volkswille," pp. 61-65.

the greatest conceivable violation of the new German civil rights, which he had himself initiated, and scarcely had this Socialist law been repealed, when our Government brought in a so-called revolutionary bill, which was a repetition of the Socialist law, and from which we escaped only by a miracle.

From the very outset, the Reichstag had no sovereign but solely a constantly menaced and circumscribed existence. In other words, it never was regarded by our Government as a constitutional governmental necessity, to check and modify the absolute *régime*, but as a support and popularising resource of the Government. "The soldier and the army, and not parliamentary majorities and resolutions, have welded together the German Empire. My trust I place in my army," said William II. on April 18th, 1891, in Berlin; and on October 18th, 1894, he repeated: "The only pillar upon which our Empire rests was its army. And this is true to-day." German political authorities are, of course, of like opinion. "In Germany," says Professor Delbrück in a transport of pride in the respect of the Germans for their dynasty, "popular representation arose, because the Government summoned it and placed it side by side with itself." And Professor Lamprecht adds¹: "The intention was to win by this means the support of the multitude of enthusiasts for German unity, on behalf of a Prussianised central administration." For Bismarck, the democratic franchise of the Reichstag was no modern principle of government, but merely a sort of convenient referendum towards the foundation of the German Empire; vulgarly expressed: the democratic

¹ Karl Lamprecht, "Deutsche Geschichte," Vol. II., p. 215.

honey with which the democratic Southern German States were caught for the German idea of unity under Prussian hegemony. As soon as the franchise had played its part, it was, as being an unwelcome limitation of the dynastic power, again slowly rendered innocuous (Socialist law, educational law, prolongation of the electoral period, the so-called septennate, non-distribution of electoral divisions, attempts at restricting liberty of speech, repeated dissolutions, threats of abolition, etc., etc.). Bismarck was a master in such matters. His Electoral Law of May 31st, 1869, and the electoral regulation of 1871, announce that every German is an elector from his twenty-fifth year onwards, and that, on the average, one deputy should fall to every 100,000 inhabitants. And, in fact, the German Empire was then divided into electoral constituencies including 100,000 souls in each; this yielded the number of 382 deputies, which (after the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine) was increased to 397. Now Article 20 of the Imperial Constitution states: "Until the legal regulation, which is reserved in par. 5 of the Electoral Law of May 31st, 1869," but there is a modest addition, in a note to Article 20: "The legal regulation has not yet been effected." That means that the German Empire of to-day, containing, as it does, 66 million inhabitants, instead of having 660 deputies, counts but 397, as in the year 1871, when it had barely 40 million. That means, again, that the 100,000 souls have, in many cases, in consequence of the growth of cities and industrial centres, become 500,000 (Berlin, for instance, elects, with a population of over two millions, only six deputies), whilst, in other cases, in consequence of emigration,

and similar phenomena, the 100,000 have been reduced to 50,000 and less, and yet return their deputy. Whence results the remarkable fact that the less intelligent country districts have, compared with the enlightened metropolis, been ludicrously favoured.

Since, then, the vote of one Lower Pomeranian or Upper Bavarian peasant is equivalent to the votes of ten progressively minded Germans of the urban population, we cannot be surprised that our Government, by the aid of this unconstitutional distribution of electoral districts, can always count upon a Conservative and Clerical majority in the Reichstag. Without this happy majority, the Reichstag would, probably, have long ceased to exist, for it is, as already stated, by its very nature not a sovereign but only a subordinate factor of government. If, at any time, the Government loses its majority in the Reichstag, it either dissolves the latter (the Emperor only requires for this purpose the assent of the Bundesrat, of which he is assured beforehand), or simply ignores it. Professor Delbrück would have us believe that Prince von Bülow had, in 1908, to retire from the Government because he could not obtain a majority for his "Inheritance tax,"¹ but we are aware that he was not obliged to go, but himself wished to go. On December 4th, 1913, the Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg received, as a result of the Zabern debate, with its 293 against 54 votes, the plainest possible intimation to preside no longer over the destinies of the German nation. Even in States like Serbia and Bulgaria (even, perchance, in modern China) a Minister so sharply reprimanded by the popular representative

¹ Delbrück, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 60.

body would have to retire. In Germany, nothing of the sort. This Imperial Chancellor, who manifestly did not rule in accordance with, but contrary to, German public opinion, was the same who, eight months subsequently, declared war, in the name of the German Empire, upon Russia, Belgium, and France.

Of all rights possessed by the Reichstag, the voting of the Budget and the taxes is, beyond doubt, the most important. In so far as the Reichstag, by Article 69 of the Constitution, controls the expenses of the Government and either grants or rejects its proposals, it locks the door against any unlimited financial arbitrariness on the part of the absolute *régime*; this beautiful theory of fiscal control is, however, most unfortunately disregarded in practice owing to a loophole. There is, to begin with, Article 62, which separates the military budget from other imperial finances, and thus practically withdraws it from any parliamentary control. Then there is further the practice of introducing the Budget and discussing it in the Reichstag itself, which by Budget law (particularly in military votes) properly only possesses a right of voting the supply.¹ The problem of State financial control by popular parliaments certainly requires (mainly in consequence of the arma-

¹ Thus, for instance, the military expedition to China (1900), the cost of which amounted to £7,500,000, was resolved upon and carried out entirely without consulting or obtaining the approval of the Reichstag. After everything had been arranged, the Reichstag was calmly invited to give its subsequent sanction to the steps taken. When it wished to complain of this violation of the Constitution, the "responsible" Chancellor, von Hohenlohe, was suddenly dismissed, and his place taken by Herr von Bülow, who, of course, knew nothing about the matter.

ments policy) considerable readjustment in all States, but in Germany more than elsewhere; for the reason that the Reichstag does not, in principle, possess any sovereignty.

The Reichstag has, again, the right to initiate laws and to present petitions to the Bundesrat, *i.e.*, the Chancellor. But, as the German Government, in virtue of its inaccessibility and infallibility, unfortunately makes a rule of not participating in the discussions of proposals emanating from the Reichstag, here the theory is again more satisfactory than the practice. Likewise, petitions submitted by the Reichstag are, for the most part, ignored by the Government. It was not until the World War was fully launched that it began, here and there, to make some modification in these feudal customs.

According to the Imperial Constitution, the Reichstag has no right of interpellation. It is true that it arrogated to itself this right and that the Government tacitly conceded it. But, in accordance with the perfectly correct theory, that without responsibility of ministers even the right of interpellation is superfluous, the responsible-irresponsible men reply to the questions of the deputies (that is, if they ever trouble to reply) only as persons who need not do so.

From this it is clear, in the first place, that universal suffrage in Prusso-Germany is not a fact, but merely a pious fraud. The Reichstag is nothing more than a debating society, and a wilfully bungled imitation of other Parliaments; semblance and not reality. Continually muzzled and bullied by the dynasty, it could never develop into a real Parliament. Prince von Bülow tells us, it is true, that "Political life in

a modern monarchy, as created by our Constitution, entails co-operation between the Crown and the people,"¹ but we are no longer impressed by these flowers of speech. What do we want with a "co-operation," in which the representatives of the people are not treated like equally privileged collaborators, but are forced to play the *rôle* of inferiors? What use to us is a right to co-operate in the framing of laws, when we have no right to watch over their execution, to expose their deficiencies and to protest against their infringement?

Prince von Bülow further instructs us that it is not so much a matter of constitutional reform, but rather that we "are so lacking in political judgment and political training." That is to say, Herr von Bülow assures us once again (more politely, be it said, than Hegel and Bismarck in their day but none the less plainly) that we are still too ignorant for the exercise of new political rights. Even Prince von Bülow does not forsake the good old Prussian style. He, also, treats us as a man whose money one first steals and then comforts him by saying that he did not know how to take care of it, and whom, at last, when nothing further is to be done, he roundly abuses, saying that money, after all, has not the value that the silly world attaches to it. Herr von Bülow honestly assures us: "It is an old mistake to want to gauge the concern of the nation in political affairs solely by the rights granted to the representatives of the people."¹ You tell us nothing fresh, Serene Highness! pray, obey, pay taxes, or : God, King and Father-

¹ Prince von Bülow, "Imperial Germany," Cassell & Co., Ltd., London, p. 313.

land. That is, in the view of an old German democrat, better suited to us Germans than political rights of which we know nothing. But what galls is not so much the assertion that, blockheads as we are, we do not understand the value of money, but the democratic lie with which our dynasty describes its money wealth as a "co-operation of Crown and people." Believe me, your Serene Highness! this hypocrisy is worse than the very absolutism it conceals.

For, in truth, Bismarck never dreamt of a serious "co-operation between Crown and people." For him, the sole point was to leave the God-appointed dynasty its old rights, and at the same time give the new German Empire the semblance of a modern political system. Germany could not and would not enter the councils of the European nations without a concession to the modern ideas of the nineteenth century. But, although the buildings of the Reichstag may look more splendid and imposing than the edifice of the "Chambre des Députés" on the banks of the Seine, yet there resides therein not the will of the people, but the will of the dynasty. The German Government needs the Reichstag as an advertisement and emblem of its modernity. For the purpose of ruling, it has as little need of it as a tradesman has of the opinion of his employés as to the working of his business.

Moreover, there exists between Government and Reichstag in Germany not merely a constitutional but also a strictly patriarchal order of precedence. Only the nobility, endowed with divine insight, is entitled, in Prusso-Germany, to fill the most important offices and to solve the most difficult political problems. Consequently all leading governmental administrative and

military posts are filled by members of the nobility.¹ If an exception is occasionally made, the civilian advanced to be Minister or General is, as a rule, at once "raised" to the rank of nobility. A German deputy can, under such circumstances, hardly ever become Minister; and, on the other hand, a former Minister, after his dismissal, can scarcely ever become again a deputy; he would thereby desecrate the rank already conferred upon him, and render himself unfit for Court and governmental circles. Since, consequently, not one German deputy has ever actually taken part in Government business, it follows that expert critics of the Government are altogether lacking in the Reichstag. In other Parliaments there are at least a dozen members who have previously been Ministers and are, hence, in a position to exercise a sound criticism upon their successors. In the Reichstag, such a case is unthinkable; thus the deputies know only the theory but not the practice of governing; the story of the man who does not understand the value of money is, it is plain, likewise the story of our popular representatives.²

This is in keeping with the conception that our Reichstag deputies have (and must have) of the dignity of popular representation. A French or English and a German deputy are about as far apart as the proprietor of a business house from his employés.

¹ Cf. here, footnote p. 46.

² While I write this, news arrives from Russia that there a Vice-President of the Imperial Duma (Protopopoff) has been appointed Minister of the Interior. A similar case has not occurred in the forty-four years' life of the German Reichstag. If it be remembered that Russia has only possessed a Constitution since 1905, one may conclude that it has developed its parliamentary *régime* more quickly than Prusso-Germany.

Where the one acts independently, the other scarcely dare intrude a modest objection; where the one is animated by the feeling that he is looking after the interests of the people, the other is only oppressed by his helplessness, and is forced to bargaining and so-called "horse-dealing," in order to obtain the smallest concessions from the Government. A classical example is the passing of the first great naval Bill, which Caprivi received at the hands of (!) the Poles; by making liberal promises in the matter of Germany's brutal policy towards the Poles he won their support for a cause which was utterly repugnant to them.

The feeling that they only distantly control the German Government, instead of leading it, deprives our deputies of that proud feeling of responsibility which national representatives in other lands display. It can only happen in Germany that the President of the Reichstag should say in a public sitting: "The Emperor understood his time; he said: 'I live in the days of publicity and free speech, and I will not be a so-called constitutional monarch, who reigns and does not rule.' I am convinced that it would not be agreeable to our glorious Emperor if he were asked to accept such a *rôle*. . . . Gentlemen, this ought to fill us with admiration, and we ought to thank Providence that we have in these times such an Emperor; this should stimulate us, to the best of our ability, and, so far as our conviction allows it, to anticipate and further the great intentions of our Emperor."¹

¹ Speech of the President of the Reichstag, Count von Ballestrem, January 27th, 1900.

Such Byzantine utterances cannot be publicly impugned. As soon as a deputy makes a sign of criticising the person of the Emperor, he is at once called to order. When the deputy Lieb knecht (senior) remained seated when cheers were called for the Emperor, a motion was made by the Government to prosecute him for *lèse majesté*; the motion was rejected, though by a bare majority.

How matters generally stand with the liberty of speech and competence of the Reichstag is to be seen from a book, "Unser Kaiser und Sein Volk," which was published in Germany and caused a considerable sensation.¹ A passage in it runs: "The President of the German Reichstag, 'gasping' in humility and obedience at the foot of the throne, has found it to be advisable, in order to shield the very assailable utterances of the Emperor from the criticism of Parliament, only to permit the discussion of such speeches as are published in the *Reichsanzeiger*. Since these tactics passed into law, the official journal cautiously avoids taking note of any of the Emperor's polemical speeches. It pretends, with a clumsy naïveté, that speeches of the monarch have never been delivered, although the official telegraph bureau distributes them in thousands of copies to the smallest provincial papers."

That, since then, little change has been made in the Byzantine habits of the President of the Reichstag is

¹ Published by Paul Waetzel (Leipzig, 1906), this book "von Einem Schwarzseher" is the despairing cry of a German patriot. The "Schwarzseher" is not a Social Democrat, but earnestly protests against the "personal régime" because it is continually pouring water on the mills of that social democracy which knows no fatherland.

shown us by the present "liberal" President Kämpf, who telegraphed to the German Emperor on the occasion of the second anniversary of the declaration of war, "May the blessing of Heaven continue to be with your Majesty, our whole Fatherland, and our faithful allies," thus obsequiously placing the well-being of the Emperor before that of his country.

If we reflect that the institution of the Reichstag was an act of grace, and its subsequent continuation only due to toleration on the part of our dynasty, we can understand why a flavour of servility and Byzantinism has always clung to it, of which it is itself quite unconscious. The constitutional impotence of the Reichstag, which is lamentable apart from this, is thus displayed in its most glaring light and makes our German Parliament a laughing stock for every serious democrat.

If, in spite of all these constitutional and self-inflicted evils, our intellectuals and politicians clutch at and hold fast to the illusion of a democratic German popular Government and "working community," then that may demonstrate to the world that we Germans so instinctively adore the democratic conquests of the nineteenth century that we gladly imagine that we possess some of them, and cannot endure it when someone by the light of facts tries to dash this fair illusion to fragments.

III

THE BASIS OF THE DYNASTIC POWER

GERMANY accordingly possesses neither a parliamentary nor a really constitutional, but, at best, an autocratic system of government, adorned with a democratic façade. If there sat in the Reichstag a majority of far-seeing straightforward democrats, then they certainly could limit certain of the ruling rights of the German Emperor by Imperial laws, but never his God-given monarchical rights. As by the decree of God and of His representatives on earth such a Reichstag has never been vouchsafed to us (and never could be vouchsafed), so in Germany there are only liberal institutions without a liberal spirit, popular rights without popular government, Ministers without responsibility, deputies without plenary powers; and, on the other side, unassailable rights of the Crown, the widest scope for the imposition of dynastic arbitrary will, supervision and domination by the King of Prussia over the Federal princes and the Federal Council, and Articles 5 and 37 of the Imperial Constitution, by virtue of which Prussia's vote in legislation touching the military system, the Imperial Navy, Customs and indirect taxation everywhere is preponderant in the Bundesrat, when it is cast for the "perpetuation of the existing

condition of things." We have, then, a political system, the political basis and spirit of which so clashed with the demands and—in other countries—actualities of modern days, that it was compelled to adopt the civilised institutions of these modern times at all events as a trimming and a phrase.

That Prussia watches jealously in Germany not only over "the maintenance of the existing order of things," but also over that of "feudal conditions," is shown with compelling clearness by the relation of our dynasty to the army. "Where lies, after all, the true power? It lies in arms. The question by which to decide the inner character of a State is, accordingly, always, Whom does the army obey?"¹

This question, as Professor Delbrück rightly affirms, is the most vital of all political questions, and perhaps that is why it is so rarely discussed in Germany. The army is, in fact, the basis and the most indispensable bulwark of a dynasty. Every dynasty has been brought into being by means of an army, can only by the aid of an army raise itself to power and prestige, and could not endure without a military protective force. "As the living forces of Parliament reside in the parties, of whom there is not a word to be found in the Constitution, so does the essence of a monarchy consist not in the functions that the Constitution allocates to it, but in the forces that took origin, long before any legal declarations, in the remote past; namely, the relations of the dynasty to the army."²

This extremely personal and, in all its aspects,

¹ Delbrück, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 133.

² *Ibid.*, p. 141.

somewhat selfish relation, in which the army stands to the dynasty, is in the modern world, and especially in Germany, not only disregarded, but, as far as possible, disguised from the people.

If, for instance, you ask a German with an average political education whether Germany has a "national army," the chances are a thousand to one that he will not only answer this question with an unhesitating affirmative, but also be seriously indignant that you should have thought of asking it. Most Germans do not entertain the slightest doubt not only that we have the best but the most national army in the world. Is not every healthy German of full age liable to military service? Can there be a more national army than one maintained by taxes levied upon the whole population and composed of all the citizens of the nation without distinction? Does not, therefore, the German army form a nation in arms in the grandest sense of the word?

The fact that in the course of the past hundred years a thorough revolution has been effected in the domain of the military system, which not only comprises universal military service, but *also* the right of the citizens to control the organisation and employment of the army—our German either does not know at all, or he does not wish to know it. He confines the notion "national army" to universal military service, and, out of respect to his dynasty, takes good care not to extend it to the command, the spirit, and the organisation of the army.

Before the great French Revolution all armies were only the instruments of dynastic interests. Of course, we find national armies in bygone days among the

Greeks and Romans—that is, soldiers who served not a dynasty, but their country. But with the decay of these States the idea of national defence of country became completely lost. In the Middle Ages there was no idea of fatherland, and thus no idea of the defence of country; the armies were the avowed playthings and instruments of the princes. That is, they were composed of mercenaries and adventurers, stood in no relation to the people, and obeyed only the behests of their princely possessors. The most perfect pattern of this standing dynastic army was created by the Prussian King, Frederick William I. His army of the “tall fellows” was a purely personal creation without any national character. All the nations of the world were represented in it. Frederick William I. would have been very angry, had anyone attempted to criticise the composition of his army. He stood in relation to his army as an artist to his work. He never could understand that he could not enlist a “tall fellow” because he happened to be a Frenchman or Englishman, and, as such, could not fight with zeal and love for Prussia.

This army, which Frederick II. took over from his father, did not go to battle out of love for a fatherland (this idea died, as we have said, with the Greeks), but out of a sense of duty and because it was paid for its services by its lord and master. Prussia's military ascendancy over its then enemies resided in the iron discipline of these royal hirelings. It was a superiority in drill and method, having no concern with any popular or national idea.¹

¹ Prince von Bülow in his book, “Imperial Germany” (Cassell), pp. 133-4, says: “From the very first, Brandenburg-Prus-

— The French Revolution begat two things which impressed their stamp upon the military system of modern days: love of country, and the resulting national military organisation. The triumphant Revolution declared the people to be, in every sense, sovereign. The dynastic army that had fought out of a sense of duty and for pay was replaced by the national army, which fought out of devotion to country. The soldier stands no longer in a mercenary relation to his leader, but is sworn to uphold the Constitution of his country. Not fealty to a monarch, but love of country, becomes henceforth the impelling force and ideal of an army. The soldier of the modern national army became, accordingly, the armed citizen of his land, in the defence of which he is bound to have an interest, because he possesses an effective share in his country's government.

Just as Frederick II. found in the pattern army of his father a superior instrument for the prosecution of his dynastic campaigns, so now did Napoleon I. find in this popular army begotten of the Revolution, and founded upon entirely new principles, an engine of war superior to all the armies launched against him. Prussian superiority in drill and sense of duty was of no avail against the new moral ascendancy of the soldier fighting with religious ardour for his country. And it was only when Stein, Scharnhorst, and

sia's military power was founded on the two great supporting forces of national life in the State: the love of home and country and the conception of State Power"; but he himself partly contradicts this assertion (pp. 140-1) when he says that it was due to "the master mind of Scharnhorst" that "In the war of liberation, the Prussian Army became the nation in arms."

Gneisenau had organised for Prussia also the first national army on the French pattern that the victory of Prussia over Napoleon was rendered possible.

Napoleon I. was the first who abused the new principle of a national army which had been born of the French Revolution. Just as the dynastic armies of feudal days were all, more or less, drilled for attack and conquest, it was intended that the new national army should only be animated by the proud idea of pure national defence. The Constitution of 1791, par. VI., leaves no doubt on this point. "The French nation expressly declares that it renounces any idea of waging wars with the intent of making conquests, and will never employ its power against the liberty of another people."

The National Convention, when it had driven away the King, and openly revolted against all divine dynastic rights, was simultaneously attacked on five fronts. Valmy and Jemappes were the victories of the new national idea over the dynastic world of the Middle Ages. On the eve of the battle of Valmy, Goethe exclaimed prophetically: "From here and from to-day a new era opens, and you can say that you were present at its birth."

Napoleon retained the universal levy (for it procured him, as we have said, an enormous superiority over his antagonists), but he was the first to betray the intrinsic purpose of the national army, for, in his arrogance, he proceeded from national defence to the dynastic war of conquest of feudal times. His army had, in form, remained national, but, in regard to its employment, the soldiers of Jena, Austerlitz,

and Friedland only obeyed the arbitrary will of their ruler.

After Napoleon's fall, France returned more or less openly to the principles of the dynastic army. For even if the army of Napoleon III. was no longer composed of foreigners and mercenaries, it yet consisted of soldiers of seven years' service, and the universal military service had, owing to all manner of limitations, purchases of exemption, etc., been practically abolished. Napoleon III.'s campaigns served so successfully his dynastic interests that they brought about the same result as did the wars of his great predecessor: the entry of the enemy into Paris, together with an enormous territorial and pecuniary loss and the fall of the dynasty.

To return to Prussia: the victories of Frederick II. had been the brilliant achievement of dynastic armies. The defeats, from Valmy to Austerlitz, had furnished proof that the dynastic principle was not adapted to a modern army. Prussia found herself faced with the necessity of organising for herself a national army, and in the well-known proclamation, "To My People," the Prussian King, Frederick William III., promised that fundamental reform without which a national army is impossible: the co-operation of the people in the government of the country. It is patent, and the French Revolution had dinned it audibly enough into the ears of all the dynasties, that the soldier can only possess a fatherland if he is called upon to participate in its government. How could he be ready to die for a country in which he has only obligations and no rights?

The royal promise of a democratic Constitution was

reiterated by the Prussian Minister, von Hardenberg, at the Vienna Congress of 1815; moreover, it was formally assured to the Prussian people by the law of May 22nd, 1815, "concerning a representative Constitution." Yet not only was this promise never kept, and this law never put into force, but the grateful dynasty went so far as to see that any person who reminded King Frederick William III. or his successor of its ever having been given was cruelly persecuted as a demagogue and traitor. Just as all the endeavours of William von Humboldt at the Vienna Congress for the attainment of a united and liberal Constitution for Germany were wrecked by the opposition of Austrian diplomacy, so later, all his repeated efforts in this direction were wrecked by that of the King of Prussia. In 1819 this very inconvenient would-be reformer fell into disgrace. Only the little State of Saxe-Weimar, then under Goethe's influence, kept the promise it had given of a liberal Constitution.

In Prussia everything remained as of old. That is to say, Prussia had, it is true, modernised its army, the Prussian nation had, thanks to this modernisation, saved the throne for its dynasty, but had after all, by so doing, only increased its obligations. From this time forth we Prussians had, indeed, a national army, in the sense of universal military service, but as far as the control, equipment, and employment of this army were concerned, we had, as before, only the right of not interfering with the King. From the fresh obligations that the Prussian citizen had taken upon himself the Prussian dynasty merely reaped new rights for itself.

Professor Delbrück¹ tells us that, when the old Roman kings had trained their peasantry to efficiency in war, there came as the "inevitable consequence" of this popular war organisation a democratic element into the hitherto absolutist *régime*. Yes! when the monarchy was too obstinate in resisting the democratisation of the political system, the latter was simply abolished by the people, who had been forced to military service, and replaced by the consular system. Nietzsche was wrong: history is not an eternal recurrence. At all events, the Prussian King, when he forced his peasants and citizens to universal military service, had, fortunately for himself, no Roman peasants to deal with. What Professor Delbrück styles an "inevitable consequence" of the popular war organisation may possibly be applicable to France and perhaps even to modern China. For Prussia all this remained a promise which was often repeated but never kept. Professor Delbrück may say what he likes. What in the case of the Romans, the Greeks, the French, the Swiss, and, latterly, even in that of the Chinese, led to democracy, *i.e.*, the institution of universal military service, led in Prusso-Germany, on the contrary, to a reinforcement of dynastic absolutism. For in Prussia there began, after the introduction of universal military service and the victories over Napoleon which it made possible, instead of a democratic era, its exact contrary—that terrible reaction which, beginning with Metternich, celebrated its highest achievement in the violent imposition of the autocratic Prussian Constitution of 1850 and,

¹ Delbrück, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 100.

finally, under Bismarck, took on the legal forms of the Socialist law, etc.

Yes! the Romans were better off than we are. It is certainly a fact that Frederick William IV., in 1848, again renewed the solemn promise and vow to make his army thenceforth take the oath to the Constitution of the country. But this promise was again not kept. The Parliament which resulted from the Revolution of 1848 was forcibly dissolved in November of the same year under the pretext that "it had exceeded its authority" (?), and Prussia was compelled to accept that feudal Constitution by which it is still governed. In days when even the Chinese have emancipated themselves from dynastic ideas, the Prusso-German soldiers, as in bygone days, swear their oath to the colours not upon the Constitution of their country, but to the King and Emperor, as their War Lord. They swear, according to Article 64 of the German Imperial Constitution, "to render unconditional obedience to the orders of the Emperor." And, in order to put the matter beyond doubt, par. 108 of the Prussian Constitution expressly adds: "a swearing-in of the army upon the Constitution of the country does not take place."

The idea that the introduction of universal military service must involve the democratic right of the people to have a voice in its employment, and thus end the era of offensive wars, is so self-evident that it was always treated by most German authors and politicians as practically a matter of course. Gustav Freytag, for instance, in 1870, demonstrated with great complacency that it was Prussia's duty to bring civilisation to France in the form of universal military

service. "With this highest and noblest form of war-service the possibility of insolent wars of conquest and of an insane military vanity, those repulsive maladies of the French, is inevitably extinguished." And he emphatically asserts that "universal military service makes a nation not merely redoubtable in war, but also peaceable in peace."¹

The same idea is to-day expounded by those German authors who have undertaken to prove Germany's innocence in this war. Professor Ernst Troeltsch says, for example, "But, above all, this universal arming of the people brings about the important consequence that an effectual war can only be waged with the actual consent and enthusiasm of the people, and must, accordingly, be always a war of defence."²

A statement of this sort, examined by the light of the German Constitution and the facts mentioned in the first chapter of this book, strikes one as simply ludicrous. Gustav Freytag could not know, of course, in 1870 what use would one day be made of universal military service in Germany; but Professor Troeltsch, who does certainly know our Constitution and the true facts as to the outbreak of the World War, should know how easily, in the country of the "Ems telegram" and the Treitschke conception of constitutional law, "the consent and enthusiasm of the people" can be secured under false pretences. Wherever, as in Germany, universal military service is not accompanied by the right of the people to an active share in the government, it becomes not only

¹Gustav Freytag, "Der Kronprinz und die deutsche Kaiserkrone," 8th ed., Leipzig, 1889, p. 43.

²"Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," Berlin, 1915, p. 72.

no check upon offensive wars, but, on the contrary, an encouragement to them.

The fact that universal military service without popular sovereignty is sure to encourage offensive wars even Professor Delbrück, who has himself just narrated to us the prophetic story of the Roman peasants, was obliged to concede indirectly. With a naïve pride in the pretorian organisation of the German army, he ventures to inform us¹ that the Prussian officers-corps is even to-day animated by the spirit of the ancient Germans, who fought not for their country, but for their prince, and never troubled their heads about the aim and object of a war, or the political ideas of their chief, but were merely pledged to him personally by their oath of fealty. "The King is, still to-day, the head of his retinue; he is the comrade of his officers, and to him they look up as their War Lord, and such is the foundation of our political system. In the Prussian Constitution it is merely stated that the King is the Commander-in-Chief of the army, and this is stated also in the Imperial Constitution."

Yes! thus it is actually written, and thus it is; the German officers are the retinue of the King; they are pledged by their oath to do him personal service, and they trouble not a jot about the political ideas of their prince. The German Emperor possesses an army, and those who compose and defray the cost of this army, namely, the German citizens, have no voice whatever in the organisation and employment of this army—not even the Imperial Chancellor, not even the Minister of War. Under the German constitution

¹ Delbrück, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 137.

there is no legal connection whatsoever between the army and the people. The German army does not exist for the sake of the country, but for the sake of the Emperor; for "a swearing-in upon the Constitution of the country does not take place." In peace, as in war, the German Emperor is the personal and absolute governor of his army and navy. Nothing has been altered in Prussia in this respect for the last two hundred years. There are only two essential points of difference between William II. and the creator of the Prussian military power, Frederick William I.; firstly, William II. no longer needs to send recruiting sergeants into other countries to impress "tall fellows" at a high rate of pay; his soldiers are granted him by the Reichstag and paid by the people; and when this Reichstag objects to the military demands it is straight away dissolved.¹ Secondly, the German soldiers of to-day no longer fight, like the "tall fellows" did, grudgingly and for money; their bravery no longer has to be kept up to the mark by means of the cudgel. No! the modern soldiers are animated by that love of country which was born of the French Revolution, and the moral advantages of which have been turned to use by the Prussian dynasty, without any corresponding recompense. Otherwise there is, as we have said, no difference between then and now. For then, as now, the army was only subservient to the royal will; then, as now, the appointment, advancement, punishment, or cashiering of officers was left solely to the personal and arbitrary decision of the

¹ *E.g.*, on May 6th, 1893, on which occasion William II. declared openly that he would "crush the opposition," which, in fact, he did, for the Reichstag very promptly voted all the soldiers he had demanded.

King. In those days, as in these, the Prussian officer did not trouble his head about the political aims of his prince; he fought, "like the good old Germans," not for his country, but only for his War Lord. To-day, as then, the King is the first officer in the land, struts about in the uniform of his troops, devotes his main energies to his army, and concedes it the first position in the life of the State. It is true that he does not, as Frederick William I. did, arrange the marriages of his officers by a peremptory decree, and that he does not perform sentinel duty in person at Potsdam, but he forces his officers to observe special ideas of honour, protects them against any civilian attacks, prescribes for them marriages suitable to their rank, and grants them at his Court privileges that the most famous university professor cannot enjoy unless he happens to be an officer of the Reserve. To-day, as then, the spirit of the army is the same: sense of duty, blind obedience, absolute fealty to the lord of the land. As we have pointed out, the only things that have been altered since those bygone days are the composition of and the cost of maintenance of the army, which, in consequence of the liability of citizens both to serve in its ranks and pay the taxes, are no longer a private concern of the King but the affair of the nation at large. Everything else (including the brutalities which form part of the education of the Prussian soldier) has remained, in principle, undisturbed, and the idea of defence of country is, after all, only a tacit assumption on the part of patriotic citizens.

* * * *

I can hear the indignant remonstrances of my German readers, and I am prepared to hear the shouts of

the ninety-three signatories of the famous appeal to the civilised world: "It is not true! It is not true!"

But it *is* true! In these calamitous days it is doubly true, and it needs to be proclaimed to the whole world; the Prussian army is feudal, not national; dynastic, not democratic. It is only in the imagination of the German taxpayer, only in the credulity of the German people, that there exists a national army, employed for national defence. The tradition of Prussia, the form of its constitution, the spirit which rules in it, and the absolutism of the German Emperor, based upon Article 11 of the German Imperial Constitution, stamp this army as being pre-eminently a royal and Imperial bodyguard—that is, an instrument for the safeguarding of the dynasty.

If anyone still has any doubts on this subject, let him read the proclamations and speeches of William II. Immediately on ascending the throne, on July 15th, 1888, he addressed a proclamation to his army, in which occur the words: "So we belong together, I and my army, so we were born together, and so will we indissolubly hold fast to one another, come, as God wills, peace or storm." In William II.'s speeches, wherever they relate to the army, we find the possessive pronoun of the first person: *my* army, *my* guard, *my* engineers, *my* officers, *my* soldiers, *my* fleet, etc., etc. In this way he insists, on every opportunity, that the chief quality of the German soldier must be unconditional, blind, and unfaltering obedience. And that not only in time of war, but also in internal emergencies. William II. feels so intensely that he is the personal owner of the German army that on every occasion of the swearing-in of recruits he perpetually

reiterates: "You have sworn me the oath of allegiance"; and on November 23rd, 1891, he declared to the newly sworn recruits: "More than ever before unbelief and dissatisfaction lift their heads in the Fatherland, and the occasion may arise when you will have to shoot down or bayonet your own brothers and relations. Then seal your allegiance with the sacrifice of your heart's blood!" Again, at Breslau, on December 2nd, 1896, he says: "The more people shelter themselves behind catchwords and party considerations, the more firmly and securely do I count upon *my* army, and the more confidently do I hope that *my* army, either without or within my realms, will wait upon *my* wishes and *my* behests." "You have the honour to belong to *my* guard and to stand in and about *my* residence and *my* capital. You are called upon, in the first place, to protect *me* against internal and external foes." Thus William II. addressed the newly sworn recruits at Berlin on November 16th, 1893. And, on June 15th, 1898, in the Lustgarten at Potsdam: "I assumed the Crown with a heavy heart; my capacity was everywhere doubted, and everywhere I was wrongly judged. Only one had confidence in me, only one believed in me, and that was the army; and, with its support, and trusting in our old God, I undertook my responsible office, knowing full well that the army is the mainstay of my country and the chief pillar of the Prussian throne, to which God in His wisdom has summoned me."

Anyone who is acquainted with the internal development of affairs during the reign of William II. will also know that the Kaiser's thirst for personal possession and power does not merely extend to the army

as a whole, but has also thrust the General Staff and the Ministry of War into a subordinate position. Just as William II. was always his own Imperial Chancellor, so as an ardent soldier was he even more pronouncedly his own Chief of the General Staff.

"A far more modest *rôle* even than that of the Chancellor in relation to William II. is that of the man who occupies the responsible post of Chief of the General Staff of the Army. It is characteristic of the startling importance that our Emperor attaches to purely external considerations that a Moltke was summoned to the post as soon as one was available. A man like the 'great man of silence'¹ William II. could just as little have endured at his side for any length of time as first military adviser, as he could endure the Chancellorship of Bismarck. But he wanted to have a Moltke."²

And so in this field William II. had such an absolute sense of personal property in his army that he conferred its chief command on any one, according to his fancy, though the person he selected, as in Moltke's case, was manifestly incompetent, and though he had the opinion of all competent Generals against him.

Anyone, therefore, who is not satisfied with the evidence afforded by the German and Prussian Constitutions cannot fail to be convinced by the speeches and acts of William II. that we have *not* a national but a dynastic army, which is entirely subservient to the private judgment of the sovereign ruler, and regarded

¹ *i.e.*, Moltke, of whom it was said that he was silent in seven languages.

² "Unser Kaiser und Sein Volk," von einem Schwarzseher, Leipzig, 1906, p. 10.

by him as the "chief pillar of the Prussian throne." Let anyone point out to me one single passage in the Emperor's speeches in which William II. has placed the defence of our country before that of his person, his house, and his personal power! Let anyone cite me the speech of a German Minister where the question of the right of the people to have a voice in military matters is treated with anything but contempt. Such a speech will be sought in vain. Instead, you will find at every turn expressions such as: "The German people must deem it an honour to wear the Emperor's uniform and protect the Emperor's house." "With God for King and country!" This watchword, emanating from Frederick William III., and, since 1871, converted into "with God for Emperor and Empire," expresses clearly and unmistakably what William II. has emphasised over and over again, that in Germany the Emperor and King come first, and the Fatherland afterwards.

The fact that such a state of things should exist in the modern world is, as we have said, so distressing to a German that he either pretends not to notice it, or else denies it. Ever and again the German newspapers speak of "our brave greycoats," "our redoubtable troops," etc.; that is, they try to take it as a matter of course that the German army is the concern of the German people. Moreover, there are large numbers of Social Democrats who declare quite seriously that the German army is the people and the people the German army.

But, unfortunately, viewed by the light of the Constitution and of facts, all this is only pious humbug, which may possibly be uttered in ignorance and good

faith, but by its incredible *naïveté* is only a fresh proof of the fact that we Germans are wont to invest anything incredible in our politics with the lying semblance of the normal democratic. Here, more than anywhere else, the naked truth, in all its mediævalism, is utterly intolerable to us.

The pious legend of the German popular army does not become a fact because it is constantly referred to by distinguished German writers. For example, the late German Imperial Chancellor, von Bülow, assures us quite seriously: "the army to-day is what history has made it; the vigorous expression of the unity of Empire, State, and people."¹ And he adds, with great complacency, "so it is also in France, the republican State and the French nation are blended together in the army." Seeing that Herr von Bülow studiously avoids speaking about the constitutional structure of this army and only praises its superb qualities and excellent conduct in the course of history, he has no difficulty in assuring us that "the officers and men both in the North and the South feel themselves before all else members of the German army, subjects of the German nation in arms." Indirectly, indeed, his ebullitions show that this so-called "nation in arms" is, in fact, nothing more nor less than a monarchical army, which lives "apart from all internal politics, from particularism and parties generally," but he endeavours, in the same breath, to make the reader understand that the German army is, like the French, the strong expression of the national will and character. We are sorry, Your Highness; the

¹ Prince Bernhard von Bülow, "Imperial Germany," p. 148. (London: Cassell & Co.)

times are really too grave for such conjuring tricks! In the first place, the question is not what the German officers and men *feel* themselves to be, but what they *are* under the constitution. And, as a matter of fact, our constitution absolutely forbids and renders impossible any blending of the Army and the people in Germany. The fact that the officers and men swear allegiance expressly to the person of the King instead of to the welfare of the nation creates an impassable gulf between the Army and the people. The two exist side by side, without interfusion and without any legal interdependence. Our very constitution—or rather the hankering of the dynasty for power which finds expression in our constitution—establishes the Army as a State within the State, as an inviolable dynastic institution, placed high above the citizen and his morality. If anyone still has any doubts on this head, he may learn from the Kaiser's speeches that in Germany the Army and the people are rigorously sundered by the clearly and repeatedly expressed intention of the Kaiser that the Army should be employed at his pleasure against "the enemy within our frontiers." And, in the second place, Herr von Bülow is pleased to deceive both himself and us. For the German officers do not by any means "feel" themselves what he pretends. Professor Delbrück emphasises with unconcealed pride, in his book "Regierung und Volkswille," the wide difference between the German and the French Armies: "Now let us suppose this (the French system of parliamentary control of the Army, without which no national army is really possible) transferred to Prusso-Germany. Let us assume a control of the Army by parliament, and select anyone you please

from the House of Deputies or the Reichstag and let him be our Minister of War. Anyone who has the least acquaintance with our officers and generals knows that this is an impossibility, knows that our Army would need to have experienced a Sedan in the French sense before it would submit to such a state of things."

Yet Prince von Bülow is perfectly well acquainted with Article 64 of the German and paragraph 108 of the Prussian constitution; he is acquainted also with the numerous speeches of William II. relative to the Army; he knows the spirit of our Officers Corps, and he knows that Delbrück's description (written a year before the war) is entirely in accordance with facts. It is true that he enjoys the reputation of seeing things in the rosiest light, and we can understand that in the midst of the stress of this World War he should more than ever feel the need of insisting on the rosy aspect of things, but, none the less, the problem is so momentous a one for the future of Germany that we are compelled to answer him with the most emphatic contradiction: No, Your Highness! The German Army is *not* "the vigorous expression of the unity of Empire, State and people"; it is the expression, guaranteed by the constitution and by tradition, of the thirst for power of the German dynasty. It is what the soldier-king, Frederick William I., made it, and what it has been plainly and repeatedly declared to be by the soldier-emperor, William II.: the chief support of the Prussian throne.

That is the German Army. Anyone who ventures to compare the French Army with this Army, organised entirely upon dynastic principles, and to speak of

this as a "national army," must incur the suspicion of deliberate falsification.

But it is the same with our army as with our Reichstag. Democratic notions have, nowadays, attained such an ascendancy over public opinion, and are felt by every rational man as being so self-understood, that we Germans quite instinctively try to represent as democratic things that are two centuries behind democracy. Hence it comes that Bülow and other representatives of German culture, including also the majority of our Social Democrats, ever and anon talk about a "nation in arms," a "popular army," and other democratic triumphs, which only live and have their being in the imagination of ignorant or wilfully blind patriots, and which, consciously or unconsciously, deceive the German people as to the real aspect of affairs. For the true facts in all their mediævalism are so disgraceful that no one dares admit them in Germany.

It is without parallel in the world's history that a dynasty contrived, not merely to retain in the modern world all its absolute feudal powers, but also to take advantage of modern progress (universal military service and universal taxation) to enhance them still further, without, in return, giving the serving and paying portion of the nation a democratic equivalent. This marvellous achievement of dynastic government could only occur in a State such as Prusso-Germany, in which thousands of servile and learned sophists were ever ready in pompous speeches to represent to the people their dearest wishes as accomplished facts.

It is surely not presumptuous if to-day, confronted with the World War, we at last exclaim "Enough!"

Let the German people be honestly told how matters stand. Tell them that, constitutionally, they are *not* fighting for their country, but for their Emperor. Explain to them that, by their Constitution, they have no right to inquire into the why and the wherefore of the war, and that the true meaning of the word *Burgfrieden* must be sought in the attempt to disguise the dynastic policy of power.

Then we shall see what the German people, who do not know (but at most guess) this state of affairs, really think: Whether they will, perchance, with Professor Delbrück, find their ideal in fighting, "like the Germans of old," not for country, but for the chieftain, without knowledge of his political aims, and only attached to him blindly by the oath of allegiance; or whether the German people will continue to be befooled by the rhetoric of Bülow and Scheidemann, and to believe that we possess a "popular and a national army."

What Professor Delbrück in 1913 arrogantly scoffed at as an impossibility, namely, that the German Army should some day experience such a Sedan as that which democratised the French Army, is moreover imminent, and it will bring about the same result as in France. It is the fate of nations and of the rulers of nations that they only learn in war that they have learnt nothing from war. Professor Delbrück and the other worshippers of the German Empire did not suspect what, if they had been a little more modest, they might have learnt from the world's history, namely, that the same spirit in which they declaim so arrogantly against the French military system was also the spirit which conjured up the World War and

helped to prepare that Sedan which inspires them with so much uncalled for sympathy for France and her army.

Yes! the German people will learn this bitter lesson from the World War. Henceforth, to the question "Whom does the army obey?" it will reply, "The German people."

IV

THE PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN POLICY: ALSO A HISTORY OF THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WORLD WAR

MANIFESTATIONS OF GERMAN MILITARISM

WHENEVER the Reichstag in a serious controversy attempted to raise its voice, it was either ignored, or roundly told that a police sergeant with twelve men would suffice to dissolve it, or it was actually dissolved.

Our Reichstag has been at infinite pains to make something of itself. And in spite of its unconstitutional composition, as already described, it would have become a good, domestic, progressive Reichstag, had this only been allowed. But was this ever allowed? It protested, in 1878, against the disgraceful Socialist law; it was dissolved, and the Socialist law for twelve years exposed Germany to the scorn of the world.

In 1887 it had the audacity to propound the question: Imperial or parliamentary army? and voted the effective force of the army for three instead of seven years; it was dissolved, and never again attempted to talk about a parliamentary control of the army.

Again, in 1893, it ventured to protest against the

constant increase of armaments; it was once more dissolved, and henceforth was obliged to vote not only the land armaments, but also the whole new naval programme of William II.

In 1907 it raised its voice against the colonial- and world-policy; it was again dissolved, and (despite the augmented numbers of the opposition votes) the dynasty again carried the day.

More than once it vigorously protested against the ill-usage of the soldiers; their ill-treatment was regretted, but not suppressed, for it is part and parcel of the iron discipline of the Prussian military system. It protested (in May, 1912) against the duelling obligation of the officers; but although an Imperial Order in Council (January 1st, 1897) had done the same, a fresh Order in Council, in defiance of Parliament, confirmed what the Imperial Chancellor had already in person told it, that an officer who was not at any time prepared pistol in hand to defend his honour (which was a special honour) could remain an officer no longer.

In the affair of the *Daily Telegraph*, the Reichstag had emphatically protested against such an intervention of the Emperor as sensational and dangerous to the safety of the State (November, 1908)¹; but Herr

¹ On October 29th, 1908, the *Daily Telegraph* published some remarks of the German Emperor regarding his relations with England. William II. expressed therein his dissatisfaction that the English did not credit his peaceful assurances. "Lies and deception are foreign to my nature. My actions speak for themselves. You have paid heed not to my actions, but to those who misrepresent and misinterpret them." The Kaiser declared that it would be difficult for him to maintain a friendly relation, because the feeling of the German people was exceedingly hostile to England; that he was, to his regret, in the

von Bülow, who had dared to convey to the monarch the modest wishes of the popular representative body, had to go at the first available opportunity, and William II., in his Königsberg speech (August 25th, 1910), once again asserted that the royal power "had been granted to him alone by the grace of God and not by Parliaments, popular assemblies, and popular resolutions." With greater distinctness than this no modern sovereign has ever rejected the principle of popular co-operation in government. It is not established whether it was Louis XIV. or Elizabeth of England who uttered the famous phrase "*L'état, c'est moi*"; but it cannot be gainsaid that at the beginning of the twentieth century William II. repeatedly and emphatically made this notion, "I am the State," the keynote of his public utterances.

Poor Reichstag! Over and over again it initiated proposals for an act establishing the responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor; but the Government treated all such endeavours with contempt. Many and many a time it tried to alter its standing orders and, for

minority, as it were, among his own people; that he had shown during the Boer War what peaceful sentiments he nourished towards England, when he refused to receive the mission from the Boers and to associate himself with the proposed intervention of France and Russia, and even worked out a plan of campaign for the overthrow of the Boers, and sent it to the Queen. (William II. forgot to mention the famous telegram to Krüger, and explained his desire for a powerful navy as due merely to the necessity of protecting Germany's world-wide trade.) These statements William II. allowed to be published without any previous consultation with his Chancellor. It turned out that the Imperial Chancellor had, as a matter of fact, approved the publication of this Imperial utterance, but that, wonderful to relate, he was wholly ignorant of its substance.

example, oblige the Chancellor to reply to questions within a specified time; the Government always remained deaf to these entreaties. Often did the Reichstag demand rewards for the heroes of the war of 1870-71, but the Government had already distributed a portion of the five milliards of francs it received from France between Moltke and his General Staff, and nothing remained over for the soldiers who had fought and bled.

And, finally, the Reichstag, in December, 1913, indignantly protested that the military authorities should brutally overrule the civilian authorities in a Constitutional State, and that a mere lieutenant should have superior rights to those of a German civil authority. Poor Reichstag! The vote of censure passed by the Reichstag was not only absolutely ignored by the dynasty, and the Imperial Chancellor, who had undertaken the impossible task of proving a glaring wrong to be right, remained still more firmly established in office, but, in addition, the Zabern criminals were decorated and congratulated, and the German people were once again given to understand that in Germany only one will prevails, and that is the will of the dynasty.

So we find, in the whole course of the Reichstag's history, only a long, dismal chain of oppressions, dissolutions and unwilling submission of the popular will to the thirst for power of the dynasty. It was only in subordinate matters that the Reichstag was allowed a free hand. Yes! when Bülow, in consequence of the rejection of the probate duty, retired from the conduct of State affairs, we were filled with delight, and pictured ourselves as living in a parliamentary model State. The delight was of brief duration.

Bülow's place was taken by a man who soon put an end to the "liberal era," declared Social Reform to be completed, and in every respect revived the old *régime*.

The simple German has fared with his Reichstag much as did "Hans in luck" of the fairy tale, when he exchanged his lump of gold for a horse, and then the horse for a cow, the cow for a donkey, and so on, until he had nothing left, but still comforted himself with the reflection that he was the richest and luckiest man in the world. Similarly, the promises made to the German people after the war of 1870-71 may be compared with a veritable lump of gold of democratic rights and privileges. But Bismarck, and still more the "new course" of William II., forced our popular Assembly to make one exchange after the other. When the simple German, on the occasion of the well-known Zabern affair, was able to some extent to strike the balance of his democratic rights and liberties, he found that all that was left of his lump of gold was a lordly building, before which stand a column of Victory and a gigantic Bismarck in bronze, to wit, a glittering Nothing, surrounded by military symbols and serving purely military ends and objects. But comfort was forthcoming from his intellectual superiors; they proved to him over and over again that he had no use for gold, that he was, nevertheless, the wealthiest and luckiest of Europeans, since, as Herr von Bülow says, "the degree of popular participation in State affairs is not to be measured merely by the sum of the rights accorded to the popular assembly."

And the simple fellow was comforted. Could he be aught else? To him, as Herr von Bülow so politely put it, "political talent was denied." He convinced

himself, again to quote von Bülow, that "we are not a political people." So he buried his disgust and vexation with politics in philosophy and social science. And here, where, so long as he only stuck to theories, he was free from dynastic interference, he became the most revolutionary being in the world.

No one ever planned such brutal revolutions on paper as Kautsky and the other devotees of the social economy of Marx. No one was so energetic in re-valuing all values, or so merciless in philosophising against the good God with a hammer as Nietzsche and his disciples. And while the German riddle was presenting itself to us with a more threatening aspect every day, Haeckel, Ostwald, and Eucken, with bold intellectual flights, solved the riddle of the universe, severed friendship with the gods above, and built up a monistic theory of civilisation the audacity of which was only exceeded, if at all, by the revolutionary phrases of the social-democratic orators. Then there were the radical theories concerning free love and the education of children, and all the daring reforms in literature and art, in the theatre, the school, and the association!

It seemed as if revolution were ready to blaze up at every turn and corner. A cloud of dissatisfaction brooded over Germany, and to observant foreigners it seemed as though the flashes of lightning were proclaiming the approach of a new Germany.

But alas! This same simple German, who had just overthrown all the gods, who had criticised without mercy the whole ordering of civilian society and law, and had constructed the most ideal freedom in the upper air, became as red as a schoolboy if a policeman

at the next corner of the street looked at him more suspiciously than usual; his revolutionary theories evaporated completely at sight of an officer's uniform, and all his beautiful ideals of freedom fluttered away, as if they had been criminal fancies, as soon as a Government organ showed the slightest tendency to disapprove of them. An impassable something separated the idea of liberty from the liberating act. Revolutionary views and reactionary realities! Of what avail to the German citizen was disrespect for the gods in heaven, if the gods of the earth forcibly demanded his respect at every turn?

Herr von Bülow was right; we are not a political people! Nowhere, not even in Freemason lodges, not even in the trade unions, dare we discuss politics. The statutes of every respectable association contain the rule that political (and religious) discussions are prohibited. Where three Germans talked politics, the walls had ears. Questions such as: Republic or Monarchy? Whom does the army obey? Who decides upon war and peace, and our future development as a nation?—questions of life and death, and right and liberty, which can be traced through the political history of all civilised peoples and gave the dynasties of Athens and Rome more trouble than all their external foes put together, may, among us, only be debated and answered in a purely monarchical sense. There was a deluge of prohibitions of meetings, Press prosecutions, and charges of *lèse majesté* whenever anything smacked of "Revolution" and "liberty"; and anyone who tried to write a word of truth on political matters was in danger of imprisonment.

We are certainly not a political nation. We lacked

a political ideal. Seeing that in the nineteenth century political ideals are necessarily democratic, our dynasty, to save trouble, forbade us to concern ourselves with politics, declaring that we were too stupid for them. It instinctively felt that, in a free contest of opinions, it could not hold its own in these days, and so it allowed us all possible liberties, except the one which is the key to all of them—political liberty.

This is the explanation of the peculiarity Herr von Bülow has constantly taxed us with—that we have remained an unpolitical people, and this procures for us also the satisfaction of being unanimously praised by our professors as a “monarchically-minded people.”

The simple German instinctively felt that a danger and a reaction were concealed in the political events of the past forty years, but he could not and dared not realise the secret opposition which necessarily arose in a feudal military State like Prusso-Germany between dynastic rights and privileges and nineteenth-century notions of civil law. Hence, the German people never comprehended the more deeply rooted causes of the arbitrary acts which constantly offended their sense of justice in German home politics. The monstrous fact that, wherever the prestige of the dynasty or the privileges of the officer or official were concerned, the whole theory of right under civil law was simply put on one side and replaced by a military-dynastic theory of right, was, as far as possible, concealed from him. The simple German allowed himself to be perpetually assured by his superiors that our Government was the most progressive of all Governments, that everything took place in accordance with a well-thought-out plan, and that the

national welfare was always the end in view.

On ascending the throne, the Emperor first addressed his army, then his navy, and only then "My people," just as though the people was there for the army's sake, and not the army for the sake of the people. But the simple German regarded this as merely a tradition, which was no doubt intended to be more friendly towards the people than it appeared.

Did not a cobbler don an officer's uniform, and by aid of this costume, which renders a person in Germany all powerful, rob the town-chest of a burgo-master and arrest both him and his secretary? The simple German only saw the comic side of this episode, and did not reflect what an alarming proof of the militarised mentality of the German civil authorities this Köpenick affair really was.

William II. declared to his soldiers: "You wear the Emperor's coat, therefore you are raised above other men!" (Kiel, December 3rd, 1894.) Here again the simple German only regarded this as a chance phrase, which, though it annoyed him, could not rob him of his joy in the proud German army.

That the Emperor always appeared in public dressed as a soldier and never spoke to the citizens of the nineteenth century in mufti, that the Prussian Minister of War and other State officials also showed themselves in the popular assembly in uniform, and that even the President of the Reichstag strutted about in the uniform of a lieutenant of the Reserve whenever he was permitted to appear in his Majesty's train—all this had no deep significance for the simple German. These things made no impression on him; he

regarded them as a custom, and could not imagine them otherwise.

Although at all the official receptions, parades, and banquets the military always took precedence of civilians; although the Imperial acts of grace referred only to military persons; although the Berlin Court was such a glitter of uniforms that the late English Minister of War, Haldane, felt abashed amid all this brilliancy, and modestly declined the Imperial invitation to the manœuvres; although, from these and a hundred other customs and events, it became clearer and clearer that the officer in Germany takes the first place, while the citizen is, as it were, regarded only as an adjunct to the military, still the honest German failed to realise the true import of these facts. On the one hand, a rational co-operation in politics was denied and abused to him, and, on the other, he had been so much drilled, both by education and habit, into a military conception of the State that he honestly believed the whole system to be part and parcel of the organisation of a modern constitutional State. Yes, he perceived in all this merely evidence of a higher culture. His views were, as we have said, influenced by people who, like Herr von Bülow, honestly assured him: "The voice of our national conscience tells us what German militarism really is: the best thing we have achieved in the course of our national development as a State and a people";¹ or, again, by chemists, who, unfortunately for Germany, have a passion for generalities, for instance, Professor Ostwald, who, from the height of his scientific knowledge, preaches

¹ Prince von Bülow, "Imperial Germany," p. 147. (London: Cassell & Co.)

that German militarism "actually represents the highest degree of civilisation yet developed."¹

There is certainly no objection to be made to the simple German and his betters regarding as both normal and civilising what all other modern States regard as contempt of the people and political slavery. If the political development of the German people had arrived at a point where the army was regarded not as the servant, but as the master of the nation, this was to be lamented (as a proof that we, out of servility to our dynasty, are about a hundred years behind the times), but was at the same time perfectly comprehensible. We Germans have had the belief forced upon us that the Hohenzollerns, thanks to their military genius, saved the united Germany; we were told so much about the unfavourable position of Germany and the resulting devastations of the 'Thirty Years' War, about the deplorable disunion of the German races, and other things of the sort, that we were, finally, led to believe that the drill-master was our only salvation.

Hence, we must define German militarism as an historical product, and realise that the German people had gradually become militarised, not only in their organisation, but in their whole outlook and philosophy.

We might, therefore, in agreement with the representatives of German culture, laud German militarism as the basis of German culture, and prove that, far from being a menace to, it is actually a safeguard of the peace of the world. Unfortunately, however, the principles which govern a State's home policy also

¹ Prof. Wilh. Ostwald, "Monistische Sonntagspredigten" (Monistic Sunday addresses), December 1st, 1914.

govern its foreign policy. And, unfortunately, conduct which at home only vexes or pleases the private citizen, when extended beyond the frontiers becomes a source of vexation or pleasure to other nations.

And since Germany's foreign policy is far less subject to national control even than her home policy, the same principle which at home only produces a comedy like the Köpenick incident or a tragedy like the Zabern affair may become a danger to the whole world. If even a man like Bülow has to admit that: "The history of our home policy, with the exception of a few bright spots, is to the time of the World War a history of political mistakes,"¹ one may imagine the nature of a foreign policy governed by the same principles.

For whereas in home policy the dynasty was still frequently obliged to disguise the answer to the question "Whom does the army obey?" with all kinds of democratic phrases, there was no such restraint upon its arbitrary will in the case of foreign policy. Moreover, in the realm of foreign policy, the dynasties have at their disposal a perfectly irresponsible secret diplomacy, which on the ground of higher interests of State renders account to no one of its proceedings. Even in a democratic State like France, this secret diplomacy concludes treaties and alliances over the head of the Parliament. How much more must this be the case in a State like Germany, where, as we have seen, the dynasty, in virtue of Article 11 of the Constitution, pronounces the supreme decision in everything.

It is well-known that the foreign policy of all States has hitherto been guided solely by military considera-

¹ Prince von Bülow, "Imperial Germany," p. 158. (London: Cassell & Co.)

tions. Humanity is still waiting for the genius who shall compel Governments to apply the same standard of civic justice and morality to their foreign policy as they (apart from exceptions) already apply to their home policy. Hitherto, in the realm of international politics, everything has been a question of military strength. Without intending to insult the diplomats, they might be described as anarchists in kid gloves, who, in their conversation, with the utmost amiability and discretion, make constant allusion to their provision of bombs, in order to give more emphasis to their demands. Hence the attitude of a State, its demands and its threats are regulated according to the armed might which it has behind it as a last resource for proving the justice of its conduct. The only exceptions to this sublime rule are the small States like Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, etc., which support their foreign policy not so much by armed strength as by exploiting the rivalries of the Great Powers.

Thus, in reference to foreign policy, armies are no longer considered as passive instruments for the defence of the country; in the hands of the diplomats they become threats and standards of right and wrong.

Down to the French Revolution it was an understood thing that the Almighty had only created nations for the sake of kings. Still, the dynasties of feudal days were so considerate that they only enforced their policy by means of soldiers, whom they hired, much as an African explorer hires his escort. Hence, the fact that the foreign policy of those times openly and honestly served only the interests of the dynasties, and that dynasties waged war upon each other at will and upon the most trifling pretexts,

without the slightest regard to the welfare of their peoples, is perfectly intelligible. For they employed for the purpose, as already stated, only such soldiers as voluntarily undertook the task. Love of country, defence of country, blessings of civilisation, etc., were, in those days, not dreamt of. Politics and "their continuation by other means," that is to say, by war, was not a national question but a private concern of the dynasty. When Soubise was defeated at Rossbach the Paris populace hardly concealed their jubilation that the braggarts of Versailles had got a rebuff. When, in 1792, Prussia and Austria marched upon France, the Prusso-Austrian peoples hardly troubled their heads about it; no one regarded the defeats at Valmy and Jemappes as a national disaster; and Goethe's "Campaign in France" treats this campaign as a purely dynastic episode, and one looks in vain, in his description of it, for any patriotic sentiment.

This epoch of absolute lordship, and of undisguised camarilla politics, when war was openly regarded not as a crime against nations, but merely as an adventure for illustrious personages, led to the great French Revolution, which gave it the death-blow.

That birth certificate of modern society, the declaration of human and civic rights formulated by the French Revolution, states, in Article 3, "the principle of all sovereignty essentially rests in the nation; and no corporation, no individual, can express any authority which has not originated from it." With these words the people themselves undertook the shaping of their destiny; the armed force was, henceforth, based upon universal military service, and was inspired by the sacred idea of defence of country. The modern

Fatherland, that is to say, the constitutional State striving towards ever-increasing justice and liberty, had come into being.

It is patent that foreign politics were thus, at one stroke, revolutionised. The political organisation, army, administration and government of the new form of State were bound, for the future, to place their services at the disposal of the common weal.

These new and excellent ideas were, to be sure, overthrown in France, at any rate in practice. The National Convention conquered the left bank of the Rhine and Napoleon I. waged war against all Europe. All the same, this fundamental readjustment of the aspirations and aims of foreign policy became, in theory, a model for all States. Dynasties were compelled to bow to the common weal. From a purely dynastic affair, the policy of the State and all that appertained thereto (especially the military system) became nationalised. Henceforth, if a dynasty wished to engage in war, it had first to prove to its subjects that its aim was not to increase by this means its own power and exchequer, but to promote the welfare of the people at large.

But in this, as in everything, the dynasties only unwillingly and apparently yielded to the new demands. The same France which had proclaimed to the world those magnificent ideas reverted openly in its foreign policy (in spite of the fact that these same principles had again been insisted upon in the Revolution of 1848) to the dynastic point of view. With the Crimean War and the Mexican campaign, Napoleon III. annihilated the last remnants of the Holy Alliance and raised the Bonaparte dynasty to the zenith of its

power. France, to be sure, became once again "*la grande nation*" and the most redoubtable military Power in Europe, but the French people had to pay for this patriotic satisfaction (just as the German people had after 1871) with the loss of all those political liberties that they had painfully won in the course of three revolutions. Like causes produce like effects. The France of 1850-1870 was a precursor of the Germany of 1871-1914; detested and feared by other nations, condemned by the whole world as arrogant, vain, and thirsty for war, the Second Empire was, in its home policy, reactionary through and through. It is an historical law (alas! disregarded) that every increase of dynastic power must be paid for by the people with a corresponding diminution of their rights and privileges, and, at the same time, regarded by neighbouring countries as a danger and menace of war. Napoleon III. wrote several books (just as William II. made a host of speeches), in which he vigorously endeavoured to prove that his foreign policy was only subservient to the weal of the French nation. Yet dynastic weal and popular weal are poles asunder, just as are capital and labour. They can only be reconciled by pious phrases and lies. Napoleon's wife destroyed the effect of the whole of his literary work with a single sentence: "*C'est ma guerre!*" she exclaimed with great complacency on the outbreak of the Franco-German War. Possibly the long *ennui* of Court festivities prompted this desire for other distractions; in any case, this expression shows clearly that the assertion of human rights and the democratic aspirations of the nineteenth century had made no impression on this exalted personage.

In the eyes of a dynasty nations have only the right to serve "higher interests," that is to say, to gather laurels for their rulers on the bloodstained fields of battle.

After the death of Frederick II. foreign politics were little discussed in Prusso-Germany. The Wars of Liberation, the ensuing Vienna Congress, and the Holy Alliance won for Prussia once more some respect in Europe. Yet how little Prussia's foreign policy was dictated by considerations for the public weal was immediately after displayed to the nation by Frederick William III. in that terrible reaction which followed the Wars of Liberation and only terminated in 1848. After the brief, bright interval of 1848 Bismarck entered upon Metternich's inheritance.

Bismarck's speeches and letters, his "Reflections and Reminiscences," are full of proofs that he, as he acknowledged, regarded himself only as the "servant of his lord." He was very skilful in proving to the German people that dynastic weal is tantamount to public weal. We were wrong in believing him. For Bismarck, though in his youth imbued with republican ideas, was the absolute negation of all those democratic ideals which had already been more or less put into practice in the politics of Western Europe, and without which a popular form of government had become inconceivable.

Bismarck's foreign policy, which was directed first against the Hapsburgs, then against the Bonapartes, resulted, when he had triumphed all along the line, in a united German Empire with a constitution which, as we have said, placed all the power in the hands of the German Emperor and stamped it henceforward not

as a liberal-progressive, but as an autocratic State with a democratic veneer.

It may be asserted that Bismarck's foreign policy was advantageous to Germany. In fact, almost all German historians and politicians agree that the victories of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71 brought the nation that moral prestige which enabled it to develop its commercial and technical capacity and to become a State with a world-wide trade of the first rank.

But there appertain to the common weal not merely material but ideal blessings, of which the greatest and most essential is political liberty. Moreover, if we place Germany's material progress since 1870 to the credit of the Bismarck wars, we must reflect that France also has, during the same period, achieved a similar result. The astounding economic development of Germany during the past forty years must then be attributable to other causes than Bismarck's foreign policy. Otherwise the vanquished and ruined France would not be able to show a like phenomenon.

This is not the place to furnish evidence that victorious wars can never be the cause of material national prosperity. But, speaking generally, we may say that if Bismarck had welded the German races into national unity without any war, the national prosperity of Germany would, thanks to the genius of the German merchant and technologist, have developed just as brilliantly as, and certainly more safely than, it did through Bismarck's annexation and armament policy, which brought us forty years of unrest, oppressive taxation, and finally this World War.

The war of 1870-71 was, like the present war,

ushered in with hollow bombast. Then, as to-day, much was talked about progress, liberty, and unity. But, as so often before, pompous words only veiled private interests. The German nation hoped to achieve through the war not only its unity, but its political emancipation, but it soon discovered that the only result of the war was to raise the rank of its dynasty. The battles of Wörth and Weissenburg had hardly been fought when the Crown Prince Frederick asked: "And what is to be the position of the King of Prussia after this war?" and he himself furnished the reply: "He must become Emperor!" But why should he become Emperor? Gustav Freytag¹ explained to his prince the dangers of Imperialism: the glamour of Majesty, of Court life, uniforms, etc., would displace the simple bluecoat of the Hohenzollerns. The self-importance of the princes would increase the self-importance of the nobles. Not merely the bureaucracy and the army, but also the people at large would gradually be infected with a snobbish and servile spirit and the highest military commands conferred upon persons on account of their birth, and no longer on account of their proved efficiency. The strong, democratic undercurrent of the time would pass unheeded. And how did the Crown Prince, in the face of these just objections (they read to-day like prophecies), none the less establish his claim to the Imperial crown? Listen! "When I was in Paris with my father in

¹ Gustav Freytag, "Der Kronprinz und die Deutsche Kaiserkrone" [Leipzig, 1889, 8th ed.], p. 21 *et seq.*: Freytag accompanied the Crown Prince during the campaign in France, and he tells us in his preface to this work that "the august gentleman very kindly assured the author that he had understood his friendly intention."

1867 during the French Exhibition, the Emperor Napoleon sent word that, seeing that the Emperor of Russia had announced his visit, he wished to learn from the King how he desired the question of the precedence of the distinguished guests to be arranged, and he would do everything in accordance with the King's wishes. Thereupon my father replied: 'The Emperor, of course, has precedence. No Hohenzollern ought to say that, it ought not to be true of a Hohenzollern,' he concluded, fiercely." And this man, who was imagined to be entirely occupied with his plans of campaign, had, in the midst of the stress of war, nothing more important to do than to sit down and dictate a memorandum to Count Bismarck, in which he urged energetically the conferring of the Imperial title upon the Hohenzollerns.

This, then, was the main issue. Before the all-important question, whether the Czar of Russia should in future take precedence of the Hohenzollerns, all other reflections and democratic tendencies of the century were scattered like chaff! No longer to rank below the Czar of Russia; that, in the mind of the Crown Prince, was the pre-eminent question. It was in order that "this should be no longer true of a Hohenzollern" that the German nation had gone to war.

What a glaring light this casts upon the secret causes leading up to war! Freytag's gossip "out of school" only confirms what history tells us on every page, that behind the fair talk of public weal and liberty there are generally concealed the most terribly trivial dynastic interests. Bismarck, in his "Reflections and Reminiscences," tries to represent himself as having

the other Generals £15,000 or more. Bismarck received the Sachsenwald Estate. And so forth. For the soldiers, who had actually shed their blood in order to win from France, for the dynasty, the Imperial crown, five milliards of francs, Alsace-Lorraine, and universal prestige, there was nothing left. Again in 1910 a reward for the soldiers of 1870 was refused by the Government.

The Aristotelian theory, that war, like hunting and agriculture, belongs to the natural sources of livelihood (while trade and banking are unnatural), was, despite all modern ideas, brutally confirmed by Prussia in the midst of the nineteenth century. The dynasty of the Hohenzollerns had not only, owing to its victories, risen suddenly from a small Power into the rank of the first European military Power, it had also become materially wealthier, having acquired Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse-Nassau, Hanover, Alsace-Lorraine, five milliards, as well as statesmen and staff officers¹ who made war a personal source of income; to boot, the finest army in the world, a down-trodden people, and a Constitution that only masked and did not curb dynastic omnipotence; that was the harvest of Bismarck's policy. These, as every impartial critic will allow, were purely dynastic gains, which were very soon to develop into distressing losses for the people. One of the few German democrats of those days who did not allow themselves to be led astray by the loquacious humbug of sycophants and orators, namely, the scientist, Karl Vogt, wrote as early as 1870 the prophetic words²:

¹ *Vide* note to p. 46.

² Karl Vogt, "Politische Briefe an Fr. Kolb," p. 18, Biel, 1870,

"In my opinion there is nothing whatever behind the whole Bismarck-Moltke machinery save the desire to perpetuate in Germany the iron military *régime*, and by a marvellous organisation to keep the whole of Germany 'in strict Prussian discipline,' in obedience to its hereditary ruler and in humble subservience to that Providence which is represented on earth by the Government."

This criticism by an influential German has been completely confirmed by Germany's development during the past forty years. Prussia became the model and the ruler, and made of Germany a modern Sparta, admired by many, feared by most, and sincerely loved by none. Step by step it pursued its iron way, from the formation of the Triple Alliance to its naval, colonial, and world-policy, from the threat to France in 1875 to Tangier, Agadir, and Serajevo, with ever-increasing armaments, with more and more boastful journalists, with more and more servile professors, and more and more undemocratic Social Democrats. A new nation, a strong nation, but also, alas! a nation which, as a result of political serfdom, unalleviated by any democratic experience, had remained blind to the dangers of despotism; a nation devoted to peaceful labour and organisation, arbitrarily cut off from politics, which, in its need for gratitude, unthinkingly attributed the marvellous development of German commerce and wealth to the results of Bismarck's policy. Prevented by force from attaining political maturity, it rejoiced in its material development, and at last regarded the "strict Prussian discipline" as God-sent pre-eminence in culture.

WILLIAM II. AND THE WORLD PEACE

When William II. ascended the throne, he already enjoyed the reputation of being a prince of warlike disposition. [Most of the Hohenzollern princes have a similar reputation, from the Emperor William I., who in 1848 was named by the people the "Grapeshot prince" ("Kartätschenprinz"), down to the present Crown Prince of the German Empire, who with his talk of "brisk and joyful war," and so forth, was the despair of every earnest pacifist.]

William II. quickly showed that he was better than his reputation. In his Speech on the occasion of his accession, on June 25th, 1888, he said: "In foreign politics I am resolved to keep the peace with everyone, as far as in me lies. My devotion to the German army and my position in relation to it will never lead me into the temptation of depriving my country of the blessings of peace, unless the necessity of going to war be imposed on us by an attack on the Empire or its allies. Our army shall safeguard our peace, and if peace should none the less be broken, regain it with honour. This it will not fail to achieve, owing to the strength afforded it by the last Army Bill, which you passed unanimously. It is far from my ideas to utilise this power for offensive purposes. Germany needs no further martial glory, nor any conquests whatsoever, now that it has, finally, conquered its right to exist as a united and independent State."

This speech was joyfully welcomed by the German people and sympathetically approved in foreign countries. To be sure, the subsequent utterances of the monarch very soon aroused the disapproval and

indignation of the people, notably, that notorious speech on the occasion of swearing in the recruits at Potsdam (November 23rd, 1891), in which, with an unmistakable allusion to social democracy, he enjoined upon his soldiers to shoot down father and mother at his orders should necessity arise; but our nation is, like all nations, optimistic. The imperial speeches at Hamburg and at the opening of the Kiel Canal (June 18th and 21st, 1895), which were again clear manifestations of the Emperor's love of peace, were enthusiastically received throughout Germany.

As a result of the great talent for speech-making of William II., a whole book could be filled with the speeches he has delivered during his long reign in which he again and again emphasised his desire for peace. Particularly notable in this respect are his speeches at Aix-la-Chapelle on June 19th, 1902, in which he emphasised the spiritual nature of the German world-empire, and that delivered at Bremen on March 22nd, 1905.

But what concerns us democrats and pacifists is not whether a dynasty *desires* peace (that we demand of it in this modern world as a matter of course), but *how* it proposes to secure peace and whether its actions are in agreement with its words. In the above-mentioned speech on his accession, William II. is already speaking of "our army" which is to maintain the peace for us. On October 5th, 1899, we find William II. saying to the Prince of Wales: "Germany possesses an army corresponding to its needs; and, if the British nation has a fleet corresponding to its needs, this will be regarded by the whole of Europe as an important factor in the maintenance of peace." In

his Bremen speech of 1905 he certainly stated that we "never aspire to an empty world dominion," yet he added, "with every new battleship that leaves the yards we have one more guarantee of peace on earth," and "that we can stand, hand on sword, shield lying before us on the ground, and exclaim: *Tamen!* let come what will come." The Emperor's idea that peace could only be sustained by strong and ever stronger armies was still more clearly expressed in his Königsberg speech of August 25th, 1910, in which he said: ". . . so we will be always on the alert, above all keeping our armour without a flaw, in view of the tremendous progress our neighbouring Powers have made. For our peace rests entirely upon our armament."

And like an echo it is repeated in the book "Deutschland in Waffen" ("Germany in Arms"), to which the Crown Prince contributed a preface, that "The sword will, until the end of all things, ever remain the decisive factor."

Upon what then, in the Emperor's mind, does the security of the world's peace rest? Upon armies, battleships, preparations for war, that is to say, upon a constant increase of war material, of militarism, and of the fear which these inspire? The German Emperor's love of peace cannot be better illustrated than by a consideration of the following facts:

The whole policy of William II. towards France was permeated by a certain graciousness. The holding of the international conference for the protection of labour at Berlin (1890) aroused in France, which had just overcome the Boulangist danger, universal approbation, and William II. was proclaimed as

the "Protector of the peace of Europe." Jules Simon, whom the Emperor William II. honoured with his special friendship, published in 1894 in the *Revue de Paris* his impressions of the Berlin Court, obtained after long residence in that city. They amount to an enthusiastic appreciation of the young monarch, which gained for the latter many friends in France. Among other matters, Jules Simon narrates the following observation which William II. made to him relative to a possible collision between Germany and France: "Therefore, I regard the man who should try to drive Germany and France into a war as both a fool and a criminal." Whenever France was shocked by any disaster (the assassination of Carnot, the death of Jules Simon, the fire at the Paris Charity bazaar, the loss of the *Bourgoigne*, the mine explosion of Courrière, etc., etc.), the German Emperor was always ready with his telegrams of sympathy, which were intended to improve the strained Franco-German relations, but were regarded by the French people as a proof of the Emperor's sympathy and desire for peace. The Emperor, on the death of the valiant defender of St. Privat, Marshal Canrobert, even went so far as to express his deep sympathy with the family. In this manner he wished to prove to the French that he was chivalrously and peaceably inclined.

Now compare this demonstration with the fact that William II., neither on the decease of the great pacifist, Bertha von Suttner, nor on any other occasion, addressed a word of encouragement to those pacifists whose purpose it was to secure peace, not by military intimidation, but by the methods of civil law, that is to say, by the development of international law. He

had such an admiration for the hero of St. Privat that he made his death the occasion for a declaration of his peaceable intentions. For the gifted woman who had championed the new ideal of justice and peace he had, despite the fact that she sprang from a highly aristocratic Austrian family, not a word.

It may now be asserted that the Emperor's love of peace was genuine, with the proviso that it was diametrically opposed to the demands of modern humanity, and was so ill-suited to the times in which we live that it was bound, in the long run, to jeopardise the peace of the world.

THE HAGUE CONFERENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

This present catastrophe had been long foretold. People like Tolstoy and Iwan Bloch in Russia; Frédéric Passy, d'Estournelles de Constant, and Jean Jaurès in France; Bertha von Suttner, A. H. Fried, and Bebel in Germany; Herbert Spencer and Norman Angell in England, etc., etc., had again and again declared that Europe was in an unstable condition; that the armaments, which were ostensibly intended to secure peace, as a matter of fact undermined peace, and that the time was at hand when civilised Europe must finally emancipate itself from these barbaric peace-guarantees by forcible methods, and through the development of international law, force its way to a peace based upon the principles of civil law. This modern pacifist idea, which was expounded by Grotius, the Dutchman, and the French abbot de Saint Pierre, and raised by Kant, the German, to a legal science, had gradually, in spite of wars and imperial speeches, found enormous support in the

world, and to the delight and surprise of the universe was, in 1898, presented to civilised humanity for practical discussion by a dynasty.

The Czar of All the Russias, Nicolas II., on August 24th, 1898, invited the Governments of all the States to an International Congress, in order to discuss the possibilities of general disarmament and arbitration. This action is so much in conflict with the main thesis of this book, that I am bound to mention it as a laudable exception to the general rule. It was, in fact, neither the French Republic nor the English democracy that offered this glad hope to the world, but a dynasty by divine right, which was, by reason of its whole tradition, regarded as being the most reactionary in Europe, and from which we might least of all have expected such a step. I need hardly say that we democrats and pacifists have a deep abhorrence of the banishments to Siberia, the pogroms and gallows of Russian policy. We are the first to be horrified at the sufferings of the Russian people, and to place them to the account of the Russian dynasty. Yet all this cannot prevent us from recognising in Nicolas II. a man who, sympathising with the ideas of Tolstoy and Bloch, clearly perceiving the state of the world, honestly endeavoured,¹ despite all dynastic traditions, to establish peace on some other basis than invincible armaments, sharpened swords, and dry powder.

¹ The incorrigible professor of "history," Schiemann, whose oracular sayings are repeated by the whole German national Press, demonstrates, of course from the height of his "science," that the Czar summoned this Conference only out of fear of England (*vide* "Ein Verleumder," Berlin, 1915, p. 9 *et seq.*). I propose that in the future treaty of peace an international

The Czar's proposal was hailed with great enthusiasm by the civilised world, and not least by Germany, but not by the German Government. What? Was there to be any other basis of peace than armies and battleships ready for immediate action? Prussia's whole tradition and political conceptions were doomed if such were the case. Hence, our dynasty regarded the Czar's proposals as so absurd that, from the first day it made no disguise of its attitude. Scarcely two weeks had elapsed from the Czar's manifesto when, on September 7th, 1898, William II. declared at Öynhausen: "Believe me, peace will never be better safeguarded than by a perfectly organised and prepared German army. . . . God grant that it may always be possible for us to preserve the world's peace with this sharp and well-kept arm." This was a categorical rejection of the Czar's ideas. The German Press was so much the more compelled to recognise it as such in that, the following December, a new Army Bill was introduced in the new Reichstag. As a reply to the Czar's proposal, the German Government demanded a vote of about 27 millions more for the equipment of the army. There is an almost comic contradiction in the fact that in the Imperial Speech at the opening of the Reichstag (on December 6th, 1898) the "pressing necessity" of this increase in the new army budget

agreement shall be contained to this effect: "Whosoever, as public political writer or speaker, in questions of foreign politics, knowingly and demonstrably perverts the truth shall, in the name of Peace, be punished with. . . ." By this means one would checkmate the mischief-making and deliberate instigators of war, and, in the interests of peace, free Europe from a danger which, under the cloak of learning, is a disgrace to civilised humanity.

is emphasised, and (following it) "the warm sympathy" with which William II. greets "the noble suggestion of my dear friend—His Majesty the Czar of Russia—for the meeting of an International Conference."

Acting on the hints conveyed by the Imperial speech at Öynhausen, the German Press commenced to treat the idea of disarmament and arbitration as childish utopianism, or a cunning trap for Germany. When, in spite of all these attempts to frustrate it, the Conference proposed by the Czar nevertheless took place in May, 1899, the German delegates were instructed by their Imperial Government to wreck the whole magnificent plan. These delegates, who, be it remembered, did not represent at The Hague the views and wishes of the German people, but, as the personal nominees of the German Emperor, only those of the German dynasty, were Count Münster, the German Ambassador at Paris, the Munich professor, Baron von Stengel, Privy Councillor Dr. Zorn, professor at Königsberg, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, and Captain von Siegel of the Imperial Navy.

The very selection of these delegates was equivalent to a mockery of the idea of disarmament, for, only a few weeks previously, Professor Stengel had published a violent pamphlet against the Czar's proposal.

The attitude of the German delegates aroused the indignation of the other members of the Conference.

At the fifth sitting of the Commission (June 26th, 1899) Colonel von Schwarzhoff replied to the Russian proposal that the Powers should pledge themselves not to increase their armies for the present, and then enter into an agreement not to increase for a definite

period the existing strength of their armies, in these terms :

"The German nation is *not* oppressed by the burden of armament and taxation; it is not sliding downwards on a steep path; it is not advancing towards ruin and exhaustion. On the contrary; both public and private wealth are increasing, the general wealth, the standard of life is rising year by year." And then he shelters himself behind technical questions, maintains that there is a great difference between a domestic law voting the army for five years and a binding international convention, etc., and, finally, ends by declaring categorically that he cannot accept the proposal.

In the question of obligatory arbitration, Professor Zorn stated his views in the seventh meeting of the third Commission (July 20th, 1899) as follows: "to take this momentous step without sufficient experience seems to me dangerous and likely to lead to dissension rather than to harmony. I think that the German nation is not alone in regarding the question from this point of view." And, that there should be no mistake, he adds. "Had the article (touching obligatory arbitration) had a formal juristic character, it would have been unacceptable to me. In this case, I should have been in complete accord with the objections raised by the representatives of the Balkan States. As it stands, it has no formal juristic character whatever, it only contains a recommendation of a purely moral nature. In other words: I refuse obligatory arbitration, but I willingly accept optional arbitration, because it does not bind us to anything."

Professor Zorn further advanced in the commission of inquiry that the German Government could only deliver its opinion as to the organisation of a permanent Court of Arbitration after having had previous experience of a temporary one. Zorn, in obedience to his instructions, refused to be talked round, and again declared that, for the present, he could only agree to a "temporary" permanent Court of Arbitration.¹

It was Professor Zorn also who resolutely insisted on the removal of the word "Tribunal" and demanded the title "Cour permanente d'arbitrage," instead of the original "Tribunal permanent d'arbitrage." We see here the same spirit at work as that which, fifteen years later, prompted the writing of the arrogant words: "It is impossible for us to drag our ally, in its dispute with Serbia, before a European court" (German White Book, Exhibit 12). The actions of

¹In the course of the World War, Professor Zorn, in a controversy with the French senator, d'Estournelles de Constant, and the Swiss professor, O. Nippold, has been forced to confess that the attitude of the German representatives at The Hague left something to be desired (*vide* Nos. 1134, 1171, and 1278 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 1916). Professor Zorn, who is still in an official position, cannot, of course, admit that the assertion of d'Estournelles de Constant and Nippold (that the representatives of the German Government had, in obedience to instructions, thwarted the endeavours of the Conference) is in all points correct, and can be substantiated by numerous documents. Yet his assurances to the contrary lack the note of sincerity. Moreover, with all due respect to Professor Zorn's scientific knowledge, we must strongly question his impartiality. Professor Zorn is not a free agent. Anyone who is capable of writing such an article as he published in the *Woche* ("Unserm Kaiser," January 23rd, 1915)—a specimen of the most absolute submission and servility—has forfeited the right to have a voice in the republic of Letters.

God-ordained dynasties are not subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary mortals.

It is impossible here to enter into all the details of the negotiations. But I cannot forbear to cite a few passages from a book¹ by the President of the American delegation to The Hague. These passages have the value of historical documents. Mr. Andrew White writes on May 24th:

“Meeting Count Münster, who, after M. de Staal, is very generally considered the most important personage here, we discussed the subject of arbitration. To my great regret, I found him entirely opposed to it, or at least to any well-developed plan. He did not say that he would oppose a moderate plan for voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no other country is or can be; that she can mobilise her army in ten days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other Power can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival Powers time to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore be a great disadvantage to Germany.”

Again, under date June 12th:

“More surprising was the conversation of Count Münster. Bearing in mind that the Emperor William, during his long talk with me just before I left Berlin, in referring to the approaching Peace Congress, had said that he was sending Count Münster because what

¹ Andrew D. White, “My Autobiography.” White was at that time American Ambassador in Berlin, and, as can be gathered from his book, a personal friend of William II. and was well acquainted with and a sincere admirer of Germany.

the Conference would most need would be 'common sense,' and because, in his opinion, Count Münster had 'lots of it,' some of the Count's utterances astonished me. He now came out, as he did the day before in his talk with me, utterly against arbitration, declaring it a 'humbug,' and that we had no right to consider it, since it was not mentioned in the first proposals from Russia, etc.

"It is clear that, with all his fine qualities—and he is really a splendid specimen of an old-fashioned German nobleman devoted to the diplomatic service of his country—he is saturated with the ideas of fifty years ago."

Again, June 13th, he writes:

"This morning come more disquieting statements regarding Germany. There seems to longer any doubt that the German Emperor is opposing arbitration and, indeed, the whole work of the Conference, and that he will insist on his main allies, Austria and Italy, going with him. . . . I had learned from a high Imperial official, before I left Berlin, that the Emperor considered arbitration as derogatory to his sovereignty, and I was also well aware, from his conversation, that he was by no means in love with the Conference idea; but, in view of his speech at Wiesbaden, and the petitions which had come in to him from Bavaria, I had hoped that he had experienced a 'change of heart.'

"Possibly he might have changed his opinion had not Count Münster been here, reporting to him constantly against every step taken by the Conference. . . . There is no telling what stumbling blocks Germany and her allies may put in our way; and, of course, the whole result, without their final agreement,

will seem to the world a failure and, perhaps, a 'farce.'

"The immediate results will be that the Russian Emperor will become an idol of the 'plain people' throughout the world, the German Emperor will be bitterly hated, and the Socialists, who form the most dreaded party on the Continent of Europe, will be furnished with a thoroughly effective weapon against their rulers.

"Some days ago I said to a leading diplomatist here: 'The Ministers of the German Emperor ought to tell him that, should he oppose arbitration, there will be concentrated upon him an amount of hatred which no Minister ought to allow a sovereign to incur.' To this he answered: 'That is true; but there is not a Minister in Germany who dares tell him.' "

June 15th:

"I then spoke very earnestly to him—more so than ever before—about the present condition of affairs. I told him that the counsellors in whom the Emperor trusted—such men as himself and the principal advisers of His Majesty—ought never to allow their young sovereign to be exposed to the mass of hatred, obloquy, and opposition which would converge upon him from all nations in case he became known to the whole world as the sovereign who had broken down the Conference and brought to naught the plan of arbitration. I took the liberty of telling him what the Emperor said about the Count himself—namely, that what the Conference was most likely to need was good common sense, and that he was sending Count Münster because he possessed that. This seemed to please him, and I then went on to say that he of all men ought to prevent, by all means, placing the young

Emperor in such a position. I dwelt on the gifts and graces of the young sovereign, expressed my feeling of admiration for his noble ambitions, for his abilities, for the statesmanship he had recently shown, for his grasp of public affairs, and for his way of conciliating all classes, and then dwelt on the pity of making such a monarch an object of hatred in all parts of the world.

"He seemed impressed by this, but said the calling of the Conference was simply a political trick—the most despicable trick ever practised. It was done, he said, mainly to embarrass Germany, to glorify the young Russian Emperor, and to put Germany and nations which Russia dislikes into a false position. To this I answered, 'If this be the case, why not trump the Russian trick? or, as the poker players say, "go one better," take them at their word, support a good tribunal of arbitration more efficient even than the Russians have dared to propose; let your sovereign throw himself heartily into the movement and become a recognised leader and power here; we will all support him, and to him will come the credit of it.'"

June 16th:

"This morning Count Münster called and seemed much excited by the fact that he had received a despatch from Berlin in which the German Government—which, of course, means the Emperor—had strongly and finally declared against anything like an arbitration tribunal. He was clearly disconcerted by this too literal acceptance of his own earlier views. . . .

"Later Count Münster told me that he had decided to send Professor Zorn to Berlin at once in order to

lay the whole matter before the Foreign Office and induce the authorities to modify the instructions. I approved this course strongly, whereupon he suggested that I should do something to the same purpose, and this finally ended in the agreement that Holls should go with Zorn."

Mr. White wrote a long private note to Herr von Bülow (then a *persona grata* with William II.), explaining the intricacies of the case and imploring him to bring the Emperor to reason: "I present them to you as man to man, not only in the interest of good relations between Germany and the United States, but of interests common to all the great nations of the earth—of their common interest in giving something like satisfaction to a desire so earnest and widespread as that which has been shown in all parts of the world for arbitration."

All in vain.

On June 21st Mr. White had to make the following entry in his diary:

"Bülow has sent to the Emperor my long private letter to himself, urgently urging the acceptance by Germany of our plan of arbitration. Prince Hohenlohe seems to have entered most cordially into our ideas, giving Holls a card which would admit him to the Emperor, and telegraphing a request that His Majesty see him. But the Emperor was still upon his yacht at sea, and Holls could stay no longer. Bülow is trying to make an appointment for him to meet the Emperor at the close of the week."

The battle was lost. White, on July 29th, made the following ironical entry in reference to the solemn final sitting of The Hague Conference:

"Count Münster, the presiding delegate from Germany, replied in French, and apparently extemporaneously. It must have been pain and grief to him, for he was obliged to speak respectfully in the first place of the Conference, which for some weeks he had affected to despise; and, secondly, of arbitration and the other measures proposed, which he had denounced as humbug; and, finally, he had to speak respectfully of M. de Staal, to whom he had steadily shown decided dislike. He did the whole thing quite well, all things considered."

No progressively inclined German reader can fail to read these sketches by a ("neutral") high-minded American without a pang. They afford a glimpse behind the scenes of the workings of the world's history. Whilst a comedy of good will is being played upon the stage, behind it the powers of progress are desperately striving against the forces of darkness. As disarmament is impossible in face of the dynastic power, the dynastic conception is victorious all along the line. The first Hague Conference firstly renounced the idea of disarmament, and, secondly, that of obligatory arbitration. Its whole result remained a possible arbitration tribunal which in practice is worthless.

The German delegates, in conformity with their instructions, and owing to their petty bureaucratic objections, rendered a question of vital import for the world at large null and void, and as a reward for this meritorious work Count Münster received the title of "Prince" from the Emperor.

Given the choice between mediævalism and modernism, that is to say, between brute force and the modern

civilised conception of peace guarantees, the dynasty, here again in accordance with the Imperial Constitution, declared itself for "the maintenance of existing conditions." How could it be otherwise? For the first time in the world's history The Hague Conferences endeavoured to create that "League of Nations" demanded by Kant as a "fundamental condition" of eternal peace. But Kant clearly stated: "the civil constitution of every State must be republican!" In fact, the conception of peace by rightful methods can only be realised when all States have a more or less republican form of government. This self-evident condition of international understanding has hitherto (for obvious reasons) not been insisted on by any leading representative of the science of pacifism, but it is logically contained in the whole idea. For the chief aim of The Hague Conferences was, after all, the final extirpation of the divine right of dynasties to dictate war and peace.

We do not know how Nicholas II., in a given case, would have responded to this fundamental demand expressed by Kant. But we have seen, from the conduct of the German delegates at The Hague, that William II. strongly disapproved of it. William II. has never recognised the right of national assemblies. And even supposing that, in the interests of the world's peace, he had been prepared, for his own part, to renounce a portion of his sovereignty—that is to say, in questions of foreign policy to admit the co-operation and control of the Reichstag—would he have been able to do so? He was, in fact, bound hand and foot by that Camarilla which, in the absence of a controlling

national assembly, always surrounds the person of an absolute ruler. Wherever, as in Prusso-Germany, the responsible advisers and popular representatives are reduced to mere ciphers, the reins of power pass into the hands of the irresponsible.

The omnipotence of those irresponsible advisers, founded on Article 11 of the German Imperial Constitution, the impotence of the German popular assembly, and the absolute belief of William II. in his divine mission; these, as everywhere else, were the decisive factors in "our" attitude at The Hague. Hand in glove with the Turk, we had demonstrated to the world that we were that European nation which, in defiance of all democratic tendencies, obstinately held to our "shining armour" and our "faultless equipment;" that is to say, were prepared to pit our military might against the noblest aspirations of civilised humanity. A man of a world-wide reputation, like Mommsen, could scoff at The Hague Conferences as being a "printer's error" in the world's history, and gain the applause of the Government Press. The National Liberal leader, Bassermann, told the Reichstag that "a more pacific review of the situation" would only ensue when The Hague Conferences were "happily vanquished." No less ironic and contemptuous were the expressions of the Prussian Minister of War of that time.¹ All persons of reputation and influence in Germany considered themselves, with a few exceptions, bound to follow the Government's lead and to represent The

¹ *Vide*, A. H. Fried, "Handbuch der Friedensbewegung," vol. 2, p. 174.

Hague Conferences as utopianism or a cunning device on the part of Germany's enemies.¹

Thus Germany, in the midst of a world filled with new aspirations and hopes, deliberately isolated herself. Instead of here taking the lead (as would have been only becoming in the Fatherland of Kant), and thus making herself a link between Western and Eastern civilisation, our dynasty insisted that in the future, as hitherto, the Rhine, and not the Vistula, should be the frontier between democracy and autocracy. In sure reliance upon its military invincibility, our Government, with an allusion to the geographical position of Germany, declared for the perpetuation of a policy which, just by reason of this geographical position, was the most dangerous for Germany that could be conceived of.

For what was the result of The Hague Conferences? An unconquerable mistrust of Germany by all other States and, as a consequence of this, their natural desire for union and protection. Thus it was our dynasty that itself created the menace of which it to-day so bitterly complains.

Republican France was not linked to imperial Russia by any ties. The former was the birthplace of the rights of civilisation and humanity, the land of liberty and of popular government; the latter a still

¹ Moreover, the German Press and the German White Book relative to The Hague Conferences were forced to falsify the account of the negotiations at The Hague; otherwise, the German reader might not have understood the brutally unaccommodating attitude of the German delegates (*cf.* Schücking, "Die Organisation der Welt." Alfr. Kröner, Leipzig, 1909, p. 605, and O. Nippold, "Die zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz." Duncker und Humblot, Leipzig, vol. 2, p. 201).

semi-barbaric police- and official-ridden State, devoid of constitution and culture, the most crying contrast to France. It was Bismarck who, in spite of the formation of the Triple Alliance, contrived for two whole decades to maintain the so-called "insurance policy" with Russia. William II. embarked upon a new course, which first revealed itself in the dismissal of the Russophil Chancellor. Hardly two years had elapsed, when the Romanoffs, who had always been the allies of the Hohenzollerns, became the allies of republican France. This unnatural alliance, as we must repeat again and again to those who bemoan the "encirclement of Germany," only took place ten years *after* the formation of the Triple Alliance. Until about 1900 it had remained more or less undefined. But when Germany had laid its cards on the table at The Hague, it took such a positive form that France, now feeling its increased security, was enabled to realise a long-desired popular reform, and in 1905 introduced the two-years' military service.

But the lesson of The Hague influenced England's policy to a still greater degree. Nothing could seemingly have brought the English and the French together. They were separated by quarrels dating centuries back. Both Louis XIV.'s colonial aspirations and those of Napoleon I. had been ruthlessly annihilated by the English. They had, in league with Prussia, overthrown the aspiration for world-empire of the Capets as they had that of the Great Corsican. The Boer War and the humiliation of Fashoda had, towards the close of the nineteenth century, so aggravated the Anglo-French antagonism that numerous distinguished French politicians had declared: "With

Germany against perfidious Albion!" Professor Oncken¹ even tells us that France and Russia, "when the Boer War was at its height . . . addressed a proposal to the German Government to join with them in forcibly bringing the war to a conclusion, and thus save the Boers and humble England to the dust." Now it was doubtless a fact that William II. refused this Franco-Russian suggestion in order, as Professor Oncken says, "not to come into conflict with a naval Power like England." But Oncken, alas! does not inform us why William II. did not at least utilise this splendid chance of ameliorating Germany's relations both with France and Russia, and of aggravating England's dangerous "splendid isolation," at any rate morally, by relieving the Franco-German tension.

Here, as always, William II. followed his own plans. He had long before this, by his sudden initiation of a very ambitious naval and colonial policy, converted the centuries-old sympathy of England for Prussia into silent mistrust. This mistrust turned to indignation when, on January 3rd, 1896, William II. dispatched that notorious telegram to the President of the South African Republic, congratulating him on having "annihilated the armed forces that had broken the peace and invaded his country, and preserved its independence against attacks from without." William II. certainly endeavoured to make good this public insult by conferring the Order of the Black Eagle upon Lord Roberts, and making his troops, in September, 1897, cheer Queen Victoria, etc. But when at Stettin (September 23rd, 1898) he uttered the

¹ "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 478.

phrase that subsequently became a winged word in Germany, "Our future lies on the water!" then, even the dullest Englishman understood that the "new course" was a zigzag one, the aim of which was hidden from the ordinary mortal, but that it was in any event a course hostile to England.

Yet in vain England looked around for friends. The Russians in East Asia and Persia, the French in Morocco and Egypt, were against her. The sympathies of the entire world were then on the side of the little Boer nation, struggling so heroically for its independence. No one wanted to have anything to do with the Englishman. Ever since Napoleon's days he had been decried as a selfish, brutal shopkeeper, and his oversea policy brought him into conflict with the whole world. Then came the first Hague Conference. What ten years of English friendliness towards France could not effect was achieved in a few months by the attitude of the German Government at The Hague Conference, namely, the Anglo-French *rapprochement*, and, at the same time, the consolidation of the Franco-Russian Alliance.

The whole perspective was changed in a moment. Yesterday isolated and hated, to-day England possessed two powerful friends: "We" had, almost by force, driven them into her arms. Yesterday in a position to gain Franco-Russian sympathies, or at any rate to keep the old English sympathies, Germany to-day found herself suddenly isolated, mistrusted and feared by the whole world.

* * * * *

The German dynasty did not perceive in this threatening aspect of things the fruits of her military co-

ercive policy. The Power that possesses the strongest army in the world is infallible. When, in 1907, the second Hague Conference was called, in order, in spite of the first plain refusal of the German Government, to continue nevertheless the difficult task of securing a democratic guarantee of peace, the opportunity was not made use of by William II. in order to conciliate and to disarm the democratic coalition of Europe against him (it would have been such an easy and graceful task); but he continued in his old paths. He did not, to be sure, again dispatch the same uncouth delegates to The Hague, but, on this occasion, men with better manners and better intentions; but he would not recede a single inch from his conception of peace as based upon force of arms.¹

As in 1899, so also in 1907, Germany was again the sole Great Power that formally rejected the institution of compulsory arbitration, and so nullified the chief task of the second Hague Conference. Baron Marshall von Bieberstein, president of the German delegation, in the fourth sitting of the first Commission (October 5th, 1907), in reply to the proposals to com-

¹ Even before its opening, the second Hague Conference was treated in the Reichstag with mockery and derision (sittings of April 23rd, 24th, and 30th, 1907). The Prussian Minister for War, von Einem, jeered: "The Governments will, in any case, put forward still further demands." The anti-Semitic Liebermann von Sonnenberg remarked contemptuously: "This whole peace movement is only a matter for old women and degenerates. We place our trust in God and our superlative army. . . . We have still our mailed fist—let them only come." The Agrarian, Oldenburg von Januschau, said: "If we Conservatives had our way, we should send the Minister of War to The Hague" (applause from the Conservative benches), etc., etc.

pel the nations to submit to arbitration by means of permanent arbitration treaties (world-treaty), stated that he had first to regret that a certain unanimity prevailed in the assembly for making arbitration obligatory; he was sorry to be in the minority; but he could not agree to the system of a compulsory world arbitration treaty. Germany had since 1899 made satisfactory application of the optional arbitration which had been established at that date, and had already concluded two treaties of this character. She would continue in the future to adhere to this "individual system," that is to say, to conclude only such arbitration treaties as she desired. But Germany would not be coerced into concluding such treaties with all the nations of the world. Such compulsion would have an irritating rather than a calming effect upon the world-situation. One must not always be snatching at moral effects and momentary successes; it behoved one to seek rather after practical results, etc., etc. Equally emphatic was Privy Councillor Kriege, when he declared before the Commission of Examination on August 6th, 1907: Germany could accept none of the proposals put forward for making adjustment of disputes by arbitration universally compulsory. Just as for a hundred years past in German internal politics, it was repeatedly asserted by the German delegates at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 that the question was not yet ripe; they must not be precipitate; experience must first be collected; too hasty action might effect the exact opposite of what was intended, etc. In the eyes of dynasties, nations are *never* sufficiently mature to decide their own destinies.

Owing to this attitude of the German delegates, the second Hague Conference could make but little alteration in the resolutions of the first. In fact, it only supplemented them in respect of a few minor points (for instance, the institution of a legal procedure).

It is noteworthy that even the representative of an Asiatic despotism like Persia declared that the advantages of a world arbitration treaty were so great, and the guarantees it offered to the whole world so considerable, that it was the duty of the Conference to remove the comparatively insignificant obstacles.

All in vain!

When the final vote was given on this proposal, thirty-two States were in its favour, nine against it, and three (among them Italy) refrained from voting. Those against the proposal were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey (upon principle), Rumania (out of friendship for Germany), Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro (because they were at that time already preparing their war of liberation against Turkey), and finally (for purely formal reasons) Switzerland and Belgium. Seeing that such Conferences do not act like Parliaments, that is to say, the majority does not impose its will upon the minority, but can only pass a resolution upon the basis of unanimity, "the great central problem of the whole Conference" (as Professor Zorn himself styled compulsory arbitration) was again left unsolved.

The aim of the German dynasty, therefore, was here, as everywhere else in their foreign policy, to discredit the whole principle of international law. The same mentality that approves annexation against the will of the annexed, and, in foreign policy, system-

atically ignores the popular will, was also bent, in a diplomatic discussion of this principle of international law, on securing its absolute rejection.

Touching the result of this second Hague Conference, Professor O. Nippold very clearly states:¹ "It appears to me that the German Imperial Government should, from a diplomatic point of view, have arrived at an entirely opposite conclusion. . . . For the impression which 'the irreconcilable opposition' of the German Delegation was bound to make upon the other States was a factor impossible to underestimate. . . . It is clear, at any rate, that the German Delegation, in the case in question, was opposed by general opinion at The Hague, and that it did not allow itself to be influenced by this fact in the slightest degree. The delegates of the other civilised States left The Hague under this impression. Will not this fact make itself felt politically?" And again, p. 217: "Twist and turn the objections to the Arbitration Court how you will, they were in any case not of such importance as to justify a nation in so seriously compromising its whole international and political situation for their sake."

It had been already sufficiently compromised by the first Hague Conference! Professor Nippold might have added. For the political isolation of Germany had been accomplished at the first Hague Conference. Instead of using the second Conference to recover lost ground our Government completed the "work of encirclement" of King Edward VII.: the Franco-Russo-English Entente now became an open offensive and defensive alliance against Germany. Germany was

¹"Die Zweite Haager Konferenz," Leipzig, 1908, pp. 213-14.

now surrounded by a world of "silent foes," less animated by a desire for Germany's military humiliation than by a common desire to get rid, once and for all, of that era of useless and yet so expensive competitive armament, which since Bismarck's day had descended upon Europe and stifled all healthy progress.

WHY ALL ATTEMPTS AT UNDERSTANDING WERE WITHOUT RESULT

It must be confessed that the Chauvinists and war parties in France, England, and Russia took full advantage of the new situation of affairs created by the attitude of the German dynasty, and that, owing to their machinations, the warlike mood in those countries became intensified as much as in Germany itself. Germany has not the monopoly of warlike feelings. It is true that no modern State can boast of a Moltke, who regarded war as part of the divine ordinance of the universe, and scoffed at the idea of perpetual peace as a dream, "and not even a beautiful dream." It is true that no other country possesses "thinkers" who, like Hegel, Treitschke, Mommsen, Lasson, Schieman, Liman, Lamprecht, Bernhardi, Harden, etc., etc., preach war as being the supreme aim of policy; and still less do other countries possess celebrities who, like Clausewitz, Hartmann, Bronsart von Schellendorf, von der Goltz, Hindenburg and others, declare a brutal mode of warfare to be the most humane, because it is, so they say, the shortest. But, even if other countries in their intellectual glorification of war are far behind the country of Kant and Goethe, yet in them also there were and are a great number who,

for one reason or another, have an interest in war. France, England, and Russia have, like Germany, a "national Press" which, as has been proved, stands at the service of the manufacturers of war materials and methodically moulds popular opinion in favour of war. They have a war budget, great industries working for war, influential officials, traders, and financiers, whose greed of gain increases with the increasing desire for war. In short, they also possess the same methods, developments, and influences, which, in the case of all Great Powers, foster those phenomena and activities that we collectively style Chauvinism, Nationalism, and so forth.

It would have been in some degree unnatural if these people and this Press, now that the German dynasty had for the second time flatly refused to agree to an international legal organisation for safeguarding the peace, had not been more clamorous than ever; but, as regards the assertions of the German Government that the Triple Entente was a cynical land-partitioning syndicate, that the cause of the war was envy of Germany's increased prosperity, and so forth, it ought in fairness to be mentioned that the forces working for war in France, England, and Russia were dwindling forces, and were not supported by public opinion, and, further, that in no case did they possess any demonstrable and effectual share of political power.

France, in particular, studiously endeavoured to give Germany no cause for mistrusting her or her policy. In 1905 she dismissed her Minister Delcassé, because the formation of the Triple Entente seemed to have made him arrogant and eager for war. In

the same way she not only most readily agreed to all the German proposals in the Morocco affair, but repeatedly made others of her own, as, for instance, in July, 1911, when Germany, by the dispatch of the *Panther*, insisted on her claims in Morocco. There is, indeed, in the whole of Germany scarcely a single serious politician who sincerely attempted to assert and prove that the policy of France had during the past ten years been defiant and warlike. Even our Government has never gone so far as to contend that France was to blame for the outbreak of this war.

Germany much more regards England as responsible for the establishment of the Triple Entente and the outbreak of the World War. But it is easy to show that in England also the elements favourable to war nowhere exercised any appreciable influence upon public opinion or even upon the Government. Allowing it to be true that the Triple Entente was due to England, it is equally true that England only regarded this entente as a defensive alliance. England's endeavours to arrive at an understanding with Germany as regards naval armament have in the last ten years been so numerous, so energetic, and so conciliatory, that their genuineness cannot be impugned, and one can only wonder how responsible German politicians can absolutely ignore them. On the occasion of the World-Peace Congress in London (1908), Lloyd George made an enthusiastic speech in favour of an Anglo-German understanding, as did also the Prime Minister Asquith, at the Lord Mayor's banquet in London of the same year. Even more clear in its intention was Asquith's speech in the House of Commons on March 16th, 1909, which found an echo in

the Reichstag, but was dismissed by our Imperial Chancellor with the remark that he anticipated no tangible results from negotiations touching the limitation of naval construction.¹ McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty, stated in the House of Commons in July, 1909, that England in the past three years could show not only words but deeds towards promoting an Anglo-German understanding.

England's unceasing endeavours to bring about an understanding with Germany were openly acknowledged in a sitting of the Reichstag on December 10th, 1910, by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who said: "Regarding our relations with England and the alleged negotiations with her, as to a contractual limitation of naval armaments, I must at once say that it is, certainly, *publici juris*, that the British Government has repeatedly expressed the wish to enter into a treaty to this end. The English Government made a like suggestion at The Hague, and has since then repeatedly renewed it, without, however, formulating any definite proposals which could form a basis for acceptance or rejection." It is thoroughly characteristic that this text of the Imperial Chancellor's speech was "modified" by Wolff's Bureau by substituting the words: "fixing of the naval strength" for "limitation of armaments."²

¹In July, 1906, England had reduced her Naval Estimates by 25 per cent. for battleships, by 60 per cent. for destroyers, and by 33 per cent. for submarines, and this voluntarily; and, moreover, expressly declared that she took this step in order, before the meeting of the next Hague Conference, to show the world that she was prepared to take the lead in disarmament, in the hope that other nations would follow suit.

²Cf. Bertha von Suttner, "Der Kampf um Vermeidung des Weltkrieges," vol. 2, p. 295 (Orell Füssli, Zürich, 1917.)

The more the English Ministers tried to press our Government for a public discussion of the problem, the cooler the reception they found at the hands of the German Government and the more were they mocked at by our Pan-German Press. In reply to a further request on the part of Sir Edward Grey, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg clearly stated in a sitting of the Reichstag on March 30th, 1911, that the question of disarmament was insoluble "as long as men remained men and States remained States." That reads almost like a sneer at the repeated English proposals for an understanding. But England's Liberal Ministers refused to be discouraged; and at the beginning of February, 1912, dispatched their Minister of War—Haldane—on a private mission to Berlin, in order, in a private audience, to consult with the Emperor and Chancellor as to the possibilities of an understanding. We are aware to-day, from the Chancellor's speech of August 19th, 1915, that our Government then suggested to England that she should, in the event of a Continental war, in any case, remain neutral; in other words, separate from the Triple Entente. England offered to give Germany the formal assurance that she would not attack her, but Germany demanded, in addition, the assurance of English neutrality in any event. Without acting the traitor to her allies, England could not agree to these terms.

England made yet more advances. The new Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, stated in the House of Commons, on March 18th, 1912, that England was prepared to repeat the experiment of the voluntary reduction of the fleet, as in 1906; if Germany ceased adding to her armaments or even reduced them,

England would, in any case, do the same, "which would be a blessing for both countries."

And, finally, Churchill, on March 26th, 1913, proposed to Germany a naval holiday of a year to begin with, during which time both countries should engage not to build any new ships of war.

All to no purpose. The English Ministers were secretly scoffed at in Berlin. How could they possibly, after their experiences at The Hague, seriously persist in clinging to the utopian idea that Germany desired any other peace-guarantee save that of ever more formidable armaments? The logic of our leading junkers and Pan-Germanists absolutely annihilated the logic of the most enlightened minds in England: if England built ships, the Reventlows, Rohrbachs and Chamberlains and their followers exclaimed, Beware! The English are preparing for war! Why? It is clear that they intend to attack us. We are lost if we do not also prepare. But if England built no ships and voluntarily reduced her naval estimates, if the Czar proposed a Peace Conference, and the English Admiralty a naval holiday, if France reduced her period of military service? Then, the same gentlemen vociferated yet more noisily: Beware! We are going to be tricked! These English, French, and Russians are so cunning, that they will speak of peace to our face and continue to make preparations for war behind our back. They want to give the stupid honest German another box on the ear. We are done for, if we do not meet these deceitful tricks by a further increase of armaments!

If, finally, the responsible leaders of the Entente gave way in despair before this marvellous logic, which

was constantly and vigorously re-echoed in the Emperor's speeches, and if, consequently, the Belgian Ministers at Petrograd, London, and Paris had to report¹ a certain nervousness and warlike mood, who was really to blame? Who did actually "encircle" us? The diplomacy of the Triple Entente, which offered "us" not only one but a hundred opportunities of putting things on a different footing? Or was it not rather our dynasty, which, conscious of its military might, in reliance upon its old German God, obstinately stuck to its mediæval principles, and regarded peace

¹ It may be mentioned in this connection that the Belgian documents found in Brussels, and since published by Mittler & Sohn, of Berlin, do, as a fact, afford much incriminating evidence touching the policy pursued by the Triple Entente. The majority of writers who wish to exculpate Germany of any guilt in this war studiously avoid reference to The Hague Conference and to the account given by the American Ambassador, Mr. Andrew White, and only talk of the Belgian papers and documents, about which they write whole reams. But it is evident that the German Government did not publish *all* the documents found in Brussels. Both dates and numbering show that a careful selection was made. Moreover, it is here, as in most diplomatic reports, a question only of a survey of transitory moods without reference to their causes. Diplomats are not historians. Otherwise, they would in the case before us have had to point out that the nervous feelings and tendencies in Paris, London, and Petrograd were but the logical outcome of the German Government's attitude at The Hague Conference. The preliminary history of the war in the narrower sense begins with July 23rd, 1914, but the preliminary history of the war in the wider, more general sense begins with August 24th, 1898, that is to say, with the Czar's Conference proposal. Whoever writes on the history of the "encirclement" without referring to The Hague Conferences will describe effects without causes. And it is only considered in relation to this fact that the reports of the Belgian Ministers have any historical value.

as being only the fruit of incessant preparations for war?

And what authentic evidence do the German historians possess that this encirclement was part of a malicious plan to compass our humiliation in the field? I have sought long and conscientiously for actual (that is to say, emanating from the Governments of the Triple Entente) warlike actions or threats; to this end I have read a host of German writing, all of which promised to furnish this evidence. But, alas! here again I had the same experience as in the case of the Serbian machinations, the invasions of Cossacks, the bombs on Nuremberg, and other crimes of the Triple Entente. That is to say, I found nothing but assertions, accompanied by citations of opinions, books, speeches, and manifestoes of the Chauvinists in France, England, and Russia, but never of responsible people occupying a position of authority. If books, newspapers, speeches and manifestoes of *private people* are to be taken to prove anything at all in regard to the desire for war of a *Government*, then this evidence will turn out to our overwhelming disadvantage. For no country in the world possesses so abundant, so ponderous, so "scientifically" and systematically constructed a war-literature as the Germany of the last forty years. As far as the Press and the disposition of a certain circle is concerned, we too appear in a very unfavourable light. Only a year before the war Professor Nippold published a little work,¹ which contains a most alarming collection of Press extracts and quotations from the most respected

¹Otfried Nippold, "Der deutsche Chauvinismus," Stuttgart, 1913.

German politicians and newspapers, in which the necessity of a war of conquest is frankly alluded to. If there was a League of Patriots in Germany there was a Pan-German League quite ten times as strong, both as regards membership and influence, as well as a Defence League, a Naval League, an Eastern Marches League, a Peasants' League, and other powerful associations, which, protected by the official good will, devoted their chief energies to popularising the notion of conquest, and, since the beginning of the World War have clamoured with one voice for annexations.

Truly, people who disregard a Crown Prince, a Bernhardt, a Pan-German League, with their enormous intellectual, financial, and moral resources, in order to heap abuse upon a Delcassé, a Lansdowne, or an Iswolsky, and to draw attention to the machinations of the French League of Patriots, give the impression of people who trip up in the street over a straw, while in their room is a beam, which they do not choose to see.¹

It looked for a moment as though the German dynasty had at length realised that a new era had dawned, in which disputes between nations could be as

¹ As Germans, we have no cause to uphold the policy of Monsieur Delcassé. As pacifists, however, we may perhaps recall the fact that on January 23rd, 1893, Delcassé said in the Chamber that France had been the first nation to approve the Czar's proposal for disarmament. And he added: "Differences must, unfortunately, always arise between great States, but I believe (the friends of peace have long believed it!) that there are none that it would not be possible to settle by a spirit of conciliation. And in this spirit I settled the Fashoda affair." Has any German statesman of the last decade ever spoken in this way? I have sought for an instance, but I have not found one.

easily referred to a civil tribunal as disputes between individuals. On September 25th, 1908, French soldiers forcibly arrested certain deserters from the Foreign Legion under the protection of the German Consul at Casablanca. This episode threatened a serious conflict with France. To the general satisfaction of Europe, this squabble was promptly settled by a decision of The Hague Tribunal (May 22nd, 1909).

This proves that the German dynasty was, in spite of its unaccommodating attitude at The Hague, ready to adapt itself to the new principle of arbitration. Moreover, the peaceful adjustment of the far more momentous Franco-German difference in the matter of the Agadir warship (at the beginning of June, 1911) seemed to prove that Germany's foreign policy had adopted something of that modern spirit which the whole world was so anxious to see in her.

In the years immediately preceding the World War the Reichstag had become a mere shadow of the dynastic sun. In the spring of 1912, the Minister for War had solemnly promised that, after passing the moderate Army Bill, it would for a long time not be asked to vote any new Bill for increasing the military strength. As if in mockery of his promise, hardly a year later, the biggest military budget in the history of the world was laid before it. This measure at one stroke raised the strength of the army by 25 per cent., and demanded of the German citizen that, in addition to existing taxation, he should furnish another £40,000,000. Thus, in the midst of peace, a demand was made upon the German people that not even vanquished and ruined France had asked her citizens to agree to, when she had to pay £200,000,000 to Ger-

many. It was manifest to persons of any penetration that William II. on the one side and the Reichstag on the other were puppets in the hands of the militarists and Pan-Germanists and their preposterous requirements (in spite of the fact that they had only a fraction of the people behind them).

After the passing of the great Defence Bill, a leading Pan-Germanist paper declared triumphantly: "The demands of the Chauvinists or Super-Patriots have been accepted in official circles; and these demands have been approved by those parties that six months previously had more or less condemned them as excessive. In short, people were now brought logically to Chauvinism, or to what was formerly implied by that term" (*Tagliche Rundschau*, May 23rd, 1913).

This sounded like mockery and scorn of the "hesitating" Government, like open exultation that the Government itself had now become "Chauvinist." Under the circumstances, the words spoken by William II. on May 4th, 1891, at Düsseldorf, evoke only a tragic approbation: "I only wish that the peace of Europe lay in my hand alone; I would, at all hazards, take care that it should never be broken." If by these words he undoubtedly wished to express that he was not the sole arbitrator of the destinies of Europe, he was *now* made to feel that, in reality, he no longer possessed any power, even in his own country, that he had become the captive of the military party, which he had himself instinctively created and supported.

PREMONITIONS OF THE STORM

From this time on matters proceeded without a check. The year 1913 was marked by the celebration

with great pomp and jubilation of the centenary of the "Wars of Liberation." Alas! when I travelled through Germany in this year, I gazed at the Battle of the Nations monument at Leipzig, and I then realised clearly what Germany was and what she intended. This massive, clumsy symbol of imperialism confronting the world was the sequel of that Siegesallee,¹ in which Luther and Kant appear so diminutive by the side of the majestic figures of their princes that they have the appearance of being their hired underlings. The Siegesallee glorifies the past; the Leipzig obelisk the German present and future. There is nothing in this pyramidal work that is not awkward, clumsy, huge, and overbearing.

In vain one's eye attempted to discover in it a single trace of a free, noble, or even delicate line. In vain, amid all these heavy blocks of stone and gigantic figures, did one endeavour to breathe freely and to rejoice in the "Liberty" it was supposed to symbolise! It was impossible! One is conscious of something threatening, unnatural, and oppressive in this monument. When the guide described the dimensions and the ideas underlying these massive blocks of granite, I became quite depressed. I still only saw the heavy melancholy of this monument, which both in style and purpose contained a challenge to free humanity, a glorification of power, a mockery of free art, and a terrible menace for the future of Germany. The flat, huge block of stone that crowns the edifice took away my breath; I had the feeling that at any moment it would crash down and bury with it the last atom of

¹ Cf. p. 206.

spiritual liberty we still possess in Germany. No freedom, no humanity, no distinction, no upward pointing spires and pinnacles; nothing but gigantic figures, guardians of the dead, corners, square stones and tombstones put together without grace or humanity. The whole thing was nothing more than a result of forty years of imperialism; the symbol of a sinister military despotism and a living testimony to the fact that we have now delivered over our German soul to the Prussian idea that force triumphs over right and utility over beauty.

What did it serve that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg lamented in the Reichstag on May 30th, 1913: "Nationalism is the bitterest foe . . . of our whole policy, and every measure taken to hamper the work of this nationalism promotes the welfare of the country and Empire." It was too late! The open confession of the Imperial Chancellor that Germany was in danger of being oppressed by nationalism is really comic when one considers that it was this very Chancellor who, according to the instructions of his imperial master, did all he could to deprive the Reichstag of its rights, though the Reichstag afforded the sole possibility of overcoming this danger.

Nobody will deny that the German Crown Prince was the declared champion at the Berlin Court of a war of conquest. His attitude during the Morocco crisis of 1911; his prohibition of Hauptmann's Peace drama at Breslau; his interference in the Brunswick question in 1913; his contribution of a preface to the book, "Deutschland in Waffen"; his talk about a "fresh and joyful war"; his "By heaven! if it were only the real thing"; his attitude in the Zabern debate in

the Reichstag, and his famous telegram "Immer feste druff"¹ to the Zabern criminals; these, and his whole demonstrative support of the Pan-Germanistic idea,² had made him the centre of the war party at the Berlin Court. Harden's *Zukunft*, and the *Leipsiger Neuesten Nachrichten*, edited by his friend, Paul Liman, were, owing to their warlike sentiments, regarded in the whole country as mouthpieces of the Crown Prince. Books like "Der Kronprinz," by Paul Liman; "Wenn ich der Kaiser wär!" by Daniel Frymann; "Des Deutschen Reiches Schicksalsstunde," by Frobenius; "Deutschland und der nächste Krieg," by Bernhardt (only to select a few of the more important), were, with official recommendation, scattered in hundreds of thousands of copies among the German people, and criticised, more or less openly, the Emperor's "immoderate love of peace," which they contrasted unfavourably with the bold and aggressive temper of the young Crown Prince.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote apprehensively on February 12th, 1914: "It is true that the present Emperor's love of peace is universally recognised, but

¹ "Stick to it!"

² For instance, the Crown Prince telegraphed his admiration to Lieut.-Col. Frobenius, author of "Des Deutschen Reiches Schicksalsstunde." And what is there in this book? Very much the same as in Bernhardt's: "Deutschland und der nächste Krieg." Among many other startling things, Frobenius definitely warns us that "France must in 1915 or 1916, under any circumstances, press for war with Germany," and therefore demands that Germany shall at once anticipate her. Of course, the publisher made immediate and skilful use, for purposes of advertisement, of the Crown Prince's recommendation, and obtained an enormous circulation for this mischievous book.

who can vouch for the permanence of his present frame of mind, and who can vouch for his successor?"

With impatient cynicism the intellectual leader of the German war-party, General von Bernhardt, wrote: "Wait we dare not . . . , the situation in the world affords us numberless points to which we can apply the lever."¹ And Professor Delbrück wrote in 1913 the equally cynical and impatient words: "Public opinion in Germany is to-day full of impatience and is despairing as to whether any ends are being really pursued. But one thing is certain, if such ends are being pursued they cannot be attained in the space of twenty-four hours; not only must our armaments be sufficient, but we must also, *above all, choose the right moment*. And, moreover, it is self-evident that this policy can be the more readily carried into effect if, as in our case, the highest authority lies in the hands of those who look far ahead, *and do not take the whole world into their confidence*."²

This means, therefore, that the whole German foreign and peace policy were entirely dependent upon the "feelings," views, and impulses of certain human beings only responsible to God, and that the *Frankfurter Zeitung* nowhere discovered any guarantee for the permanence of the peaceful feelings of these individuals. In other words, we must, in accordance with Bernhardt's view, "regard war as an indispensable instrument of politics and culture . . . and face it manfully." It means, further, as Professor Delbrück points out with patriotic cynicism, that, thanks

¹ General v. Bernhardt, "Germany and the Next War." Edward Arnold, London.

² Prof. H. Delbrück, "Regierung und Volkswille," p. 186.

to the supreme merit of our Constitution, the German people, thank God, cannot interpose a word when its lords and masters deliberate behind closed doors on the life and death, the liberty and welfare, of the German nation.

I believe that if an Englishman or a Frenchman were to get up and assert that the main advantage of a national policy was that it was not determined by the popular will, but by the chance opinions of a God-appointed dynasty, he would quickly incur general contempt and have to retail his mediæval sentiments through some obscure organ of the Press. Nothing of the kind in Germany. We Germans are powerless against barbarians posing in the robes of scientific professors. For, thanks to the dynasty, the Delbrücks hold the chief offices in our State, educate the royal princes, wear the highest orders, and dispense their imperialist poison in the leading university lecture-rooms of the nation.

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V

THE GERMAN DYNASTY AND THE GERMAN NOTION OF CULTURE. TO WHICH IS ADDED A STUDY OF THE INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE WAR

GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS, PROFESSORS AND HISTORIANS

DYNASTIES could not, however, despite their military and political power, become the embodiment of great States, had they not also behind them the support of intellectual forces. In these days of national schools, franchise, and military service, rigid military discipline would by itself have given a far too despotic impression. Since, moreover, the gods are long since dead, that is to say, have been relegated to their true empire, heaven, a dynasty can no longer be content merely to point to the divine ordering of the universe.

For these and other reasons, the dynasty requires a philosophical and scientific justification of its rule, which will prove the more effectual in proportion to the skill it exhibits in making the views of the modern world serve the private ambitions of earthly gods.

Since the days of Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Feuerbach, the divinity hedging round the dynasty had in Prusso-Germany, as elsewhere, become more and more a fiction, in which the people themselves had no

longer any faith. But in contrast to France, where the philosophical ideas preached by Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau were consistently converted into action, philosophical doctrines in Germany never passed beyond the stage of mere theory. In France the restoration of the divine ordering of the world completely collapsed. Charles X. had to be taught, in 1830, that the gods intended, once and for all, to insist upon the first of the ten commandments. Louis Philippe, the successor of the last Bourbon, was no longer King by God's grace, but a citizen-king, "citoyen-roi." Even Napoleon III., although he had founded his Empire upon a *coup d'état* and emphatically supported the hegemony of Rome, refrained from insisting too much on his divine origin. Even in the days of the most acute reaction (1851-1869) the spirit of Voltaire dominated the French intellectual world. Napoleon possessed the strongest army in Europe, he ruled over the most bigoted country in Europe, but he had no power over the consciences of the French Intellectuals of the day. That is to say, he did not control the national sense of right and was incapable of fettering the free play of science by Bonapartist laws.

Not so in Prusso-Germany. The storms of the revolutions were, in our case, only storms in the heads of professors and students. Consequently, the natural aspiration of all despots (to gain popularity by suppressing intellectual forces) was bound, in the country of "pure reason" and critical methods, to give vent to itself in a more brutal and systematic manner than elsewhere. Even Kant, who had for a moment forgotten himself and spoken as a Republican, was severely reprimanded by the King and had to

promise amendment. Fichte, who had only dared to express his Republican ideas under the French *régime*, held his peace after the Wars of Liberation. Political and military democrats, like Baron vom Stein, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Jahn, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, etc., were merely made use of to assist the King in recovering his power; and afterwards fell into disgrace. The German republicans, Schiller and Klopstock, died at the right time; and so did not witness the intellectual ignominy which followed the "Liberation." Goethe, who himself, a Minister, exercised dynastic power, was adroit enough to hold his peace on all political topics, but he ill concealed his antipathy to Prussia. Goethe, the two Humboldts, Jean Paul, Uhland, and a few others were the last heroes of the waning glory of classic Germanism. From this time forth, Metternich undertook the political and Hegel the intellectual leadership of Germany.

George William Frederick Hegel is the great man whose merit it is to have secularised, that is to say, modernised, the dynastic idea. He did not attempt to re-establish on earth the gods that the French Encyclopædists and Kant had hurled to the ground. He created a new divinity, which ostensibly followed in the steps of the achievements of the French Revolution and Kant's doctrines, namely, *The State*. Hegel's doctrine, that the State is a divine entity and that man is not an end in himself, but only a brick in the fabric of the State, and that the people is that portion of the State that does not know what it wants, became the root idea of that Prussianism which finally triumphed under Bismarck. In his learned and elegant though obscure style, Hegel supplemented to such good

purpose the somewhat brutal and mediæval principles of Metternich, that he was made a Prussian State philosopher and overwhelmed with honours.

Hegel's philosophy has, not without reason, been called an intellectual force. A doctrine may be ever so obscure and ever so pedantic, yet, if it obtains official sanction, it is sure to find a host of youthful enthusiasts and be proclaimed in the journals, universities, and drawing-rooms as the acme of political wisdom. Such was the case with Hegel's philosophy in Prussia. Everyone in Germany was henceforth, in one shape or another, compelled to acknowledge Hegel's principle, that the State is everything and the individual nothing. That is to say, all those German intellectuals who sympathised with the French Revolution and regarded the individual as an end in himself, and political freedom as the foundation of all culture, were outlawed and persecuted, had to leave their country or renounce all their activity in the field of political science. Heine and Börne, Herwegh and Freiligrath, Prutz and Pfau, and a hundred other German thinkers and poets fled before the Prusso-German reaction, and, from foreign lands, hurled their scorn and derision against Germany in cries of anguish and revolt. Uhland, the last poet in Germany to celebrate the democratic idea of freedom, kept silent until 1848. "Young Germany" never reached man's estate. Metternich, the merciless gaoler of the intellectual prison of three dynasties, was everywhere triumphant. He placed a muzzle upon the German intelligence, such as has seldom been worn by a nation, and one which Bismarck found very apt to his purposes after the ill-starred Revolution of 1848.

We find Schopenhauer ironically remarking that a Government will never appoint professors who teach the opposite of that which forms the foundation of their governing authority. And he adds, with biting sarcasm, that our official professors of philosophy, such as Hegel and Schelling, do not live “*for* but *by* philosophy,” and that, therefore, they cannot be regarded as unprejudiced investigators of the truth.

Schopenhauer might have added, further, that there exists nowhere a body of professors and scholars under such strict supervision as in Germany. The Prussian State has always possessed the indisputable monopoly of education. She has never tolerated free schools and universities, such as exist in France, Belgium, England, Switzerland, etc. All professorial chairs are, without exception, in the nomination of the State. German professors are State officials. In 1898, for instance, a so-called “*Privat-dozent*”¹ law was passed for Prussia, placing even these lecturers under Ministerial discipline. In the same year, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against Professor Delbrück (whom we have already referred to as a loyal supporter of the Emperor). In his capacity of a Prussian State official he had in his *Preussische Jahrbücher* attacked the brutal expulsion policy directed against Danish subjects, and, in consequence, in March, 1899, received from the Disciplinary Court a reprimand and an order to pay a fine of £25. Prussian royal officials, or any who aspire to become such, are thus not entitled to their independent opinions in politics (wit-

¹ A *Privat-dozent* is an unsalaried lecturer at a German university, who receives only the students' fees.

ness the cases of Löhning, Willich, Arons, Michels, Delitzsch, Traub, Jatho, etc.).

German professors have unlimited liberty in the exercise of their calling, with the exception of the liberty to differ from the Government. Provided that they regard the Prussian State as a model State, the dynasty as appointed by God, and the existing Constitution as the highest expression of civic bliss, they have even the liberty to rebel against the Almighty (Häckel, Ostwald, Eucken) or to criticise the existing economic order from a socialistic point of view (Schmoller, Sombart, etc.). Hence, among the German professors, we find extraordinarily bold spirits—Free-thinkers, Freetraders, pedants of Reform, theorists of Socialism, sexual-reformers, and even intellectual anarchists; but there are among them no actual Democrats, Republicans, or apostles of popular liberty. In other countries, professors, after quitting the lecture-room, again become citizens and take their place, as such, in the political world, without regard to the Government. Professors who belong to the Socialist party and openly acknowledge the fact, are not unknown in England, France, Italy, Switzerland, etc. In Germany such a state of things is unthinkable, because there professors, in their private life, still remain Government officials. A century of intellectual drilling has reduced them to such a condition of absolute dependence upon the State, as bread-giver, that the dynasty can blindly rely upon them. They are never guilty of an act of lawlessness; they, in duty bound, combat “revolution,” write huge folios in praise of science, and in a few years become Privy Councilors and only seldom, and then as mouthpieces of the

Government, intermeddle with politics.¹ But, as a general rule, they remain aloof from politics. I believe that there is not in the whole of England and France a single professor who is not acquainted with the main principles of his country's constitution and who would not, at any moment, in obedience to a natural impulse, be prepared to break a lance for the inviolability of civic rights and liberties. In Germany, on the other hand, there are professors of world-wide renown (*e.g.* Häckel), who have not the slightest acquaintance with politics, which they regard as an occupation unworthy of a man of learning.

The German professors have been styled "the intellectual bodyguard of the Hohenzollerns," and indeed, if they are not an ornament of free science, they are certainly a source of satisfaction to our Government.

In order rightly to estimate the spirit and ideals animating the development of German culture during the past century, these peculiarities must be borne in mind. For example, our labours in the field of history and international law, eminently important

¹That there are laudable exceptions to this rule can be proved by the case of the Munich Professor, Ludwig Quidde, who published at the beginning of the 'nineties a pamphlet "Caligula" (a study of Roman Cæsar madness). In this he characterised the person and acts of the young Roman Emperor in a manner that left no room for doubt as to the reason of his presenting the German public at this time with this study. The pamphlet ran through more than thirty editions and made a great sensation (it is to-day even more worth reading than it was then). Accused of *lèse majesté* and asked, in cross-examination, "Whom do you mean by Caligula?" Professor Quidde replied, with astonishment: "Whom do *you* mean, Mr. Attorney-General?" The proceedings had to be dropped for want of evidence.

factors in the guidance of coming generations, have always been confided to the safe hands of Privy Councillors and Excellencies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the volumes on history which Hegel, Ranke, Sybel, Treitschke, Mommsen, Lamprecht, Delbrück, Schiemann, etc., have bequeathed to us always have at bottom the same idea, viz., that the logical significance of the world's history must be sought in the rise of the Hohenzollerns to the German Imperial dynasty. Although differing in scope, form, and method, the work of the German historians is terribly monotonous in its treatment of this fundamental idea. The theory that the old German dream of the Emperor Barbarossa has been finally realised, thanks to Bismarck's astuteness, for the happiness of the German people, has with innumerable variations formed the constantly recurring theme of all the German historians since 1870.

The French historians, such as Michelet, Taine, Blanc, Thiers, etc., differentiated between the interests of the dynasty and those of the people, and finally even went the length of asserting that the interests of a dynasty could only be promoted or the reverse at the expense of the people; and consequently they have always inspired a secret horror in our "Privy Councillor historians." In the eyes of the latter, history is nothing but a collection of the martial deeds of a handful of men, towering above the formless and ineffectual mass of the people, and endowing it with life and significance by means of their wars. No doubt, these historians have achieved wonders in investigating and elucidating ancient civilisation; the science of historical research has ever stood high in Germany. But the idea that populations exist as well

as dynasties, and that these populations are, after all, entitled to the same consideration as their God-appointed lords, is one which, though now and again it dawns upon the German historians, they are forbidden to express in connection with Germany. In France, where even the dynastic power of the last Napoleon was unable to stifle the consciences of scholars, historians could entertain other ideals. The whole of Michelet's historical work is, for instance, nothing but a pæan of praise for the vigour of the people and their enthusiasm for liberty. But if a German were to write a history of the German nation in which he proved that the greater the power and glory of the Hohenzollern dynasty the greater the loss of the German nation in respect of political dignity and liberty, he would never become professor and Privy Councillor and never be allowed to attain celebrity. Uhland was, in fact, the last German professor of history holding democratic views. And even Uhland, in spite of the fact that he laboured in South Germany, and not in Prussia, only continued in his appointment for three years. Then he gave up the struggle, or he would, like so many of his colleagues, have had to reflect behind prison bars that the history of the German people must perforce be a glorification of the ruling dynasty.

In the same way that Metternich found in Hegel a philosopher after his own heart, so did Bismarck discover in Treitschke an intellectual partner for the furtherance of his diplomacy. Treitschke was, like Hegel, loaded with the highest Prussian honours and offices and proclaimed a German national genius. His influence upon modern Germany was tremendous.

Any one in the new German Empire who laid claim to education must sit at the feet of this half-deaf Excellency. He may, without exaggeration, be styled the intellectual father of the present German generation. He and his pupils (*e. g.* Delbrück, Lamprecht, Schiemann, and General von Bernhardi) furnished Pan-Germanism and the idea of conquest with that scientific constitutional basis which (say what one will) became the theoretical forcing-bed for the policy of war and armaments of the Court Camarilla, which now rules over Germany.

INTERNATIONAL LAW—ON THIS SIDE AND ON THAT

No less than did Bismarck as the successor of Metternich in the sphere of politics, Treitschke, as the successor of Hegel in the sphere of history and international law, revealed himself the inveterate opponent of all the democratic ideas and ideals of the nineteenth century. "The State is Power." This phrase is the essence of Treitschke's teaching,¹ and is in the sharpest contradiction to the idea proclaimed by the French

¹ This phrase is the idea underlying Treitschke's leading work, "Politics" (London: Constable & Co.), lectures delivered in Berlin (1875-1895 and 1898-99). These lectures have become in Germany a sort of political gospel. Treitschke's fundamental idea, "The State is Power," denotes, first, the ignoring of all international treaties and possibilities of amicable understandings, and, secondly, as a positive result, the glorification of war. The whole of the domestic and foreign policy of the German Empire has, since Bismarck's day, been dominated by this leading idea. Had Treitschke himself been Germany's representative at The Hague Conferences, he could not have expressed this view better than did Count Münster and Marshall von Bieberstein.

Revolution: "The State is Justice." It is true that Treitschke also affirms that justice is one of the main functions of a State, but anyone who takes the trouble to dip beneath the surface of his teachings immediately perceives that the other function, namely, the conduct of war, is by far the more important.

In Treitschke's writings there is not the faintest trace of the spirit of classical Teutonism. For instance, Wilhelm von Humboldt's doctrine that the main task of the modern State is the conservation of individual liberty was regarded in "modern" Germany as antiquated and "long since superseded." Might and War; War and Might; this after 1870 became the password, which Hegel had still named "State and Politics," and Humboldt "Liberty and Justice."

All the English and French philosophers of the past two centuries have been yearning and striving for an ideal Constitutional State. Justice and popular liberty were also the aspirations of our classical philosophers: Leibnitz, Kant, Lessing, Herder, Humboldt, Fichte, Feuerbach, and Schleiermacher all maintained this—each in his own way. But with Hegel began the philosophy of the State and of the striving for Power. In the field of politics the existence of these mutually opposing tendencies is shown by the fact that both English and French philosophers were coming to regard war more and more as a thing of the past, in the last resort as a terrible necessity, but always as something immoral, from which the civilised world must emancipate itself.¹

On the other hand, the German philosophers, follow-

¹ A few exceptions, like Ruskin in England, Jules De Maistre, J. P. Proudhon and others, have not altered the general trend

ing the example of Hegel, glorified war as a necessary means towards a continual increase of Power, as a source of national progress, and, in short, as a divine, holy, normal, and moral law governing the development of the human race. In his "Politics," Treitschke devotes a whole chapter to the holiness of war, declaring it to be the "most potent force in the shaping of nations," and "the sole cure for decaying nations," and demonstrates his direct relationship with Hegel by adding: "And herein lies the grandeur of war, that the mere individual is lost sight of in face of the great ideal of the State."

If Hegel be compared with Treitschke, and the latter again with Bernhardi, we can, step by step, trace the increase in brutality which German ideas of culture have suffered under Prussian leadership. In Hegel, after all, the doctrine of universal citizenship of the Kant and Goethe period is still discernible, but we find in Treitschke only the narrow-minded, power-intoxicated nationalist; whilst Bernhardi appears to be nothing better than a Red Indian, save for the fact that he is able—most unfortunately for us—to read and write, and that he has the *entrée* at the court of an absolute ruler.

The French Revolution had thrown overboard every idea of a dynastic State and proclaimed the sovereignty of intellectual progress in these countries. It is true that Proudhon, "the father of Anarchism," celebrated war in two thick volumes and fulminated against the "jurists," Grotius, Vattel, Kant, etc. Yet the final result of all his researches is the assertion: Mankind will not tolerate war any longer! Moreover, Proudhon conceived of war as being entirely a "chivalrous duel." In this sense, he is in direct opposition to Clausewitz and his followers, who scoff at legalised warfare as weak and puerile.

of the people. It was the origin of that science which all, with the exception of German professors and in spite of the present World War, name "International Law." In a legal sense, International Law is the codification of legal principles touching the attitude and relations of civilised States to each other. Now the French Revolution had set up an entirely new morality in respect to these relations between State and State. This morality culminates in the proposition (but tell it not to any German professor!) that every country has the incontestable right to administer its own affairs.

It is clear at a glance that an International Law resting upon this basis is a negation of the former divine constitutional right of dynasties, as Machiavelli taught it, and as it has been modernised by Hegel and by Treitschke.

The people had been hitherto the absolute chattels of their princes, and could by war, barter, treaty, or marriage be transferred at will from one dynastic house to another. Now, however, the Revolution declared the nations to be independent individuals and collective souls, and exhorted them to govern themselves. Mirabeau proudly stated in the Constituent Assembly that henceforth Right was the sovereign in the world; no longer that right which a dynasty possesses only so long as it is in a position to defend it against all comers *vi et armis*, but that hallowed, unwritten Right common to every being born into the world which slumbers in the collective consciousness of every people under the sun.

These new theories of the free right of nations to control their own destinies were immediately put

into practice by the Revolution. When Alsace demanded its incorporation with the French Republic, the new French Government ordered first of all a plebiscitum of the Alsatians. When Savoy made a like application it submitted to the National Convention a popular resolution in these words: "The Nation of Savoy, seeing that the deposition of Victor Amadeus and his heirs has been proclaimed, declares itself a free and sovereign nation," and, as free and sovereign, "it unanimously desires to be united to the French Republic." The National Convention replied that it gladly conformed with this wish, since it had been shown that "the free and unfettered desire of the sovereign people of Savoy, as expressed in their communal assemblies, was that they should be united to the French nation." The Mayor of Annecy announced to his compatriots that they were henceforth citizens of the French Republic and proudly added: "We are not a conquered, but a *free* people."

What "International Law" imports is visible yet more clearly in a report that Carnot laid before the French Government in regard to the incorporation of Monaco:

"It is the inalienable right of every nation to live apart from others, if it so pleases, or, for the vindication of their common interests, to unite with others, if such be its desire. We French, who know no other sovereigns save the peoples themselves, have fraternity and not lordship as our system. We worship the principle that every nation, be the territory it occupies ever so small, is absolute master in its own house, and must, as regards its rights, be treated as equal with the greatest; and that nobody can justifiably

violate its independence, unless its own is manifestly imperilled."¹

This new, clearly formulated, and eminently logical right of the nations to free self-government, which forms the basis of our present international law, was, it is true, frequently infringed by France herself; notwithstanding, it still shines, as a guiding star of European popular aspirations, above the realm of politics. The whole European history of the past century is characterised by a striving for national forms of government. The nations no longer intend to be ruled by alien conquerors, but themselves intend to control their own fate.

After nearly a hundred years of conflict, the Balkan States emancipate themselves from the Turkish domination of the last four centuries. Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia gain their independence, thanks to French and partly also to English and Russian aid. Poland is maintaining a stout, though an alas! indecisive struggle against the domination of the foreigner. Italy, Hungary, and Prussia throw off the Hapsburg yoke. The Teutonic States, after having in 1848 vainly striven to attain, in a peaceable way, a democratic empire, had, after two bloody wars, consolidated their national unity. Popular liberty was the cry from one end of Europe to the other. But it was not everywhere understood in the same sense. The people meant by it their national and their political liberty. Not so the dynasties; these (mostly uninvited) were astute enough, in this struggle, to pose as advocates and champions of the popular will, while all

¹ Cf. Gabr. Séailles, "L'Alsace-Lorraine," Paris, 1915, pp. 15-17.

the time they only meant by liberty the freedom of their States outside their borders. For instance, the Prussian dynasty wages, in the name of this principle of nationality, three successive wars, but, at once, proceeds to annex foreign territory, and, by its treatment of the annexed peoples, to trample this very principle of nationality under foot.

Only France remained, to some extent, faithful to that idea of popular and international liberty proclaimed to mankind by the Great Revolution. It is a feather in the cap of Napoleon III. that, despite the fact that he was the most powerful sovereign in Europe, he always respected this right of the people to autonomy. Before, in 1859, annexing Savoy and Nice, he required their inhabitants to approve, by vote, the treaty which, as a result of the Italo-Austrian War, ceded these countries to France. Modern Italy came into being (between 1859 and 1871), partly through Napoleon's aid, only by virtue of the popular vote. Even if it were really the fact, as has been often asserted, that these plebiscites were only comedies, yet the fact remains that Napoleon III. recognised the new International Law, at all events in principle, as a political theory, although by virtue of his dynastic power he was never obliged to do so. After the war of 1866 Napoleon III. went actually so far as to have a clause inserted in the Treaty of Prague by which Prussia pledged herself only to incorporate Schleswig-Holstein in the German Confederation after it had signified its consent to this course by popular vote. Prussia endorsed this pledge but with the firm resolve never to abide by it. For the right of nations to free autonomy, proclaimed by the Great Revolu-

tion, though opposed in Europe by Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey, found its bitterest enemy of all in Prussia.

Yet Prussia, unlike Austria and Russia, did not support its antagonism to international law by the bloody arbitrament of war, but by very edifying juristic and philosophical theories. Prusso-Germany was not and is not a State bent on bloody conquest; no! it is the home of jurisprudence, of progress, and of popular liberty! In contrast to Russia, it possesses a Constitution and a democratic popular assembly and army, and it likewise possesses a culture that henceforth envelops it with the nimbus of a modern and progressive State!

Prussia never makes conquests; she acts either in self-defence or in virtue of higher rights. Any one who is backed by a victorious army and is executing the will of Providence is entitled to claim for himself both a special standard of right and a special wisdom. An act that, in the case of a private individual, would be called either thieving, swindling, or extortion becomes, thanks to a victorious army, a praiseworthy act of self-preservation and higher justice.

It was the task of Treitschke and his apostles to condense Bismarck's diplomacy and the invincibility of the Prusso-German army into a philosophical and legal system. Although this problem seems, at first glance, rather difficult, they solved it admirably.

In contrast to the "revolutionary" right of nations to free autonomy, Treitschke and his school were the champions of "historical" right. Thus, if a country like Alsace, after having been for centuries a possession of Germany, is then snatched from it, the latter coun-

try has an historic right to the portion wrested from it.

So much the more, when to its historic right is added an ethnographic one. Supposing a race, such as the Alsace-Lorrainers, the Swiss, the Flemings, the Baltese, etc., are actually of German descent, use the German tongue, and have German customs and habits, then the great community to which it thus belongs has a sacred right to absorb it, in the interest of the cultural unit, and to draw it into the great racial family of which it is a member.

Again to this historic-ethnographic right may be added an etymological one, which will carry us a good step further. Nancy, for instance, is a patent mutilation of the good old Imperial city Nantzig, and Dunkirk can only be derived from Dünkirchen; down to the present day the Bretons, in the north-west of France, employ an affirmative that sounds like the German "*Ja*"; and so forth. Whence it not only follows that all territories and races whose language and local and proper names show Celtic-Germanic roots were, originally, German peoples and territories, but that Prusso-Germany has also, in the name of German culture, a sacred right to make them German once more.

The French professor of international law says: Alsace is certainly German, it belonged to Germany for centuries, and Strassburg, in the Middle Ages, was a Mecca of Teutonism. Yet Germany has, on that account, no right to lay claim to Alsace as its own property. Everything depends upon the wishes of the Alsatians. Since, in bygone days, out of affection for our Republic, Alsace voluntarily chose to become a part of France, and since every people is

the sovereign master of its destiny, there can be here no other "right" than the right of the Alsatian people. What concern is it of Prussia that Neuenburg was once upon a time Prussian? What concern is it of us French that French is spoken in Geneva, and that we can trace thousands of French roots in the languages of England, Spain, Italy, and even Roumania, if we trouble to investigate the matter? A community governed by the principle of nationalities does not build up its rights upon excavations, linguistic roots, popular customs, and historical events and investigations. For such a community the sole question is: What does the Neuenburger want? What does the Genevese desire? Does he wish to be a Swiss citizen? His will is law and "right"; and when once he has clearly expressed it, all further discussion is superfluous. For us French there are no other rights save the universal right of all nations to their autonomy.

"It is difficult"—so writes the French historian Ernest Lavisse¹—"to get foreigners to understand why France cannot forgive the loss of her provinces. The Germans say 'it is the law of war.' In the eighteenth century, such a view would have caused no surprise; and, even now, it appears quite natural to the politicians of the old *régime*. But, in the nineteenth century, France stands for quite another policy. Among the nations of the world, France is conspicuous by her rationalism and her sense of right and wrong. She maintains that a human community is not to be treated like a flock of sheep. She believes in the existence of a national soul. She has sympathised deeply with the sufferings of the victims of force. She wept over

¹ G. Séailles, "L'Alsace-Lorraine," p. 21.

Athens, Warsaw, and Venice, and she gave the 'oppressed' something more tangible than tears. The Peace of Frankfort did not only leave us the humiliation of defeat; it did not merely violate our frontiers and bring our country into a condition of unendurable insecurity. It was when the victor robbed us of souls who were ours, and wished to remain so, that he outraged our religion. And *this* is at the bottom of the Alsace-Lorraine question. It brings two civilisations face to face, and in our defeat we have a consoling honour: that the reparation of the wrong done us would be a satisfaction to the most lofty sentiments and to the spirit of the age."

"You appeal to the principle of nationalities, but you interpret it differently from the rest of Europe," wrote the French international jurist Fustel de Coulanges to Mommsen. "In your view, this principle entitles a powerful State to forcibly annex a province, without other justification than the fact that this province is peopled by the same race as is the annexing State. According to normal public opinion in Europe, and in the civilised world at large, the principle of nationalities simply forbids a province or a people to obey a foreign dictator against its will. I will give an example, by way of illustration; the principle of nationalities did not permit Piedmont to forcibly annex Milan and Venice, but it allowed Milan and Venice to emancipate themselves from Austria and voluntarily to join themselves to Piedmont. You perceive the difference. Consequently this principle may well give Alsace a right, but it cannot give you a right over Alsace. It creates a right for the weak, but it affords no pretext for the ambitious. The principle

of nationalities is, by no manner of means, the old right of the stronger, under a new name."¹

Treitschke and the German School of International Philosophers were not tardy with their reply:

The Alsatians are German; they have been forcibly wrested from the great German family. Hence, we Germans have not merely a mission of culture to execute in Alsace, but, considering that we are, obviously, the more highly organised and civilised race, we have to secure the peace of the world.

"Who can plead, in the face of our duty to secure the world's peace, that the Alsace-Lorrainers do not want to belong to us? Confronted by the sacred necessity of these great days, the doctrine of the autonomy of all German races, that alluring theme of outlaw demagogues, will come to a miserable end. These lands are ours by the right of the sword and we will deal with them by virtue of a higher right, by the right of the German nation not to allow its sons for ever to estrange themselves from the German Empire."²

As, then, according to the Prusso-Hegelian doctrine, nations themselves never know what they want, they must be made happy against their will. Treitschke solemnly declared: "We Germans, who know both Germany and France, know what suits the Alsatians far better than that miserable people knows itself. . . . We wish to restore to them, against their will, their own real self."³

¹ Cf. Gabr. Séailles, "Alsace-Lorraine," Paris, 1915, p. 11.

² Preussische Jahrbücher, Juli, 1870. H. v. Treitschke: "Was fordern wir von Frankreich?"

³ *Ibidem*.

"By the right of the sword!" "That miserable people!" "Against their will!" Here we find ourselves in the midst of the neo-German notion of constitutional law and culture. Hegel's fundamental idea of the stupidity of the people is brilliantly demonstrated to us by Treitschke with reference to those "miserable" Alsace-Lorrainers. It is apparent, at the first glance, that this "modern" German conception of constitutional and international law is not only very convenient for the dynastic will to power, but is really nothing else than a learned term for it. The fundamental difference in the legal conceptions of the two hostile nations is now rendered apparent, and also the reason why this antagonism, which has troubled Europe for forty years past, could never be adjusted.

The whole history of France and Italy during the last century is entirely animated by the new religion of popular rights. England accorded to all its colonies having a white population (even to the Boer Republic it had vanquished) free autonomy; that the Irish have no Home Rule is not England's fault, but the fault of the religious differences obtaining in Ireland itself.¹

¹ It is a proof either of ignorance or of deliberate calumny that, since the beginning of the World War, it has frequently been asserted in Germany that England treated the Irish no better than Prussia has treated the Poles, the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and the Danes. During the last decade England has given generous proof of her respect for the right of the Irish to control their own destinies. In 1898 Ireland received from the English Government the so-called "Local Government Act," in 1899 a special department for agricultural and technical instruction, in 1903 the Wyndham "Land Purchase Act" (the direct antithesis of Prussia's Polish Eviction Acts), in 1908 a national university (just imagine a Polish university at Posen or a French university at Strassburg), and finally, in 1911, the possibility of political self-government (Home

Even Russia granted the Finns and Baltese a kind of self-government, such as German Poland and Alsace-Lorraine have never known. Russia was even a pioneer in this new international law and helped the Bulgarians and Roumanians to their national independence.

But in Prusso-Germany there was nothing but a policy of "Blood and Iron in the hands of potentates and princes."¹ Not even theoretically might the new Rule). What, in spite of this, caused that disaffection in Ireland which, in Easter week of 1916, found expression in armed and open revolt? Because a quarter of Ireland (the province of Ulster) declared that they would rather die than submit to such a Home Rule Act, and thereupon raised up the voluntary army and the revolutionary movement of 1912-13. Because a small but very active group of propagandists (the Gaelic League) demanded complete separation from England, and the revival and forcible introduction of the long-dead Gaelic language, and because (*O tempora! O mores!* Herr v. Bulow) the English Government, until Easter week, 1916, not only did nothing to cope with this movement but even indirectly encouraged it (by financial contributions towards the teaching of the Gaelic language in Irish schools, by tolerating the more than revolutionary propaganda of the Gaelic League, by not opposing the formation of a voluntary army in Ulster, designed to resist the Home Rule measure proposed by the Government, etc., etc.). England's policy toward Ireland is thus the direct opposite of the policy of Prussia towards the Poles, the Danes, and the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. The treatment of Ireland by the English Government may not always have been above reproach, but the chief offenders were in this case the Irish politicians, the Gaelic League, and the fomenters of religious hate.

¹The proclamation of the Allied Emperors (November 5th, 1916) touching Poland's autonomy is a striking instance of this. The new "independent State with an hereditary Monarchy and a Constitution" does not arise by reason of any suffrage or parliamentary deliberation. It is solely the will of two God-ordained dynasties, by right of the sword and as the tool of dynastic interests. The term autonomy is here but the mod-

doctrine of international law raise its head among us. It is remarkable that even our German Social Democrats (with a few exceptions) ignored it.¹

ernised phrase for annexation. For this is what it actually means. If it be realised that this proclamation of an independent Poland is only a pretext for the raising of a Polish army, then, viewed from a democratic standpoint, it can only be regarded as a sheer mockery of the international law of modern times. A similar mockery is contained in the very style of the proclamation: in order to show plainly that the population have no voice in the matter of the creation of States, William II. here again, as is his wont, confronted the German Reichstag and Poland with a *fait accompli*. By a Cabinet order he adjourned the Reichstag on November 4th, and then, on the 5th, without giving an opportunity for any discussion on the matter, proclaimed the creation of a new kingdom and simultaneously announced that the Prussian Poles would still remain Prussians, and that there was no thought of a change in Prussia's brutal Polish policy. Truly, the Middle Ages and Prussia in all their glory!

¹ When, a year after the outbreak of the World War, I translated a book by Gustav Hervé, in which he advocated for the better assurance of world-peace, the autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine and thereby a Franco-German understanding, this proposal was rejected with scorn in Germany at large, and by the Socialists in particular. The work of the former Revolutionist, Paul Lensch, "Die Sozial Demokratie, ihr Ende und ihr Glück," openly scoffs at the idea of the right of nations to autonomy. German Social Democracy was, theoretically, the champion of the autonomy of nations. But it regarded this, according to schedule, as "civic ideology," and only awaited its realisation as a result of the great anti-capitalist revolution, without which no social amelioration was thinkable. Social democracy regarded the eight-hour day movement as more important than all the "petty" ideals of the revolutions of 1789 and 1848 taken together. Marx alone is a praiseworthy exception to this narrow-minded party programme. Writing from London in 1870, in the name of true internationalism, he protested against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and with extraordinary perspicacity foretold the present war.

How little the Franco-English notion of international law was known, as a theory, in Prusso-Germany is apparent from the correspondence which David Friedr. Strauss had with Renan, and Mommsen with Fustel de Coulanges. The French *savants* might explain to their German colleagues a thousand times over that it was not their grief at the military downfall of France which led them to protest against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, but the fact that, in the nineteenth century, no territory ought to be annexed unless the population declared themselves in favour of the change. All to no purpose. The German philosophers either regarded this only as a further proof of their claim, that the stronger is always in the right, and that the French standpoint was only the hypocrisy of the weaker, appealing in the name of international law only so long as he felt himself impotent to try fresh conclusions on the battlefield. Or else, if they felt the justice of the French claim, they held their peace. Bebel, Liebknecht, and Jacoby were, in modern Germany, the sole upright men who dared to speak in the name of the free autonomy of nations, that is to say, to call the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine a crime against international law. For this boldness they had to suffer within prison walls, and their fate awed all those who secretly disapproved the Bismarck-Treitschke modernisation of dynastic despotism.

Accordingly, an idea that in most civilised countries had passed into political practice remained, in Prusso-Germany, punishable *even as a theory*. And this explains to us the fact why, during the past forty years in Germany, not a single voice has been raised to tell

us Germans what "International Law" really means. At all the international pacifist and socialist congresses hitherto held, in which a mutual understanding between nations has been aimed at as the goal, there was ever an oppressive silence regarding this fundamental principle of international policy. All the truly progressive German authors and politicians of the past forty years who took part in these proceedings were not free agents. A condemnation of the Hegel-Treitschke legal doctrine would be equivalent to a condemnation of the Bismarck policy of conquest, *i.e.*, a condemnation of the dynasty, or High Treason.

There was, and still is, among the Germans a secret barrier to our flights of thought. And this is the dread of certain penal paragraphs in our Code. While we, sitting at our firesides, may, as private individuals, entertain the same views and ideals as the French and English, directly we begin to speak and write for the public we become learned metaphysicians and sophists, and execute veritable egg-dances in order to escape the necessity of speaking the truth. French representatives at international congresses have often expressed to me their astonishment that the Germans, while, in private conversations, condemning the German point of view as being at variance with constitutional law, actually defended it in public meetings. As if we dared to profess any other ideas concerning international law save those prescribed for us by our Constitution and laws!

For all these reasons, there exists in Germany down to the present day only a caricature of true international law. That is, the German *savants* of to-day understand by "international law" only such rules as

have been mutually agreed upon, with the humane purpose of lessening the horrors of war, as, for instance, those embodied in the Paris Declaration concerning Maritime Warfare, in the Geneva Convention, or in the various Hague agreements. A German professor of international law who should declare international law to mean the unfettered right of nations to autonomy, and to therefore denounce the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and of Bosnia, or even the violation of Belgium, as being crimes against the law of nations, would at once be arraigned on a charge of high treason.

The logical thinking out of the principle of the free right of nations to autonomy, which was proclaimed by the French Revolution and has been acknowledged by the whole civilised world as, at least, a theory of international law, is a crime in Germany, because it inevitably leads to a condemnation of the whole Prusso-German policy. And, therefore, such a logical thinking out has never been publicly attempted in the Fatherland of Logic. Is it likely that a Government will appoint and pay professors who condemn its policy as contrary to the law of nations? In the same way that Schopenhauer's colleagues did not live for, but by philosophy, so Schücking's¹ colleagues live not for, but

¹ Prof. W. Schücking is almost the sole teacher of international law in modern Germany who has had the courage to take his stand upon the ground of true international law and has not left it even since the war began. His treatment of the Polish question in "Das Nationalitäten-problem" (Dresden, 1908), his ideas on "Die Organisation der Welt" (Leipzig, 1909), his "Neue Ziele der Staatlichen Entwicklung" (Marburg, 1913), and finally, his masterly treatise, "Das Werk vom Haag" (Leipzig, 1912), are all written in the spirit of democracy and the

by international law. "I stick up for my master"—this is applicable to newspaper editors, Privy Councillors and Excellencies alike.

GERMAN RACIAL SCIENCE AND DEDUCTIONS THEREFROM

The German constitutional and international law we have just described was the scientific complement of Bismarck's policy of conquest. And here, in the realm of science and philosophy, we are confronted by a phenomenon similar to that of the Reichstag in the domain of politics. In the same way that the latter looks modern and democratic, so also does this science, with its numerous foreign words, awake a feeling of respect and modernity. However, the Reichstag is really only the democratic mask of an autocratic *régime*, and, similarly, historical right and the philosophy of the divinity of the State are but the modern veneer of mediæval despotism.

But, after the foundation of the German Empire there arose, side by side with this Hegel-Treitschke philosophy of constitutional law (which, after all, has historical tradition behind it), quite a new science, which complements it. Its reaction upon the German foreign policy of the past twenty years is so manifest that it cannot be dismissed without some notice. It is, moreover, an integral part of German culture.

This science was originally called Aryan anthropology, and on its further development was split up into various subsections: craniometry, Germanistics, true science of international law, and thus have not, unfortunately, in modern Germany, met with the appreciation they deserve.

etymology, ethnography, philology, etc., etc. Certain of these sciences had already been in existence, but, after the war of 1870-71, they were given an entirely new form and significance.

The father of this completely new science was Gobineau, a Frenchman who made his mark in the 'fifties of last century. His work "Essai sur l'inégalité des Races," published in many volumes (1854) was practically ignored in France, but its German translation was eagerly bought and became the theme of much discussion. This Count Gobineau did us Germans an inestimable service. Firstly, he established the contrast between the long-skulled, blue-eyed, and fair-haired Germans (the Aryans) and the round-skulled, black-eyed, and black-haired Latins, the latter saturated with Jewish blood; and, secondly, the intellectual superiority of these fair-haired Aryans over the decadent Latins.

This doctrine, which this highly imaginative Frenchman, with characteristic French facility, reeled lightly off from his finger-tips, is the most wonderful rubbish of modern days, and, down to 1870, was never taken seriously, even in Germany; but it fitted in so well with the German military successes from 1864 to 1870, that it was at once raised to the rank of a science. Had the German not proved in these wars that the Latin "races" had actually played their last *rôle* in the world, and that the fair-haired German was stronger, more moral, and more capable of higher culture than his Western neighbours? Yes, the war of 1870-71 was a glorious proof of the decline of the Latin races, and this Gobineau was now, in truth, not only a great thinker, but also a prophet.

Thousands of German *savants* now began to dig up and measure skulls, to invent Aryan aboriginal languages, religions, and civilisations, to determine the first home of this early Teutonic stock, and to formulate no end of theories as to the rise and fall of races. Down to 1870 this "science" had been quietly laughed at and Gobineau regarded as a wag who was bamboozling the poor honest Teuton for the amusement of serious science. Now, however, the whole thing gained a politico-scientific background, and, instead of being a wag, this Gobineau is really the inspirer of the present World War.

For if, afterwards, Mommsen, Woltmann, Driesmans, Reimer, Bopp, Chamberlain, and a thousand other "Germanists" were zealous in developing this racial science, it was done with the secret intention of proving that the Teuton was the highest type of man and consequently the only trustworthy creator of culture.

The demonstration was brilliantly successful. The German *savants* unanimously proved that the brachycephalists (*i.e.*, the flat-heads) were the inferior and the dolichocephalists (the oval-heads) the higher intellectual element in Europe. The former, as the war of 1870 showed, had finished playing their part, and thus the oval-heads have the divine right to dominate and (if they resist) to exterminate them. The fair-haired German is the born, God-appointed vehicle of European civilisation. To him alone belongs the world's future. Science has proved it! God has willed it!

Thus arose those superman and super-race theories to which not merely a Richard Wagner fell a victim, but to a certain degree even Nietzsche, with the result

that in foreign countries these great Germans have, very unjustly, been placed in the same category with Treitschke and Bernhardi.

As in German politics one Armament Bill ousted its predecessor, so also, in this field, one scientific theory dispossessed the other, and the last always excelled the preceding one in learned mystification. Reimer, Driesmans, Woltmann, and Chamberlain proved to the listening world not only the superiority of Teutonism in the present but also in the past. All the glorious achievements of mankind are, beyond question, those of the German race. Woltmann's works, "Die Germanen und die Renaissance in Italien" and "Die Germanen in Frankreich," will in future days be marvelled at as monuments of German learned stupidity. Every sentence in these books is an invitation to satire; if Heine were alive to-day, he would have wrung from us tears of laughter over this "colossal" science. And his sound common sense would have discovered in Reimer's "Ein Pan-Germanistischer Deutschland" and in Chamberlain's epoch-making work, "The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century" (in the circulation of which William II. took a personal interest), an equally inviting target for his wit.

We are confronted here by a development similar to that we have just been obliged to recognise in the case of the political philosophy of the State. Hegel was as little an Imperialist as Gobineau was a Pan-Germanist; Mommsen's Racial Science can, like Treitschke's doctrine of Constitutional Law, still claim to be based upon logic and historical facts. But in the cases of Reventlow, Bernhardi, etc., we are face to face with fanatics such as Hegel would scarcely have dreamed

of. In the same way, Gobineau would be utterly indignant and astonished could he perceive what Reimer, Woltmann, Driesmans, and Chamberlain have made of his theories. After these leading spirits of a literally world-subverting science had proved that all the celebrated men of the Middle Ages and of recent times were of German origin (Lafayette = "a typical representative of Germanism"; Murillo = a palpable mutilation of the German Moerl; Da Vinci's forebears were called Wincke; Diderot = corrupted from Tieteroth; Briand = Brandt, etc., etc.), one can readily understand that Reimer arrived at the scientific conclusion that Jesus of Nazareth must, if he ever existed, have been a German!

Our German eggs (to the glory of German science laid by a Frenchman and hatched by an Englishman) have in contradistinction to other eggs two yolks: an ordinary yolk, and a special yolk created expressly by the Lord God for us Germans, from which all civilisation has been born and which gives the whole world a Germanic character!

Such scatterbrained theories were not, as one would expect, confined to the narrow circles of professional philosophers, but attained universal popularity. Their political deductions found, for instance, an energetic expression in the Pan-German League: this Pan-German League was not, be it marked, a political party, but had its influential representatives among almost all parties (even, it is said, among Social Democrats). Although the fundamental ideas of this pseudo-science remained entirely unknown to the common herd, yet in freemason, military, intellectual,

and exclusive circles they were warmly welcomed, and, like the Hegel and Treitschke doctrines, enjoyed official esteem and approbation. The imperialistic application of this racial and craniological science was popularised in the text-books of our schools and in the encyclopædias,¹ and was the secret inspiration of German foreign policy. More frequently than was pleasant to the citizen of cosmopolitan sympathies, it was openly expressed in imperial speeches.

On February 24th, 1892, William II. said in the Provincial Diet in Berlin: "To this is added the feeling of responsibility towards our All Highest Lord above and my irrefragable conviction that our ally of Rossbach and Dennewitz will not leave me in the lurch. He has taken such infinite pains with our Mark and our House that we cannot believe that he has done this to no end. No; on the contrary, Brandenburg, we are destined to higher things, and I shall lead you to more glorious days in the future." On the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the German Empire (January 18th, 1896), as also in the famous imperial speech of June 19th, 1902, at Aix-la-Chapelle, there is also a Pan-Ger-

¹ For example, Meyer's "Konversations-Lexikon" contains a graphic map of the distribution of the Germans in Central Europe, which includes the whole of Belgium and Holland (thus regarding both countries as legally appertaining to Germany). Another chart illustrating German dialects denotes the vulgar tongue as spoken from Antwerp to Dunkirk and from Liège to Brussels as "low-Frankish," while the language spoken in Holland is partly "Frisian" and partly "Westphalian." That is to say there is not, in fact, a Dutch nation or a Dutch language; when Verhaeren and Maeterlinck wrote in French, they were in error, because scientific investigations have established that Belgium does not speak French, but Lower-Frankish!

manistic undercurrent perceptible, appealing, in the one case, more to the commercial, in the other to the moral and religious superiority of Teutonism, yet on both occasions every idea of a war of conquest was relegated to the Greek Calends; and stress was laid upon the necessity for peace. Again, in his speech to the Berlin Academy of Arts (December 18th, 1901), he says: "For us Germans great ideals have become permanent blessings, whereas other nations have more or less lost them. There only remains the German nation, which has been called upon to guard, foster, and perpetuate these grand ideals." But, in the notorious Bremen speech (March 22nd, 1905), the Woltmann-Chamberlain theories are very evident: ". . . to abandon ourselves to the firm conviction that our Lord God would never have given Himself so much trouble about our German Fatherland and its people, had He not destined us for higher things. We are the salt of the earth, but we must be worthy of being so." The famous toast on the 105th anniversary of the birth of Moltke (October 26th, 1905) at Berlin was less inspired by the Pan-Germanic theories than by the resulting imperialistic conception of war. "My second glass is drained to both the future and the present. You have seen, gentlemen, how it stands with us in the world. Therefore, powder dry; sword sharpened, the aim in view; our energies at tension, and down with pessimists!" On August 31st, 1907, he again said at Münster: "Then our German nation will become a block of granite, upon which our Lord God can erect and complete His civilising work in the world. Then the words of the poet will be realised, who wrote: 'Teutonism will one day

prove the salvation of the world.'"¹ Few comments are necessary. It is, besides, known how much William II. interested himself in the investigations of Aryan anthropology. The racial scientist, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who is of English birth, was his favourite author. "I particularly advise you to read what Chamberlain has so admirably said in the preface to his 'Foundations of the Nineteenth Century' on this point," said William II. to the masters and first form of the Friedrich Public School at Cassel on August 29th, 1911. In the fourth chapter of this book I have already shown how such lines of thought were turned to practical use by German foreign policy. In particular, the attitude of our dynasty at The Hague Conferences is a clear proof that the German foreign policy was not only permeated by the tacit presumption of Germanic superiority, but also by the fact that by "superiority" nothing else was meant than the brute force of the stronger.

¹"An deutschem Wesen wird einmal noch die Welt genesen." Geibel had written this verse cited by the Emperor as early as 1861. But Geibel was, like his colleague, Hoffmann von Fallersleben (the author of "Deutschland über Alles"), by no manner of means a Pan-Germanist, but a democratic patriot, who expected the regeneration of the world from the union of German races and the resulting political liberty of the German people. It is strange that the song "Deutschland über Alles" was first sung in Hamburg, on the occasion of a manifestation in favour of the liberty of the Press. Now, however, since the unity of the German races has been effected in a manner so utterly different from that which our democratic national poets ever imagined, their words have been given another, namely, an imperialistic meaning.

CONCERNING THE FREEDOM OF GERMAN CULTURE

It may possibly be suggested here that I am confusing cause with effect, and it will certainly be suggested that every nation has the culture that it deserves. Is the dynasty really to blame for the fact that, during the last hundred years, we have developed a constitutional, a military, and a racial science, that has earned us the hatred of the whole world? Was it not rather the theories and researches of Hegel, Treitschke, Chamberlain, and Bernhardi that exercised a decisive influence on the attitude of the dynasty? And, if Germany failed to produce any effective antidote to these teachings, is not this a proof that the German people were at fault? How came it that the teachings of Hegel, Treitschke, Gobineau, and Chamberlain won such an enormous following? How was it that Schopenhauer—a far more distinguished thinker—did not become a “spiritual force” in Germany, instead of Hegel? And so forth.

We do not put these questions, and we do not fall back on the popular assertion that every nation possesses what it deserves. Perhaps at some future time, when we have nothing better to do, we may argue the question whether man is a product of his environment, or whether the environment is a product of man, or whether mediæval scholasticism was dictated by the Papacy, or whether the power of the Papacy was the fruit of a scholasticism. But we have little desire to argue the question whether the nature and direction of German culture in the nineteenth century was dictated by the dynasty, or whether the dynasty was a fruit of German culture, because the matter is so

perfectly clear. Just as it is obvious that neither Germany's gigantic armaments nor her aggressive foreign policy are the products of the will of the German nation, so also the German culture of Treitschke, Chamberlain, Bernhardi, and their school, with its glorification of war and conquest, is not a result of the national spirit of Germany, but a result of the thirst for power of the dynasty. It is this thirst for power of the dynasty, and not any national ideal, which has been the animating and directing force behind all the German intellectuals since Kant, Goethe, and Humboldt. It has been the German dynasty which, for the last hundred years, for the safeguarding of its existence, has brutally and systematically stifled all free expression of opinion, all sound criticism, all democratic sentiments and aspirations. It has been the German dynasty which has always stood, watchful and suspicious, behind its professors. Over the most distinguished professors no less than the most insignificant school-teachers it has exercised relentless control.

As Germans, we can only reflect with secret melancholy upon the fact that since the age of Goethe the dynasty has lain like a gravestone over the intelligence and the aspiration for freedom of Germany. Every German who since that time has felt himself to possess the right and the talent to come forward as the champion of democratic liberties has always been confronted with the choice either of wearing himself out in fruitless opposition, or of taking refuge in a foreign country, or of bowing to circumstances, that is to say, becoming tacitly or openly a panegyrist of the dynasty.

In this struggle with their conscience and their

better self, very many talented Germans have succumbed. In their youth they have, for the most part, nourished democratic and international sympathies, but sooner or later they have given up the struggle and, in order not to be compelled to stifle their talent and their longing for recognition, they have decided to serve the dynasty. This dynasty, which, in Prusso-Germany, disposes of every dignity, title, and office, has exercised over the nation for the last hundred years an intellectual terrorism which scarcely weighs upon the present generation, which outwardly is scarcely perceptible, and which it is quite impossible for foreign nations to understand.

Therefore, almost everything that has been said about German culture in France, England, and Italy, since the beginning of the war, is false; because it is impossible for the people of those countries to conceive that the national idea of right and of culture can be a dictate from above and consequently they believe that it emanates from the people.¹

¹ When, in October, 1914, that notorious "Appeal to the Civilised World" was published, about which we shall speak later, the famous French Socialist, Gustav Hervé, in his indignation, cried to the French soldier: "Now fire into their ranks without any scruple!" Questioned concerning his point of view, said Anatole France, Hervé gave in this phrase the only possible answer. Since then, the conviction that the idea of culture expressed in the manifesto is that of the whole German people has in France (and to some extent also in England, Italy and the neutral countries) become almost a dogma, which every good patriot is bound to accept. In the interest of the German people and of the coming peace, this notion is all the more to be regretted, in that it will be extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate to those who are at present our enemies how the case really stands. For supposing that the German dynasty is conquered in this war and that Germany produces a thousand new representatives of cul-

Many French and English chauvinists went so far as to assert that it was this culture emanating from the German people, with its sinister dream of world-power, which had urged on our Government in its dangerous world-policy. The fact is, however, that we Germans for the last hundred years have not dared to be what we actually are and would like to show ourselves, namely, the descendants and the upholders of the classical Germanism of Leibnitz, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Humboldt, Uhland, etc.—that is to say, eminently peaceful natures, perhaps somewhat heavy, but always of cosmopolitan sympathies.

It was our dynasty that compelled us to become Prussianised. Even Bismarck, as is discernible on the first page of his "Reflections and Reminiscences," was, as a youth, a Republican, although he would never have become Bismarck had he not betimes discarded his youthful follies. Until his mature years, Moltke was a devotee of the old German idea of eternal peace, which is developed by Kant, but as soon as he perceived that Kant and Peace were in Prussia less estimated than war and conquest, he became our most famous strategist, and glorified war (by which he gained £45,000 and recognition as a national hero) as

ture, who unanimously condemn the present *régime* and uphold democracy and internationalism, then it is to be feared that they will be received in France (and elsewhere) much in the same way that in their time Renan, Fustel de Coulanges, and other distinguished Frenchmen were received by the German intellectuals. That is to say, they will be told that their sudden democratic and international sympathy is merely the hypocrisy of the vanquished, and so forth. For decades the German intellectuals will have lost their credit in the world. This is a tragedy, the full bitterness of which will only be tasted by our children and our children's children.

the spring of healing for nations and an element in the divine order of the world. Treitschke was fêted in Paris in 1864 by the Republicans there as a spirited opponent of Prussian despotism; but when he saw that the future belonged to Prussian despotism, he altered his course, and became our most uncompromising philosopher of War and the State, receiving as his reward the coveted title of Prussian "Wirklicher Geheimrath" (Privy Councillor).¹ The same happened in the case of Sybel, the historian, in his younger years a great opponent of Bismarck, and who later became one of the most reliable of "Geheimräthe." Likewise, the author Arnold Ruge, who in the 'forties instigated a revolution against Prussia and, later, became one of Bismarck's great admirers. David Friedrich Strauss wrote in his youthful days a learned pamphlet against "the Romanticists on the throne," and, after the war of 1870, defended against Renan the conquering romanticism of the Hohenzollerns as a divine right. Even a man like Ferdinand Freiligrath, the spirited champion and poet of the Revolution of 1848, received unexpectedly, the protection of Bismarck, and in 1870 made mock of his whole past career by pouring out verses lauding the glorious German victories.

So it went on and so it still goes on in Prusso-Germany to-day. When the philosopher Kant had a severe snub administered him by the King of Prussia for his revolutionary writings; when the antiquarian

¹ A title not really translatable into English. It carries the further appellation of "Excellency," perhaps equivalent to "Sir," the Knight's title. The author sets these titles out at length, *post.* [Translator.]

Delitzsch was sternly reproved by William II. (Letter to Admiral von Hollmann, February 15th, 1903) because he had permitted himself to publish the results of his Babylonian investigations in the sense demanded by true science; or when charges of *lèse majesté* have been based on pure suppositions, pastors like Traub and Jatho deprived of their offices for a liberal phrase, trivial comedy-writers like Blumenthal honoured, and genuine poets like Hauptmann severely reprimanded: always and everywhere the same spirit and the same will were predominant. Nothing manly and democratic could be tolerated; and, instead, the shallow, self-seeking, and subservient were extolled.

Not even in Russia or China are there so many orders, titles, and official berths as we possess and therefore there are in those countries fewer sycophants, lickspittles, and intellectual lackeys. Prusso-Germany is the happy hunting ground for titles, uniforms, and orders. From the Iron Cross, Second Class, to the Red Eagle, First Class with diamonds, it is a long, long way. The badges of servility (so-called orders) at the disposal of our Government might well be used to embellish the corridors of the Reichstag, and so effectively stifle in our popular representatives any taste for opposition. With us, much adroitness is required in order not to sin against etiquette. Even the number of "councillors" makes a novice giddy. There are provincial government, engineering, juristic, accountant, medical, court, ambassadorial, commercial, and other councillors, all of whom, in reward for the faithful discharge of their duty, await their advancement to "Privy" and thence to "acting Privy"

councillors. If the novice has contrived to understand all these distinctions of rank, and is then actually introduced into the presence of a representative of the realm of Excellencies, he has, meanwhile, become very humble and asks himself whether on God's earth there can possibly be anything grander than to be "acting Privy Councillor of a Legation, with the prefix Excellency." But even this exalted station is surpassed by that of a lieutenant in the reserves; for the latter is admissible at Court, even more admissible than the nobility itself.

"The gross extent to which the position of officer in the German Army is overestimated is not in the least realised by the people at large. Among all the varied ambitions which throng about the Court, it is only the military ambitions which are practically unrealisable. Herr Friedländer, for instance, might become Privy Councillor of Commerce (*Geheimer Kommerziensrat*); he might be raised to the nobility; he might even receive the Order of the Red Eagle, Second Class, with diamonds, but never will he be created lieutenant in the reserves. Herr Dernburg was nominated Acting Privy Councillor (*Wirklicher Geheimrat*), with the prefix "Excellency," without any hesitation, but he will have to perform wonders in his new office before he will achieve promotion from vice-colour-sergeant (*Vizefeldwebel*) to lieutenant in the reserves."¹

"Prince von Bülow, whose disposition is so entirely unmilitary, had to become General in the Hussars, in order to hold his own against the toadies of the Court."²

No one in Germany can boast of a full understand-

¹ "Unser Kaiser und sein Volk," p. 109.

² *Ibidem*, p. 107.

ing of these matters. Merely to acquire a knowledge of all the new uniforms, badges, chains, ribbons, oak-leaves, order-clasps, medals, titles and other decorations which have sprung into existence during the reign of William II. has become a veritable science, demanding special study of the most arduous nature. In the matter of etiquette and of heraldry we have reached a perfection which a Chinaman would by no means envy us. For the feature of it all which would arouse the laughter of a Chinaman, namely, the fact that the wives proudly claim for themselves any title possessed by their husbands, no matter how insignificant, is a bitterly serious matter in Prusso-Germany. Just as the German Crown Prince was indignant that the Czar should take precedence of his father, so every Frau Oberpostdirektor (*i.e.*, wife of a manager of a District Post Office) will deprive you of her friendship if you address her merely as Frau Postdirektor (*i.e.*, wife of a postmaster), and if you should address her merely as Frau Schulze, then her husband will challenge you to a duel with pistols.

The German fondness for titles has always excited the merriment of the world. The great philologists of other nations have vainly endeavoured to find English, French or Russian equivalents for expressions like "Allerhöchstdieselben," "Unterthänigst," "Durchlauchtigst," "in Gehorsam ersterben," etc., etc. No other language in the world possesses like word-combinations. For even if the spirit of etiquette and caste apparent in such expressions is to be taken as characteristic of every monarchic community, yet this science exists nowhere in such servile perfection as it does in Germany.

In order to avoid any errors in passing judgment on the German people, we must be quite clear on the point that all this is not a product of genuine Teutonism, but is only the fruits of dynastic culture. The servility and class-distinction it has so magnificently nurtured, coupled with the most petty intellectual tutelage and the most reactionary policy any country has ever known, explain how it happens that all the really great Germans of the last century (great not only in talent, but in character) have either fled to foreign countries, or have risen to fame and have laboured in foreign countries, or have studiously held aloof from all political activity.

Wagner laboured in Paris and in Switzerland, and finally, after renouncing his republican ideals, found a home at the Court of a small dynasty which had, at least with regard to art, remained liberal. Like the poets of the Young German school, Marx fled from Prussian reaction and spent the greatest part of his life in Paris and London. Nietzsche lived in Italy and Switzerland and called himself a "good Swiss." Schopenhauer remained in Germany, and virulently attacked Hegel, but he had to wait fully thirty years for recognition, and, moreover, carefully avoided descending from his high pedestal in order to wage that war against the political powers which in other countries was receiving the support of Victor Hugo, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, etc. Friedrich Albert Lange, one of those quiet German *savants* who, like Karl Vogt, combine knowledge with conscience, proceeded, like the latter, to Switzerland, from which country he vainly protested against the shrieks of victory set up by the Bismarck fanatics.

There is, I believe, no other State in the world that, like Prusso-Germany, has driven continually its best men into foreign lands, leaving us only broken reeds and strictly tutored Privy Councillors. A Tolstoi, who was possible in Russia, would have had to emigrate had he been a German. As far as Prussia itself is concerned, it has not, since Kant, produced a man of genius and character who would have held out in Prussia. A man like William von Humboldt may succeed for a time in remaining near the throne and yet in energetically championing popular liberty, but he cannot remain there long. Even Humboldt fell into disgrace and had to smother his bitterness of soul in foreign travel; his brother, Alexander von Humboldt, a genius of whom Prussia may well be proud, held aloof from all political activity (which did not prevent his intervening with Frederick William IV. for a poet like Prutz), and so forth.

GERMAN CULTURE, THEN AND NOW

The matadors of the divine order of things (Mettelnich, Hegel, Bismarck, Treitschke) ruthlessly sundered the threads woven from the German classic epoch to modern days. When, in 1859, the centenary of Schiller's birth was celebrated as a German national fête-day, the public jubilation rang out like a cry of yearning for the return and continuation of that genuine culture as embodied in Schiller and his era.

It was too late! Schiller and his epoch were officially outlawed. Their works still lived on, but not their free, German ideals. In the classical sense, liberty, progress, and public weal had vanished in Ger-

many. Within the past forty years we have managed to banish the free ideas and cosmopolitanism of our classical school so utterly that we have been obliged to import cosmopolitans. Despite all official discouragement, the instinctive demand of German readers and theatre-goers for cosmopolitans was so strong, and German cosmopolitanism was so thoroughly disheartened by the German Empire, that people like Ibsen, Tolstoi, Gorki, Zola, Maupassant, Anatole France, Wilde, Bergson, Maeterlinck, Verhaeren, and others became our gods.

The *rôles* were changed. The country of poets and philosophers had, at the beginning of last century, become the intellectual teacher of the world; we were the fountain-source of ideas. Our philosophers and musicians, our poets and men of science, were admired and quoted in foreign lands. Madame de Staël drew for her countrymen an enthusiastic and sympathetic picture of the Germany of Weimar days, and all the world then spoke with the highest respect of our intellectual, artistic, and scientific culture.

But now foreign countries, with astonishment and apprehension, interested themselves only in the "views" of our "racial scientists" and military authors. Nietzsche was the last German cosmopolitan that foreigners translated into their languages and discussed. With silent amazement our neighbours heard (on November 10th, 1908) from the Emperor's lips that Count Zeppelin was the greatest German of the twentieth century. General Bernhardi became Germany's most lamentable celebrity; his books were translated into most civilised languages, and, together with other productions of our "Realpolitik,"

were everywhere regarded as the symbols of modern Teutonism. A nation of philosophers and poets, which had now apparently become a greedy race of fire-eaters and warriors. In all the innumerable speeches William II. has made during his twenty-eight years' rule, names like Goethe and Schiller occur at most two or three times (not to mention Kant, Herder, and Lessing). Bombast and arrogance had taken the place of the Weimar peaceful liberty of thought. We were no longer the disciples of our classicists, but the devotees of Bismarck and Treitschke. Politically isolated by our policy of the "mailed fist," we had, intellectually and artistically, sunk to the level of the tolerated and rapacious. The cleverest of our so-called "moderns" were not equal to the task of dimming the lustre of a Count Zeppelin or lessening the influence of the works of a Chamberlain, a Liman, or a Frymann.

A general cloud of uneasiness brooded over the land of poets and philosophers. We were discontented with ourselves, stood in our own light, and did not quite know why. We had a sort of misgiving that we were loathed by the rest of the world, and a dim sense of how little we could now offer it compared with formerly. Of course, we were comforted to some degree by the reflection that we had become the leading merchants, men of science, chemists, and organisers in the world, yet, after all, we instinctively felt that this could not be the true *rôle* we had to play in the world. Everyone spoke sentimentally of German culture, but no one knew really what this implied. But, in our innermost hearts, we wanted this culture to be actuated by

cosmopolitan ideals. Openly, however, we scoffed (even in the halls of German Freemasonry) at this "cosmopolitanism" of our ancestors. Ridicule of the ideal of a thoroughly German and democratic period was considered good taste under a monarchical *régime*. But here, as always, we spoke without real conviction. We would so gladly have become what we really are, by virtue of our national gifts and tradition, but could we ever become it? Not even in the province that is furthest removed from any dynastic influence, namely, in art, were we allowed liberty. "An art that disregards the laws and limits I have laid down is no longer an art," said William II. to the Berlin artists, who, under his direction, had sculptured the statues of the Siegesallee (December 18th, 1901). And he added: "This much I can tell you: the impression the Siegesallee makes upon the foreigner is quite overpowering; everywhere we find an enormous respect for German sculpture. I trust you will maintain this high reputation. . . ."

What William II. here said about the Siegesallee is generally applicable to German culture; the impression it made upon the foreigner was overwhelming, and everywhere in the world it was regarded with the greatest respect. Yet only externally. Secretly, the foreigner was amazed, perturbed, and depressed at the sight of its uniformity and stiffness. The foreigner was as far as the German people itself from guessing that in Prusso-Germany everything is shaped on the same last, and that this is a dynastic last. Political Constitution, Siegesallee, or German culture—it is all one; all alike are inspired by the dynasty, executed according to orders, and forced upon the

German people as a glorification of the hereditary despotic house.

But Heaven has granted the German people the gift of good temper; vexed, at times, about this excess of military discipline, it yet secretly admired the versatility of a ruler who not only interested himself in soldiers and battleships, but, also, in art and artists.

To be sure the German people failed to realise how matters really stood. For just as it yearned in secret for a really national government, army, and policy, without actually attaining it, so it dared not foster a really national culture that would have satisfied the true German ideal. As, in the realm of politics, our constitution and army were only a semblance, and not the reality of true German thought, so since Hegel our official German culture had long ceased to be a product of true Germanism, and had become merely the will-to-power of the dynasty expressed in scientific and artistic forms.

This fact, realised only by a few (among them, Nietzsche), was revealed to us with the most unmistakable clearness on the outbreak of the World War. When in October, 1914, that appeal "An die Kulturwelt" was issued, which was signed by ninety-three of the leading German intellectuals, and caused so much amazement and excitement in the civilised world (even in the real though muzzled Germany), then this German culture threw off the mask and showed itself in its true form, a protective bulwark of the dynasty.

There is no longer any question here of that scientific logic which in Kant's days had its home in Germany: "It is untrue!" "It is untrue!" This is not

the language of logicians, scientists, and free Germans, but of lackeys, whose views may well be discounted.

Investigation of truth, reflection and objectivity, once the hall-marks of German science, are foreign to this modern culture. "Often enough, during his reign of twenty-eight years, has William II. proved himself the protector of the world's peace . . . And only when a superior enemy long lurking at our frontiers fell, from three sides, on our nation did it arise as one man." Thus do people speak who, for a century past, have been drilled to express themselves not in accordance with their convictions but in accordance with the wishes of their Government. Whenever the dynastic Government is assailed, all sense of honour and scientific evidence is for such persons non-existent.

The quintessence of this appeal, the spiritual balance, as it were, of a hundred years of intellectual tutelage, is contained in the following sentence, which will bring a blush to the cheek of our grandchildren and great-grandchildren: "But for German militarism, German culture would long since have been wiped off the face of the earth." After this, all doubt must cease. Everyone who feels within himself a spark of true Germanism will be forced to admit that this sentence amounts to a declaration of the bankruptcy not only of classical Germanism, but of every human aspiration towards culture. Even though we were able to emerge victorious from this war, and to build up a German world-empire from Antwerp to Bagdad, this sentence would proclaim us eternally vanquished. It is a Sedan of the German spirit.

Militarism as the pre-requisite and basis of German culture! It looks as if these ninety-three champions of culture had struck themselves in the face, in order then with blushing cheeks to confess that a free man does not allow himself to be struck in the face, he only performs the act himself—on command.

The fact that these ninety-three intellectuals include not only official professors and dignitaries, but also persons who, before the war, were honoured as citizens of the world and as affording the highest hopes for a free Germany—Dehmel, Eucken, Eulenburg, Wilhelm Förster,¹ Häckel, the two Hauptmanns, Ostwald, Sudermann, Ludwig Thoma, etc., etc., whose signature is thus a voluntary act—is only a fresh proof that the official control of the German idea of culture had already demoralised a great many of the free German writers and artists, and that they too, in return for titles and decorations, are now ready to sell their consciences.²

That true culture can only be born in a world outside the prejudices of countries and dynasties, of this, as the appeal shows, the “champions of culture” in modern Germany have no idea. Talk to the world-renowned jurists Laband and Liszt about the aggression in Serbia and the violence done to Belgium, and they will only reply, not as unprejudiced jurists, but as staunch patriots: German necessity knows no law; and be very cautious not to seek any valid evidence of such necessity. Speak to our Dehmel and Fulda

¹ Not to be confused with his son, the Munich Professor F. W. Förster.

² Hauptmann, Sudermann, and others have meantime received the Fourth Class of the Red Eagle, the lowest in that series.

of the destruction of invaluable libraries and churches, and it would not surprise me if they dilated on the tragical beauty of a cathedral blazing in the service of German culture. Complain, again, to Hauptmann about Germany's questionable methods of warfare, and he will, like any chance German lieutenant of the Guard, tell you that any desecration is not more than Germany's power and dignity demand. Speak to Scheidemann and Südekum of the necessity of at last bringing the European nations under a democracy, and of utilising the potentialities of this World War for the acquisition of new international rights, and, with scarcely veiled admiration for the model German social legislation, they will reply that even the most liberal republic conceivable, considering that it is always controlled by accursed capitalists, is no better for the labouring man than an absolute monarchy.

For Emperor and Empire! Between these everlasting blinkers, our historians view their documents, the professors their antiquities, the freemasons their corner stones, the classical scholars their Pegasus, and the Social Democrats the ark of the covenant of the sacred-Marx.

German culture in the German Empire? No! A Ptolemaic cosmic system of superstitious theories, which circle round the stationary level of their dynasty; a graciously tolerated cloak of militarism; a puerile phantom machine with "energetic imperatives" and thousands of empty phrases; a Ptolemaic religion of fawning mandarins; at the best, a musing on pious sentiments and a splendid naïveté of prophetic souls;

here and there, perchance, a subservient attempt to curb the war-thirsty beast. Nothing more.

The German "champions of culture"? Among a hundred there is hardly one who dares to play the man: slaves, who carry their master's whip; pedants, who belaud as liberty what all the rest of the world has long felt to be serfdom; acrobats and court jesters, who are permitted by their grand lords to present all manner of burlesques of freedom to the people; occasionally an earnest eccentric who has heard it said that dynasties are not indispensable in our modern world; but the overwhelming majority of them, intellectual lieutenants in the Hohenzollern Guard, ready to obey at the word of command.

Learning without character, knowledge without conscience, organisation without humanity, discipline without liberty, ideal without dignity; such is the result of a mental development that, commencing with the disappearance of the Weimar Germanism, and politically trained by Metternich, Bismarck, and William II., and intellectually by Hegel, Treitschke, and their disciples, could only play its part as a protecting power of the dynasty. The World War is the absolute proof of this. It has shown the culmination of this development in a complete victory of Potsdam over Weimar. I believe that, after this catastrophe, we require an entirely new generation of men to answer by entirely new conduct this—for Germany—entirely new question, namely, what Culture really means.

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VI

THE GERMAN'S FATHERLAND

IN the foregoing pages we have embarked on a strictly judicial voyage of discovery through modern Prusso-Germany, basing all our observations upon actual facts. As a subject of the Fatherland of scientific logic my aim was to apply this logic, as far as in me lay, and without prejudice or malice, to a topic hitherto totally excluded from free German investigation—namely, the legal, military, political, and intellectual relation of our dynasty to our country. I do not claim completeness for my studies. The materials I have collected on these subjects would have sufficed to fill a book of fully threefold the volume I now present to my readers. In Germany things exist which afford the most valuable evidence in support of the views here urged,¹ concerning which, however,

¹ The reader will, perhaps, have noticed that I have said nothing about the Prussian Constitution, the Prussian franchise and Upper House, the privileged position of the Junkers in the Prussian political system, the infamous Prussian Polish policy, etc. I have also left unmentioned numerous expressions of William II. which, though indubitably uttered, have not been officially confirmed. A special chapter, which really belongs here, and would do much to elucidate the psychology of dynasties, would be an honest account of those numerous scandals at the Berlin Court (Stöcker, Schrader-Kotze, Hammerstein, Waldersee, Eulenburg, etc.) which, since Bismarck's fall, have disclosed the secret workings of the Berlin Camarillas and exercised an unsuspected influence upon German politics.

a good patriot prefers to keep silence. Yet the little evidence I have above adduced will, I trust, suffice.

If, for instance, by the word "fatherland" we mean what all civilised nations to-day, except the Russians and Turks, mean by it, then by the light of our investigations we arrive at the result that we Germans have no Fatherland at all. For what the French, English, Swiss, Americans understand by "fatherland," namely, the country in the government of which they have a voice, does not exist in Germany.

The modern notion of "Fatherland" was first created by the French Revolution and is, essentially, an ideal of public weal and justice; it is (let Germans realise this fact) inseparable from the notion of the sovereignty of the people. The Frenchman, the Italian, the Englishman, and the Swiss (lately, perhaps, the Chinese) is willing to give his life for his country, because he feels himself a responsible part of a sovereign whole, a member of a national organism striving towards a continually higher ideal of justice and welfare—in short, free citizens; possessing equal rights in a political and constitutional community.

But we Germans are not permitted to attach such a meaning to the word "fatherland," since, as already shown, the antecedent conditions to such a conception are wanting. Any German who honestly investigates this question must admit this fact. Both as a function and in its effects, our electoral right is only a pretence. We have neither ruling statesmen nor responsible ministers, neither a legally guaranteed position as against our Government, nor soldiers, sworn to uphold our Constitution. Thus, we are not the free citizens of a constitutional State, but, as William II. in his

speeches has again and again insisted, the subjects of a God-appointed ruler.

First of all, there is no question with us of real spiritual liberty. There are many Germans who proudly boast of our liberty of the Press; but, alas! the German liberty of the Press is the same democratic illusion as the German Reichstag and the German popular army. As German policy is exclusively the business of the German Emperor, and the speeches and actions of the Emperor may not be criticised (the mere supposition of an intention to insult the sovereign¹ suffices, in Germany, to get anyone into prison), in Germany our much vaunted liberty of the Press stops just where, in other countries, it begins, that is to say, where it begins to fulfil the purpose for which it was founded. There is nothing worse and more stupid than liberties, which are counted upon, and yet, at the very moment when they ought to prove their use, become crimes. Liberties that prove valueless, as soon as they are to be employed for the purposes for which they were ostensibly created, are, in truth, Hegelian speculations on the stupidity of the people. If we made no pretence of having liberty of the Press, then we should, at least, know how we stood. But as things are, one has to take infinite

¹ One instance out of a hundred. In January, 1899, the editor of a Magdeburg Socialist paper was sentenced to four years and one month's imprisonment for an article written in the form of a legend, but which, unfortunately for him, the Court held to bear upon German politics. By the aid of that supposition (that German politics were intended), the Attorney-General made out a case of *lèse majesté* of the Emperor and the twelve-year-old Prince Eitel Fritz and was entirely successful.

trouble to bring a German to comprehend that liberty of the Press, absolute government, and *lèse majesté* are three things, like surgeon, sickness, and belief in miracles, *i.e.*, the last produces the second and scoffs at the first.¹

As far as human despotic power can reach, the Hohenzollern dynasty is in Germany politically omnipotent. Despite all advances in civilisation, the words addressed in 1717 by Frederick William I. to the Prussian Estates—"the authority of the Junkers will go to the wall; but I establish the '*souveraineté*' as a 'rock of bronze'"—and, again, to the General Directory, on December 20th, 1722—"we are, after all, the King and we do what we please"—have 180 years subsequently been repeated emphatically by William II. in countless speeches: thus, "my course is the right one and I shall go on steering it" (February 24th, 1892); or again, "the descendant of him who by his own right became sovereign duke in Prussia will pursue the same paths as his immortal ancestor; just as once the first King said '*ex mea nata corona*' (my crown I have myself created), and his illustrious son established his authority as a '*rocher de bronze*,' so do I, like my imperial grandfather, represent the monarchy by divine right." (Königsberg, September 6th, 1894).

¹ This criticism refers, of course, to the constitutionally guaranteed liberty of the Press *before* the war. That since the outbreak of war we have been completely deprived of even the semblance of liberty of the Press, and that (despite solemn undertakings to the contrary) it has not been restored, is well known. Moreover, it is only in England, among all the belligerent countries, that any real liberty of the Press has survived since the outbreak of the war.

The sovereignty by Divine Right is not, in Germany, a meaningless phrase, not a dynastic fiction, and, certainly, not an imagination, as alleged, of so-called unpatriotic subjects. It is an absolute fact; and two centuries of human development have not altered it a jot. As we, as good Christians, have to believe that God created the world in six days and rested the seventh, so have we, as good patriots, to believe that the dynasty with God's help arranges everything for the best. Come what may, and be it ever so much in conflict with the times, we know that it is a part of the Divine order and that behind it is concealed a higher plan.

We Germans are, in truth, born critics; we have probed the mysteries of the universe, established the limits of human knowledge, and conceive ourselves to be the cleverest and most highly educated people in the world; yet, in matters of political government, we have been struck blind by the gods and by Hegel. And, our dynasty has, to simplify matters, forbidden the nation of thinkers to think about these matters.

What then have we Germans left? Upon what do we found our German patriotism? As a fact we base it upon our affection for the imperial house. Any other devotion to country would be senseless. William II., Professor Delbrück, and other authorities assure us, and with truth, that the army "is the basis of our political system." But, since this army is sworn to allegiance not to our country and its Constitution, but to the person of the Emperor-King, it follows, by mathematical logic, that our whole German political system does not exist for the behoof of us German citizens, but is merely a creation and possession of

the German dynasty. And so it is; Emperor and Fatherland are in Germany one and the same. The Emperor is not only the supreme authority under the Constitution, but the born incorporation of our political system, the leader of our national fortunes in peace and war, umpire in matters of art and science, and sovereign plenipotentiary of the German people—in short, the sole initiating and guiding force of the German Empire within and without.

As he is all this, the notion of Fatherland implies for the German only the person of the German Emperor. Our devotion to him is our love of country. If a German were to love his country, as other civilised nations do theirs (as a political community of which he is an active member), he would be a revolutionary. Even to-day the idea of a Fatherland belonging to the German nation is regarded as a crime.

Of course, it may certainly be disputed which notion of Fatherland is the higher, that of the French, the English, and so forth, or that of the Germans. But it cannot possibly be disputed that on this point, as on most others, we have sundered ourselves from the rest of the civilised world, that is to say, we have placed ourselves in diametrical opposition to it. For State and Fatherland, which elsewhere form a natural entity, are in our case only notions artificially welded together. In reality, the Prussian conception of the State is the absolute negation of the conception of the Fatherland obtaining in other countries.

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It has been shown that in all vital questions German domestic and foreign policy has been guided not with the co-operation of, but in opposition to, the

German people, and that, therefore, logically, where the policy "of Germany" is referred to, it ought rather to be described as the policy of the German dynasty. I wish here, once more, to emphasise that in all important questions in which the German people have been allowed to have a voice. They have invariably given it against the policy of their Government. The fable that the German people are one heart and one soul for their dynasty ought to be finally discredited.

Foreign countries, who have, as a rule, no idea how things stand in a country where *lèse majesté*, telegrams from the Crown Prince, and adoration of the military uniform are taken for granted, have an idea that the German people are delighted with their dynasty. At this crisis, no stone must be left unturned to dispel this illusion. Had the dynasty been really so assured of the support of its people, it would long since have dispensed with those protective laws behind which it has so carefully shielded itself. But during the last twenty years those laws have become both more severe and more frequently applied than ever. The dynasty went yet further. It demanded the application of these laws to the Reichstag and forbade any discussion of speeches from the throne. Finally, denunciations for *lèse majesté* had become such a public nuisance, that William II. (1907) reduced the period of limitation for actions of the kind from five years to six months (without, however, making the crime dependent upon publicity). This shows that the dynasty was, in Germany, only popular because by every available resource it enforced this popularity and ruthlessly suppressed every other sentiment. It further shows that the proverbial obedience of the German

is not a natural trait in his character, but only the result of brutal and long compulsion. A monarchical Government that has never tolerated the smallest openly republican association within its realms may easily assert that its citizens are loyal to the backbone. As no counter-evidence is allowed, and as this fealty has not sprung from the soil of liberty and free will, it may be regarded with suspicion.

There is no large party in Germany which desires the monarchy for the monarchy's sake. The fundamental factor in genuine monarchical fealty, namely, unselfishness, is to be sought for in vain among our so-called monarchical parties. We have, in Germany, men who regard monarchy as a political ideal, disinterested politicians, journalists and scholars, who are anxious to further this ideal, but no political party, supported by a popular majority, disinterestedly serving the monarchy in its present form. Those very parties, who are reckoned pillars of the throne and the Church, support the throne not for the sake of God and King, but only because God and King serve their own ends best. That is the plain truth, which is naturally contradicted most vehemently by those who live by and not for the monarchy.

The Prusso-German people, as a whole, have for decades past regarded the divine right of the monarchy with some scepticism. Whenever opportunity offered, they have protested against this divine right. In the National Assembly of October 12th, 1848, Schultze-Delitzsch declared in the discussion of the Constitutional Charter: "It is usual, when a commercial house goes bankrupt, not to make use of the old name for the new business. Now I believe that in past history

absolutism has come to complete bankruptcy under the old title 'by God's Grace.' Accordingly, I suggest that we do not adopt this old, bankrupt name for our new business." And by 217 to 143 votes the "bankrupt God's-grace firm" was then struck out of the Draft of the Constitution. Was it the fault of the Prussian nation that Frederick William IV. forcibly dissolved this assembly, and, in defiance of all popular demands, forced upon it a Constitution (which has continued to this day) beginning with the words "We, Frederick William, by God's Grace, etc."?

Had the spirit of the German people been really as monarchical, slavish, and imperialistic as our enemies of to-day allege, then it could never have come into conflict with its Government. But, as a matter of fact, these conflicts have been frequent and numerous.¹

¹ Some of the acutest conflicts of the past decade between the Government and the people have already been noted in the fourth chapter of this work. How strong is the opposition of the German people to its Government is evidenced not only by these conflicts, not only by the unconstitutional character of the German popular assembly, a character which has been preserved in defiance of every protest, but, in particular, by the attitude of the Reichstag since the commencement of this World War. The so-called "Burgfrieden" and the boasted "sacred unity of all parties" have not been able to prevent the Reichstag from protesting, almost unanimously, and vigorously, against protective detention and censorship, against the exclusion of Jews and dissenters from the corps of officers, against the disregard of the German popular representation in matters of foreign policy, etc. All in vain. What in England, in 1629, was abolished by the so-called *Petition of Rights* (namely, the arbitrary power of the royal officials and the unprotected state of the citizens) the German citizen demanded the Imperial Government to abolish (unanimously but fruitlessly) at the end of October, 1916. The

That the German people never emerged from their victorious was not their fault, but rather a consequence of that law of the world's history which ordains that the people only begin to gain the upper hand when the dynasty has suffered a loss of prestige outside. But Prussia has suffered no such loss of prestige since the period from 1806 to 1813.

Our democratic neighbours and present foes, who tax us with not being ripe for democracy and declare that we have slavish minds and no understanding of liberty, should give a little consideration to their own history. The French, especially, who are regarded as the most revolutionary nation in the world, should reflect that they, too, in the past, and under like circumstances, possessed almost the same (apparent) faults as those they tax us with to-day. For instance, so long as the two Napoleons returned from their campaigns flushed with victory, the French never dreamt of a revolution. And, at that time, they were just as hated and feared in the world as we Germans have been for the last few decades. Since the French dynasty was boastful and eager for war, the story was spread about the world that the whole of France was intoxicated with militarism and vanity and was a menace to Europe. Here, as elsewhere, the faults and errors of the victorious dynasty were thoughtlessly placed to the account of the people.

A French revolution between 1798 and 1810, or between 1851 and 1869, might have saved us from

tragi-comic element of the whole business is that, with the same unanimity, the same Reichstag voted all war credits, which were demanded under the plea that Germany was fighting a crusade against—Czarism.

the catastrophes that the Bonaparte dynasty brought upon the world, just as a German revolution could have saved us from this present war. Why did not the French revolt at that time? The answer is simple: because they could not. The course of events is everywhere alike; victorious dynasties bring despotism; against this despotism arises a secret revolt, which, however, is shouted down by the loud praises of those who live in the pay of dynasties and wield the power. The louder these praises resound in the land, the stronger and the more embittered becomes the silent dissatisfaction of the real nation. In order to exercise the growing popular discontent, dynasties must have recourse to war as the sovereign remedy. And only when it is proved that their calculations were wrong, and when the eagle flutters wounded to the ground, can this popular indignation burst out and be victorious. Jena and Auerstätt, which strengthened the dynastic rule in France, were for Prussia the signal for a popular uprising culminating in a conspiracy against the Prussian King. But as the Prussian Revolution of those days needed for its victory both the Russian and the Austrian dynasties, it could not, unfortunately, gather its fruits. On the other hand, Sedan marked the birth of the German Empire "with its Prussian summit," and in France the birth of the Third Republic.

There are, after all, rigid laws in history. One of these ordains that dynasties which are victorious outside their realms are at the same time victorious at home over the politics, logic, science, and liberal aspirations of their peoples. When Lamartine said, "It

is not the country, but liberty that is most imperilled in war," he should have said "in *victorious* war." For every victorious war means for the victorious nation a loss of political liberties, whilst for the vanquished it is a fountain of inspiration and democratic progress. Had there been no Königgrätz, Austria would still be without a Constitution and Hungary still under the Austrian scourge; yet, on the other hand, without a Königgrätz the National-Liberals in Prussia would not have unexpectedly become "Reptiles." Without a Sedan, no Bismarck *régime* but, also, no Gambetta. Had Russia been victorious over Japan, the Russian people would to-day have no Constitution. And so on.

Hence, just as the victories of Wagram, Austerlitz, Jena, Sebastopol, and Solferino could not unchain revolutions in France, so from us Germans no revolutions could be expected after Düppel, Königgrätz, Sedan and Paris. Victorious revolutions are only rendered possible by lost campaigns,¹ and it is the misfortune of us Prussians that we have not lost a campaign since Jena. Yes, my dear readers, it was in truth a misfortune, for had Prussia been only once overcome, "the old bankrupt firm" would have been long since extinguished and the present war would not have come to pass. For then there would not

¹ We must lay stress here upon the term "victories." The Revolutions of 1848 were not begotten of wars and not waged against dynasties conquered in the field. But in France, as also in Germany and Austria, they were victorious for a moment only, and immediately after made room for a fresh reaction. Something similar can be said of the great French Revolution, which dethroned a King in order to bring home an Emperor who set all Europe in a ferment,

have arisen the arrogant dream of a German world-empire and the Pan-Germanism of the present day.

Rather more historical logic is seriously needed by our friends across the Vosges and the Channel. They would then realise that we, as a people, have done what we were able to do. They would no longer reproach us on account of faults and bad habits which, under similar circumstances, they themselves evidently possessed, and which are merely due to the dictates of victorious dynasties. The recognition of this fact would be of vital importance in securing a sensible conclusion of peace.

So far as the militarism and foreign policy of the German Empire is especially concerned, I have already indicated that it is quite correct to say of the German people that it has been militarised to the marrow. But one ought not to confound militarism with eagerness for war. The indubitably strong (artificially created) military spirit of the German people was no menace to peace, but, as our nation honestly believed and was again and again assured by William II. in his speeches, a means of maintaining the peace. This is to say, the German people, like all other peoples, considered militarism as a necessary evil for the defense of the Fatherland. It could not, would not, dared not realise the fundamental idea of the dynastically nurtured German militarism—that is to say, its eagerness for war.

This was strikingly proved at the outbreak of the war. In the first chapter of this book I have, by the light of German documents, unearthed a few of the numerous contradictions and forgeries to which the

German Government was obliged to have recourse in order to represent a patently offensive war as a holy war of self-defence. It would not have needed these very compromising contradictions and forgeries, had it not been well aware that any policy of war as a means of conquest was absolutely repugnant to the German people as a whole (in spite of all attempts to militarise them). But after the Government had spoken of Cossacks in East Prussia and bombs on Nuremberg and all this had been expressly confirmed by "official" reports; after it had suppressed, in the Press and the Reichstag, the mediation proposals of the Czar and those of the English Foreign Office, it was a mere trifle to announce solemnly: "Envious foes compel us to a just defence. The sword has been forced into our hand" (speech of William II. on July 31st, 1914, delivered from the balcony of the Palace). Thanks to these imperial and official announcements, German patriots believed themselves faced with that sacred need of self-protection and self-preservation which in the view of every civilised nation is always the justification for armament; the sacred wish and will to defend one's country. When, then, the German people, proudly and as one man, rushed to arms in August, 1914, what were the objects of its enthusiasm? The plans of conquest, as enunciated by Bernhardt, Harden, Reventlow, Keim, Frobenius, and their like? Was it the world-power policy of the Hohenzollerns, the "Greater Germany," the "liberation" of the Flemish, the Baltic races, etc.? Not a bit of it. Anyone who imputes this kind of enthusiasm for war to the ma

jority of the German people is doing them injustice. If so many and such mad plans of annexation crop up, at the present time, everywhere in Germany, while, on the other hand, protests against them are both few and far between, and then only shyly expressed, that is no proof whatsoever that our politicians who desire conquest have the majority of the German people behind them. This alleged lust of the German people for conquest is on a par with its loyalty to the Crown. The Government will not suffer any counter argument, and anyone who at present should advocate an immediate conclusion of peace without annexations would be compelled to hold his tongue. For instance, the *Berliner Tageblatt* was suppressed for several days because it ventured to describe the demands for annexation of the six agricultural unions as calculated to prolong the war. In this way, the impression can readily be engendered abroad that the whole German people is dominated by a barbaric lust of conquest.

Here again, as everywhere in considering this German problem, appearances must be distinguished from actualities. The actuality is that the German people in August, 1914, waxed enthusiastic for the patriotic idea of defence of country. We should not have deserved to remain a nation had we not been animated by this idea. As soon as our national honour and independence are assailed, we, like all other nations, become bellicose; and on the authority of the official German description of the causes of the war we were compelled to believe that this was what had happened. What German, in the confusion of those days, could for a moment conceive that in Prusso-Germany of the

twentieth century those theories of divine constitutional right still prevailed which Machiavelli commended to the princes of mediæval times? The most vigilant democrats, the staunchest opponents of war, could not believe in such a monstrosity; even persons like Liebknecht, Haase, and Bernstein voted the war credits in honest belief that it was for the defence of their country.

In this way, and no other, can the psychology of the German war enthusiasm be explained. It was engendered by the aid of falsifications and the solemn assurance that "we enter upon war with a clear conscience and in the conviction that we did not wish for war" (speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the populace on August 1st, 1914).

It is a simple task (and, perchance, a not unwelcome one to foreign lands) to refute the correctness of this account. Let us, for this purpose, suppose for the nonce a Germany under parliamentary rule. Let us suppose that, in Articles 11 and 68 of the German Imperial Constitution, the phrase "German Reichstag" is substituted for that of "German Emperor," or else that to the latter are added the words "by consent of the German Reichstag." Then, in the realm of German politics, there would be no longer room for the insolent application of the doctrines of Machiavelli. In their place there would be an army subservient to the popular will, Ministers responsible to Parliament, and who could be impeached, reasonably formed electoral divisions, that is to say, a Reichstag with about 660 deputies (instead of 397, as to-day). Then let the election results of 1912 be examined. Out of a total of twelve million votes, almost

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eight million are in manifest opposition to the Pan-Germanistic idea of conquest.¹ These eight million of German electors, all of more or less democratic sympathies, would have to be represented, in this reasonably constituted Reichstag, by about 440 deputies, whereas the real Pan-Germanists, for whom, in the elections of 1912, about four million votes were given, would, in such a Reichstag, have secured about 220 seats.

Now imagine the outbreak of the Austro-Serbian dispute. This Parliament is convened in accordance with the Constitution, and there is presented to it not only the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia together with the latter's almost obsequious reply, but also Grey's proposal for a Conference of the four Powers (Nos. 67 and 84 of the English Blue Book), the telegram of the Czar to William II. of July 29th, which suggested the settlement of the dispute by The Hague

¹ The following can obviously not be regarded as Pan-Germanist: Social Democrats, Liberals, Poles, Alsatians, Guelphs, and Lorrainers. On the other hand, the following are confessedly Pan-Germanist:—National-Liberals, Conservatives, the Imperial Party, Anti-Semites. The Catholic "Centre" occupies an intermediate position. It secured over two million votes in the election of 1912. As the supporters of this party are mostly people in humble circumstances and the candidates of this "Centre Party" in many electoral districts (such as the Rhine Provinces, Alsace-Lorraine, and Upper Silesia) hold definitely democratic views (the Centre has more than once voted against the Army Bills, it opposed the Polish policy, and was, in 1907, even the ally of the Social Democrats), we shall not be far wrong if we halve the Centre votes, and allow about one million as being non-Pan-Germanist. Had the plain question been put to them, Do you wish for a war of conquest? four-fifths of the Centre Party of 1912 would have responded with a loud "No."

Tribunal, and, finally, also, the further mediation proposals of Sazonow (Russian Orange Book, Nos. 50 and 67) and of Grey (Nos. 101 and 103 of the English Blue Book). Instead, then, after the declaration of war, of acquainting an unconstitutionally organised and constitutionally impotent Reichstag four full days after the declaration of war with accomplished facts and grossly deceiving it with fables of Cossack invasions, bombs dropped by aviators, and by the suppression of the most vital proposals for mediation, etc. (which, be it repeated, is only possible under Articles 11 and 68 of the German Imperial Constitution), our Reichstag, reconstituted upon a rational basis, and endowed with full powers, would, constitutionally, have had to decide on war or peace.

Realise this fact, and then honestly reply: Would the German Government, in the face of these proposals for mediation, have ever been empowered by such a Parliament to deliver to Russia on July 31st, 1914, that twelve-hour ultimatum which rendered war unavoidable?

I reply to this question most emphatically, and I believe that all who possess any logical sense will also reply, "*No!*" With the same determination with which the German nation, deceived by falsifications and suppressions of the truth, embarked upon a holy war of self-defence, it would then have demanded (seeing that two-thirds of the German electors are not Pan-Germanists) that all the endeavours and proposals for a reconciliation should first be discussed, and that all possibilities of maintaining the peace compatible with the dignity and independence of the nation should first be exhausted, before the General Staff was sum-

moned and entrusted with the continuation of politics "by other means."

As a German patriot, I am proud to state here in the name of my country that two-thirds of the German electorate have a horror of a war of conquest, they secretly condemn the crimes committed against Belgium, and can only conceive the World War as the result of Cossack invasions, bombs dropped by aviators, and "actual attacks." Two-thirds of the German soldiery have taken the field with "a clear conscience," in the proud conviction that they are defending their country and in the firm belief that "we" did not want the war.

I only wish that this fact could at length be clearly realised. The constant reproach that we are a servile nation, unripe for self-government and craving for world-dominion, has not been levelled at us only by foreign nations, but, alas! even by those few German Socialists and Democrats who are, to-day, in opposition to the German Government. They shrug their shoulders and inquire: What do you expect? The whole German people stands behind its dynasty. It is poisoned with militarism. If William II. had not declared war on August 1st, 1914, our people would have forced him to do so.

The election results of 1907 and 1912 show, at a glance, the criminal absurdity of such a statement, and it is a gross insult to our peaceable, industrious German people. A people that dreams only of booty and robbery need not be worked up to enthusiasm for Emperor and Empire and defence of the Fatherland by means of laws concerning *lèse majesté* and violations of constitutional rights, and certainly not by "actual

attacks." On the contrary, such a people might have been calmly told, what our Pan-Germanists had already vociferously proclaimed, "We are stifled. We need more space under the sun! As we possess the strongest army and the highest civilisation, we have a sacred right to expand." But the Government took good care not to approach our people in this way (although they would thereby have avoided the responsibility for those subterfuges). Sufficient proof has been adduced to show that we Germans are, at heart, as peace-loving as other nations, but that we were artificially and forcibly inoculated with a belief without which our Government could not have carried on this war.

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To sum up: the German Fatherland is embodied in a God-appointed dynasty—that is to say, a dynasty ruling with all the mediæval attributes of power. Belief in this dynasty is a patriotic dogma, to which the Prusso-German people assents not of free will but by coercion. The true German national sense has long ago declared the old firm "by God's grace" bankrupt. That is to say, the dynasty has not been able to prevent our nation passing through the same development and evolving the same democratic ideals of culture as other nations. And, as far as war in particular is concerned, it thoroughly abhors any idea of conquest and, like every other civilised nation, is only moved to enthusiasm for the sacred ideal of defence of the Fatherland.

But, unfortunately with us Germans, this sacred ideal fares in the same way as other political questions. As our idea of the Fatherland, in accordance

with the Constitution, culminates in the dynasty, as German soldiers, in accordance with the Constitution, fight not for their country but for their War Lord, so our sense of nationality is regarded by our rulers only as a means to "higher ends," which we have the less right to know or to criticise, in that it is our bounden duty to come whenever the King calls. Since, then, the sum of the German national sense is simply the patriotic sum of the dynastic dogma, it follows mathematically that our own desire and will are in such matters both immaterial and troublesome to our masters, and that hence they obtained from the gods the right to deal with them according to their pleasure.

This is then the unvarnished constitutional and (by the aid of the German documents) scientifically proven truth. We are not to blame if to-day it sounds monstrous and revolutionary. It none the less remains the truth, and it has to be said.

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VII

THE ORIGIN OF AND MEANING OF THE WAR

THE OPINIONS OF GERMAN PACIFISTS AND SOCIALISTS

HAVING discussed the Germany dynasty and the World War from the German point of view, let us now essay to treat succinctly the dynastic problem from the European point of view and to realise the universal import of this World War. First of all, we must be perfectly clear in our minds that all wars arise from a dynastic craving for power. In these days of "modern ideas," this truth seems, it is true, somewhat "antiquated," and many intellectuals will dismiss it with a superior smile. We have seen that intellectuals do not, by any means, always follow their inward craving for truth. Here, in particular, where the investigation of truth is compelled to respect certain legal paragraphs and patriotic dogmas, the True, the Simple, and the Obvious easily come under the heading of Revolutionary. Consequently, the question as to the origin of wars has been needlessly complicated. The views held by our German official philosophers and other intellectuals rarely satisfy present-day common-sense and frequently give the impression of avoiding

the truth. Only our great Kant had the courage simply and straightforwardly to characterise "insensate war-waging" "as the affair of the monarchs, who are never tired of war." A confirmation of this statement of Kant has been furnished by his diametrical opposite, Bismarck, whose authority, it may be hoped, no one will question. "The majority has, as a rule, no inclination for war; war is kindled by minorities or, in absolute States, by Sovereigns or Cabinets," he said with laudable frankness in his speech in the Reichstag of February 2nd, 1876.

In fact, war has always been the business of monarchs. And so it will continue as long as the latter remain endued with divine power.

Accordingly, whoever sets himself the task of denouncing war (and who would not do so to-day?) must first, if he be honest, commence with an attack upon the dynasties. Yet since Kant's day few have undertaken this. In Germany, in particular and for obvious reasons, nobody has dared to develop Kant's doctrines. The more numerous, during the past twenty years, the "scientific" pacifists in Germany became, the more carefully did they avoid Kant's republican thesis. Instead of dwelling upon the dynastic will for power, they only criticised its external phenomena (armament policy, militarism, secret diplomacy, Chauvinism, Pan-Germanism, inflammatory Press, etc., etc.). The chief German exponent of so-called German Pacifism, Dr. A. H. Fried, nowhere, for instance, in his voluminous writings speaks of dynasties, constitutional powers, supreme control of the army, universal military service, autonomy of nations, etc., but has a great deal to say on the topic of "inter-

national anarchy," of the workings for force, of the irrational organisation of international society and other matters, concerning the origin and effects of which he tells us a great deal, but he does not tell us *who* originates, develops, and employs them. Thus, Fried and his school do not pose as politicians, democrats, or even revolutionaries, but only as cautious scientists, rhetoricians, or (as Fried likes best to describe himself) "pioneers of peace."

When, shortly before the outbreak of the war, I privately inquired of a distinguished German pacifist what he honestly believed to be the real cause of war, he replied, with the candour that we Germans only dare to display in our private conversations, "Oh, we have long known that:—the dynasties!" He gave me certain information touching the already very threatening world-situation at that time (which I cannot repeat here), and when I said to him that, under these circumstances, it was essential to make our struggle firstly a political one, that is to say, to oppose the dynastic principle of power, he replied dejectedly, "What can we do? If we were to say in public who and what drives us into war we should be got rid of on the spot. We have to be glad that we are suffered to remain as we are. The initiated know all the same that we are Republicans." This conversation made such a deep impression upon me that it finally induced me to write this book. From that time forth it became clear to me that every German fighting for peace, popular liberty, and democratic progress must perforce employ a special kind of phraseology, so as not to offend the "powers that be" in Germany.

What Dr. Fried, for instance, cautiously styled "international anarchy" is, when it is thought out to a logical conclusion and clearly expressed, "dynastic will to power." The advantage of the term "international anarchy" lies in its scientific sound, which does not afford the Attorney-General the pretext of looking behind it for any "revolutionary" meaning.

Whom does the army obey? To put this question, examine it, answer it, and extract from it any principle which may be used to serve the maintenance of peace, has, as far as I know, never occurred to the German Pacifists. Woe to the German who, whether Democrat or Republican, ever posed this, the most vital of all questions.

And so modern Germany might be instanced as a proof of the fact that, in a State ruled entirely by technical science, the dynasty need not abate one jot or tittle of its divine and military powers. A closer investigation has proved to us, moreover, that in modern Germany our much boasted "culture" is entirely subservient to dynastic will-power, and, instead of becoming a counterpoise to war, it in fact became its secret tool. What does Dr. Fried make of the fact that in modern Germany, despite its highly perfected technical science, Articles 11 and 68 of the German Imperial Constitution, based as they are upon mediæval ideas, remain unaltered? How was it possible that, in spite of the continuous development of commercial science and the resulting desire for political freedom, any demand for such a democratic modification of the Constitution as would secure this was punished as *lèse majesté*!

It was possible because, as we see, the most modern

technical science is absolutely compatible with the darkest political mediævalism. The more "scientifically," that is to say, the more timidly, the leaders of the intellectual and political opposition protest against it, the easier it is for the rulers of the country to bring about this strange harmony. As long as the "scientific" pacifists are afraid of openly becoming democrats, so long will that technical science which is supposed to promote international brotherhood be a curse rather than a blessing to mankind. For, under these circumstances, modern technical science labours entirely in the interest of war; the World War proves that the horrors of warfare have increased to a degree that fills us with loathing. Whoever, like Dr. Fried and his disciples, expects true culture—that is to say, peace—as a result of technical science, and holds aloof from all constitutional questions and the fundamental demands of democracy, will, like Ostwald (who, moreover, also styles himself a pacifist, and is one in his own way), regard culture merely as technical organisation and social discipline. But true culture is no ideal for mechanicians and technical scientists; man did not invent the machine in order afterwards to be enslaved by it. No! the essential condition of every true culture is and remains the political liberty and dignity of the citizen.

Sovereignty of the people, human dignity, and intellectual liberty—where these are lacking there is no culture whatever, and pacifism, Socialism, etc., become mere caricatures. The collectivist war economy prevailing in Germany to-day furnishes a proof that even Socialism (so long as it is only a question of the needs of the stomach, and confines its demands to

questions of household economy) can perfectly well subsist by the side of an absolute dynasty. If there exist people who give the name "Culture" to this blending of a seemingly most revolutionary principle (collectivism) with the most arbitrary feudal dictatorship (*Burgfrieden*)—and some people have in fact been heard to declare that it is only necessary to transplant the present-day war economy into the coming state of peace, in order to realise the chief aims of Socialism—we must beg to differ from them most emphatically. For as long as, in the midst of the most gigantic technical and economic organisation, dynasties are left in possession of their divine privileges, so long will this culture be not the work of man, but a gift of the gods; a constant threat of war will hover above it, and a bomb dropped from an aeroplane upon Nuremberg will be able to bring the whole structure to the ground.

Is earthly culture in general, and the German in particular, any longer to depend upon the incalculable caprices of the gods and the god-ordained? We ask this question of all who, like Dr. Fried, expect "culture" to bring about a pacifist ordering of the world, without *first* inquiring as to the political and constitutional foundation of this culture. The antecedent history and the outbreak of the World War show that our much vaunted culture is not ours, but belongs to others. So, my dear Dr. Fried, nations look for their happiness as the result first of all of political Constitutions, and not of technical science, culture, and organisation; these and other similar blessings are, after all, of no value for safeguarding the world's peace, so long as they are under the control of "God's grace."

Peace and war are, after all, not so much the results of foreign policy as (strange though it may appear) the inevitable consequences of the inward constitution of the State. "International anarchy" is not a thing apart, but only the natural consequence of feudal-military Constitutions! Hence *away with these Constitutions*. All else is only puling pacifist quackery. What have they to do with our great Kant? *Cherchez la dynastie!* My dear Doctor, wars are never declared by "international anarchies," but only by dynasties. *Cherchez la dynastie!*

* * * * *

The Socialists attack war with equal prudence. Whenever they bring themselves to speak of dynasties (and they do it charily and unfrequently), they declare them to be the representatives of the capitalist interests of the ruling classes, and maintain that wars will be inevitable as long as that evil thing, capital, rules the world. If anyone speaks to them of the dynastic will to power, they smile at this "plebeian ideology" and prove from the height of their "materialistic conception of history" that this so-called dynastic will to power is only a small portion of that "capitalist spirit" to which we are indebted for all (yes, absolutely all) the evils in this world.

Yet, merely to represent universal military service as an outcome of the "capitalist spirit" is in itself a big undertaking. For universal military service is an achievement of the French Revolution and has evidently not the least connection with capitalism. For those very wars which are waged in the interests of capitalists (namely, Colonial wars) are waged *without* resort to universal military service. Very highly de-

veloped capitalist States, such as the United States and England, had no universal military service at all, while, on the other hand, undeveloped capitalist States, such as Russia and Austria-Hungary, possessed it.

And then, if war is really the necessary consequence of capitalist interests, why, I ask, have very highly developed capitalist countries, like the United States, England, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, etc., not waged any wars for the past hundred years,¹ whilst it was those very European States whose capitalist

¹ Cf. note to p. 37—England's wars since Waterloo have been all Colonial wars and waged by *volunteers*. Wars fought by volunteers (as the war of the North American Union against Spain) are never really national affairs, but capitalist undertakings. Whether a contractor sends workmen into a mine, or whether a syndicate dispatches for its own purposes mercenary troops to the Transvaal, Cuba, etc., it is, really, all the same. Although, of course, we strongly condemn a bellicose Colonial policy, yet we cannot quarrel with a person who, for good pay, is ready to risk his life for the interests of others. Our hope is that, henceforth, no mercenary soldiers will be found available for such capitalist marauding expeditions. Moreover, England's past history affords a very apposite instance of the incorrectness of the Socialist thesis. In the course of the past century, England has allowed numerous and frequently very serious disputes to be adjusted by arbitration, despite the fact that she, more than any other State in the world, possessed the means of compelling a settlement favourable to her own interests. In 1863, the King of Belgium settled a dispute between England and Brazil; in 1869, the President of the United States another between England and Portugal; in 1872, the Court of Arbitration at Geneva that pending between the United States and England; in 1893, the Paris Court of Arbitration determined the differences between England and North America touching the seal fishery; in 1904, The Hague Arbitration Tribunal adjusted the serious dispute between England and Russia in the matter of the Hull affair, etc. Whence comes this predilection

economy is a hundred years behind the others, namely, Russia and Turkey, who, in the nineteenth century, waged the most numerous and the most sanguinary wars?

The attentive reader who, as in my case, scrutinises without prejudice the actual causes of war will instinctively feel that the Socialist theory that capitalism is at the root of war contains, it is true, a grain of truth (especially in relation to Colonial wars), but is in the main nothing but a web of sophistry, which, like the scientific pacifists, they wish to weave round the core of the problem.

* * * * *

One great curse of our days is that erudition which intermeddles with matters with which it is not in the least concerned. War is a blackguardly and irrational thing and requires no learned exposition. But our age so revolts against the natural brutality of certain things which have been taken over from the Middle Ages, that it demands "scientific" investigations and justifications even where they cannot possibly be found. And, therefore, our professors narrate to us the most extraordinary stories as to the origin and purpose of wars. The scholar, who is diametrically opposed to the philosopher, may, it is true, have a good grasp of things lying within his own domain, but he is timid and circumscribed in his views, that is to say, incapable of bringing his special knowledge into relation with the world and mankind at large. Thus,

for arbitration in a country wholly controlled by capitalism? The answer is clear. In England the dynastic will to power *was wanting*. If England is economically ruled by capital, yet *politically* it is ruled by Parliament and Liberalism.

the biologist proves that the stern law of the preservation of the race and the individual is the cause of war; the Marxist bewails the evils of capitalism, the "civilian" national economist the aspirations for emancipation of the Fourth Estate, the theologian the lack of religion in the world, the scientific pacifist the international anarchy, and the vegetarian, perchance, the wantonness of a flesh-eating society, as the origin of war. There are even in Germany representatives of the so-called "yellow" trade-unions who seriously maintain that the English trade-unions have been the impelling force towards war!

Thus, every party and sect enlightens us with its own particular fad as to the origin and import of wars; and while Europe is passing through a catastrophe, the simple causes of which every man in the street knows full well, our professors, with pathetic helplessness, present us with their theories, like the Byzantines, who at the very moment when the Turks had made the first breaches in their walls spoke in oracles concerning the light of Tabor.

Smiling and exalted, the world of the dynasties stands above this learned chatter. It is quite content that a thousand theories should be invented as to the causes of war, for the express purpose of avoiding the mention of the real causes. In this way, the people are sustained in that belief in the unavailability of wars, which is just what the dynasties require for the maintenance of their absolute rule. Should a new Kant one day arise, who, with his brilliant simplicity, will merely call things by their right name, then the dynasty will find a way to bring him to reason. Even in the case of Kant, it has succeeded to such an extent

that our Königsberg philosopher is to-day not known at any university as a Republican and champion of international law; his name is associated only with the theory of knowledge.

Whenever I talk with a socialist, and he explains that capital is at the root of all evil, that wars will cease as soon as the villainous capitalist domination is got rid of, etc., I always think of an incident which befell an officer's orderly.

He brought his master's sick horse to a veterinary surgeon for advice. After examination the surgeon gave him a powder with the following instructions: "Take a piece of thick paper, make a roll of it, put the powder inside, put the roll into the animal's mouth, and then vigorously blow the powder into its throat." The following day the servant came back with a woe-begone, sallow face, and, when the veterinary surgeon inquired whether he had carried out his instructions, faintly replied: "Yes, doctor, but the animal blew first." For years the Social Democrats boasted of their powder for the sick horse. Two years before the outbreak of war, in Berne and Bâle, they threatened it with a terrible Revolution by way of a laxative. But when it came to action, the Junkers—blew first. Yes, and since then the Scheidemanns, Davids, Heines, Lensches, Südekums, and their associates have been running about the country with sallow faces and hiding their chagrin under loud abuse of the capitalism—of others.

DYNASTIC STATESMANSHIP AND WAR

If wars, as is proved by universal history, arise, on the one side, from a dynastic will to power, yet

they, on the other, demand justification in the eyes of the people. Before the introduction of universal military service, when wars were still the unquestioned private concern of monarchs, the people (excepting perhaps those inhabiting the theatres of war) were mostly disinterested lookers on. But since every citizen has become liable to general military service, a dynasty can only wage such wars as have the consent of their peoples. This consent it creates by an appeal to the need of defence and the patriotism of its citizens.

If, then, wars are, on the one hand, the means of existence and the object in life of dynasties, they are, on the other hand, from the point of view of the peoples, struggles for safeguarding the national existence. That is to say, what for the dynasties is only a pretext for the attainment of their secret ends is, in the eyes of the people, a sacred, serious actuality.

Dynasties have been commissioned by the gods to look after the happiness and independence of the peoples under their sway. Hence, they pose as guardians and promoters of national interests, and the people have all the greater confidence in them, in that, in the hour of peril, any opposition is made a penal offence. In principle, therefore, the policy of every dynasty is directed to the end of proving to its subjects their incapacity for self-defence and self-government, while holding itself up as the indispensable instrument of national independence. This policy, which is summed up under the name of "Statesmanship," is only in the rarest cases dictated by the demands of the general welfare. When, for example, a war breaks out, it is always concluded with an eye to dynastic interests.

intentionally, or accidentally, but in any event, instinctively, the demands of the common weal are passed over, so that the peace just concluded contains the germ of a fresh conflict, by the successful settlement of which the dynasties may reap fresh laurels and once more demonstrate their indispensability.

Let us adduce a few instances: After the Russo-Turkish war, Bismarck prevented the absorption by Bulgaria of Macedonia, though the latter was Bulgarian both in language and sentiment. He thus ran counter to the justifiable aspirations of the Macedonians, who remained under the detested Turkish yoke. Why did Bismarck act thus? He, as the representative of dynastic interests, regarded the national aspirations of the Macedonians as an absolutely unimportant matter. His purpose was not to pacify the Balkan States and to group the peoples according to the principle of nationalities. No! his chief object was not to weaken, to any great extent, the friendly Osmanli dynasty as against the semi-inimical Romanoff dynasty. This pre-eminently important object was worth several wars, and Bismarck attained it by reversing the Peace of San Stefano, which, to some degree, satisfied the principle of nationalities, and by restoring Bulgarian Macedonia to Turkey. The practical issue of this statesmanship was three sanguinary revolutions of the Macedonians against the loathed Turkish despotism and almost half a dozen Balkan wars. Had the Macedonians and Bulgarians been accorded their due rights on the previous occasion, the notorious Balkan problem would have been practically settled and there would no longer have been a "witches' cauldron" in Europe. But would not the "Russian

predominance" in the Balkans have then become intolerable? Could the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns tolerate that? No! the important thing was, on the one hand, to prevent the Romanoff trees from growing too high, and, on the other hand, to keep the "witches' cauldron" seething in the Balkans. For, if the diplomacy working for dynastic ends no longer possessed such a "witches' cauldron," this would involve the loss of a number of things without which politics would be very tedious, for instance, the "menace to the Austrian sphere of interest in the Balkans," or the "peril of Russian preponderance," or the "machinations of Panslavism," etc., etc. This cauldron had to be kept boiling in Europe. It afforded occupation for the diplomats, provided the nations with endless disputes and occasions for mutual abuse, and finally served Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, in 1913, with a pretext for his tremendous Army Bill. All this is infinitely more important than all the interests of the Macedonians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks put together!

In 1871, Bismarck annexed Alsace-Lorraine in spite of the protests of its inhabitants.¹ The consequences

¹ Bismarck was no blind enthusiast for annexation in the sense of our modern Pan-Germanists. In 1866 he prevented the intended annexation of Austrian territories, not merely in the hope of a subsequent alliance, but, as he writes in his "Reflections and Reminiscences": "I asked myself, as regards territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Austria and Bavaria, whether it was probable, in any future wars, that after Prussian officials and military had been withdrawn they would yet remain faithful to Prussia and receive orders at its hands." Similarly, in 1871, he vigorously (though in vain) raised his voice against the incorporation of the French-speaking part of Lorraine. This attitude of Bismarck does not alter, but, rather, on the contrary, confirms the fact that his policy was everywhere *only* determined

are well known: the French thirst for revenge (which, as we have seen, is really a demand founded on international law). From that time forth, Germany was haunted by a terrible bogey; each time that the Reichstag makes a show of resisting the arch-reactionary policy of its rulers, this bogey is brought up and it never fails in its effect. Triple Alliance, Dual Alliance, colossal armaments, encirclement, etc., are, as it were, developed automatically by the agency of this bogey, and make it more formidable every day. Thus, we must be grateful that we have the strongest army in the world, and must take care that it remains the strongest. For "our peace only depends upon our military equipment." In view of this constantly increasing insecurity, we must, as Professor Delbrück tells us, be more than glad that "the decision lies with those who look far ahead." Who, in the face of this serious situation, would dare to prate about democratic constitutional changes, less severe military discipline, etc.? Alas! for us, if we, like France, possessed a miserable "Parliamentary Army"; immediately the French *revanche* would destroy us. Every German feels that under such circumstances the dynastic supreme control of army and policy is an iron necessity

by regard for dynastic interests and future wars. He does not protest against the annexations in the name of the peoples concerned, but only in the interest of his lord and master. He fears not the hate of the annexed or the disapproval of the civilised world, but only the possibility of disastrous wars in the future. Thus, from the democratic standpoint, Bismarck can only be regarded as the most violent opponent of the modern ideal of international arbitration, that is, as the most thorough and most successful regenerator of the dynastic policy of power in the last century.

for Germany. Thus, in the most natural manner in the world, these continual menaces from without become the most cogent reasons against all reforms from within, and the astutest statesman is the man who knows how to furnish a constant supply of fresh menaces.

In 1908, in defiance of the existing treaties, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereby caused in Serbia an irritation similar to that caused in France by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. In the same way as the French thirst for revenge hangs like a perpetual threat above the head of Germany, so have, hitherto, "Serbian intrigues" hung like a millstone round the neck of Austria-Hungary; they finally imperilled the existence of the Dual Monarchy to such an extent that the latter was, in dire necessity, compelled to appeal to arms. Had Bismarck, in 1878, humoured the national aspirations of the Bulgarians, had not Austria annexed Bosnia, and by the artificial creation of Albania blocked out Serbia from the seaport she had so painfully won, then this whole policy would have found a simple solution, in accordance with the national weal and the principle of nationalities. But then the business of the world-power politicians would have been at an end: the Austrian politicians, with their brazen-faced falsifications (*vide* the Friedjung case, the Agram case, the Prochaska case, etc.), would not have been in a position to testify to the Serbian intrigues, and everything would have become very dull.

The obvious result of these simple solutions would, however, have been that the nations living at peace would eventually have demanded democratic reform, and might, perchance, have asked what purpose was

served by divine dynasties, standing armies, etc., when there was no menace to be feared from without. Nations who have nothing else to do begin philosophising. But philosophising nations are revolutionary, dangerous nations. Metternich and Bismarck knew this full well. They and their successors took good care to stifle this threatening development. The simplest method for the purpose is never to allow the people to enjoy peace of mind, to keep them by perpetual threats in constant apprehension, and so prove to them continually that they are incapable of self-government.

Hence, the most marked feature of dynastic statecraft is the art of, from time to time, conjuring up new bogeys, which are held up before the people on suitable occasions, in order to keep them in a state of submission, to wean them from all democratic aspirations, and, one fine day, to utilise the artificially created witches' cauldron and bogeys as pretexts for fresh wars. It is all a policy of poking the fire with the sword. In the same way as beasts of burden are, in North Africa, goaded on by having their festering wounds constantly tickled with a stick, so are the peoples of Europe ever driven forward into new dangers of war and armaments by never allowing the old wounds to heal, but always opening and irritating them afresh. Hence it results that wars are an unavoidable and indispensable element of the divine order of things.

Down almost to 1900, Germany's bogey was "French *revanche*"; then it was the "encirclement" brought about at The Hague, or the "Panslavist danger" threatening in the Balkans. Poor Austria, on the contrary, had constantly to struggle against the Russian designs in the Balkans and against "Serbian intrigues." At

length this "higher policy" became a wondrous chain of effects, and these effects became causes, until the ordinary human intelligence was absolutely bewildered. For, as it is almost invariably forbidden by the police to call the secret ambitions and ideals of this dynastic secret diplomacy by their right names, at length they come to be regarded as merely instances of "superior judgment," and the humble citizen bows respectfully before the high authorities who "look so far ahead."

But, by means of this statecraft, the dynasties, as clearly pointed out, also secure the internal political conditions requisite for the maintenance of their despotism. It is clear that dynasties faced by loud threats of and preparations for war cannot possibly have either time or money for democratic reforms. Armaments become, under such circumstances, the first law for the safety of the State, the Alpha and Omega of all financial and taxation policy. A State which argues logically (and Germany has in this respect remained the fatherland of logic) is bound, under such conditions, to devote all its energies to the perfecting of its armaments; whoever now talks of democratic and social and political reforms is a traitor and wants to reduce us to a state of defencelessness, etc.

What, then, is the secret of this God-inspired dynastic policy, which is constantly engendering quarrels and war? What is its position? A terribly simple and commonplace one. It is *the purely instinctive impulse of dynasties for self-preservation and self-aggrandisement*; the very same impulse that causes the artisan to demand such an increase of wages as he deems necessary for his existence and general comfort

is, *mutatis mutandis*, the cause of wars. Were the dynasties no longer the rulers of the nations, were they, for their higher wages, compelled to rely upon their own resources, then wars would be impossible.

If the concern of the dynasties for their own existence and for the extension of their power were not the secret mainspring of European politics, that is to say, if politics were guided in conformity with the views of the people, we should no longer have in Europe an Alsace-Lorraine, a Polish, a Macedonian, or an Irredentist question to deal with. The peoples would long since have settled these points comfortably with their own interests and wishes, and not troubled their heads about "spheres of interests" and "world-power policy." Europe would have long since become a gigantic Switzerland with a thousand cantons, a hundred tongues, terrible wars of the pen, amazingly revolutionary "modern ideas," serious collisions between Capital and Labour—would be, in short, engaged in a heated and continuous struggle for progress, but yet would be a Europe of true culture living in peace. But all this would have been too human, too simple, and too beautiful. In a Europe constituted on such lines the dynasties would have become superfluous. And so it is only they who have thwarted this free autonomy of the nations, that is to say, have obstructed the beautiful policy of simple solutions and have promoted the welfare of the people after their own fashion. Everything may be demanded of a man and even of a dynasty, save only the renunciation of the basis of its existence. Whoever attacks this will always meet with the most bitter resistance. This free autonomy of the nations is not, to be sure, a direct

attack upon the existence of the dynasties (England, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, etc., are proofs of this), but it is, none the less, a step in this direction, that is to say, it is a limitation of their powers and influence. Hence their open or secret, but always embittered, resistance against International Law and everything to do with it.¹

THE MEANING OF THE PRESENT WORLD WAR

We have formulated the conditions under which war must remain an inevitable and periodically recur-

¹Cf. here note to p. 181. The Proclamation—in defiance of every conception of International Law and of Nationality—of the Kingdom of Poland on November 5th, 1916, is a fresh proof of the fact that the dynasties now as ever are intent upon pursuing their arbitrary policy of self-interest, despite the fact that this is bound to bring about fresh wars. Owing to the fact that the Prussian Poles—as expressly set out in that manifesto—remain Prussians, and the Austrian Poles remain Austrians, the new kingdom (if it ever materialises) by its composition and situation will present grave dangers. Instinctively and inevitably it would strive for the emancipation of its brothers “oppressed” by Prussia and Austria. In this it would, of course, be able to reckon upon the open or covert assistance of the—in this case, defeated—Entente. There would be no end to intrigues, and these would, of course, immediately be made a pretext for reprisals on the part of the Central Powers. Thence would ensue, on the part of Germany, the same policy against Russia that Austria has hitherto pursued against Serbia, and Germany against France. Fresh conflicts and frictions would be the inevitable result, until, one day, the sword would again have to ward off those machinations, and secure the peace of the world. An absolutely free Poland would be one of the most powerful guarantees for the peace of Europe. But a free and united Poland would comprise not only Warsaw, but also Lemberg, Cracow, Ratibor, Beuthen, and Posen.

ring evil. Yet many a monarch has gone to war under the pretext of furthering his people's good, and with the secret intention of adding a fresh pearl to his crown, but, instead of this, has secured the victory of a principle which had served him only as a pretext. Thus, Gustavus Adolphus was desirous of increasing the fame and power of his dynasty, and became in fact the executor of the Reformation. It was Napoleon's dream to become Emperor of Europe and make vassal kings of all the members of his dynasty. As a result of this endeavour, he became the pioneer of the new social principles established by the Revolution.

The present World War affords a perfect instance of this "dualism" of war. At its root is, manifestly, the world-power dream of the Hohenzollerns. Like all dynasties which have acquired power and prestige, the Hohenzollerns became intoxicated with the idea of world-power. This is so logical and is so grounded in the very nature of all dynasties, that we have not the smallest right to upbraid the Hohenzollerns on this account. Take whatever dynasty you please (including the Papacy of the Middle Ages) : they all had their dream of world dominion, which they sought to realise, sword in hand. Only Rome succeeded in attaining it, for a few centuries. But always a military defeat was necessary in order to induce the dynasties to forego their aims. The Merovingians and the Lancasters, the Hapsburgs and the Capets, the Hohenstaufens and the Bonapartes, the Caliphs and the Popes, had first to be convinced, on sanguinary fields of battle, that world-empires have no place in the plans of Divine Providence.

But side by side with this Hohenzollern bid for

world-power, the present war presents another aspect, given it by the peoples concerned. In fact, if we leave the privy dynastic ambitions out of account for a moment, and only view this war from the standpoint of the *nations*, it presents itself to us as a terrible collision between two conceptions of the world which are now striving together for predominance in Europe. This antagonism which is now being brought to a sanguinary issue may be expressed in a great many equally correct formulæ. For instance, the Right of Might, or the Might of Right? Machiavelli or Kant? Sparta or Athens? The nation which possesses an army, or the army which possesses a nation? Bismarck or Jaurès? The right of the nations to free autonomy, or the right of the dynasties to their policy of self-interest? Idealism or Materialism? The policy of nationalities or of despotic rulers? A Civil or a Military Constitution? And so on.

Any one of these antitheses might be used to symbolise the cause of the World War.

For us democrats and pacifists, this World War represents the final struggle of the dynastic coercive policy against the demands of modern humanity. It was not these demands of modern humanity that brought about this war, but the arrogance of the dynastic idea. This war, like others before it, might have been avoided, had dynasties only understood their age and made concessions to it. But what dynasty has ever understood the age? What dynasty has ever made concessions at the right moment? It is they and they alone who, with their divine rights and powers, have always and everywhere opposed the spirit of the age and have made a sanguinary settlement inevitable.

One would have to be a narrow-minded partisan, a half-dead Pan-Germanist, or a professor grown withered in the service of the State, in order, in the face of this conflict of principles now being decided in Europe with all the infernal devices of the modern science of murder, to represent side-issues as being the real origins of the war, and to say, for instance: English or German world commerce? English naval supremacy or the freedom of the seas? Economic throttling or economic expansion of Germany? And so forth.

Every book published in Germany, in the course of this World War, has repeated the same old theme. German scholars and statesmen, with their ingrained dynastic conceptions, are simply incapable of seeing anything in a war except plain, material questions of power. And they always employ the term "power" in the most material sense of the word. Thus, for example, Herr von Bülow writes:—

"Germany will in future require protection against hostility and desires for revenge, both old and new, in the West, the East and beyond the Channel; such protection can only be found in the increase of her own power. . . . Only if our power, political, economic and military, emerges from this war so strengthened that it considerably outweighs the feelings of enmity that have been aroused, shall we be able to assert with a clear conscience that our position in the world has been bettered by the war."¹

In an essay on "The Meaning of the War," Professor Otto Hintze says²: "The two Central Powers of

¹ Prince von Bülow, "Imperial Germany." London: Cassell & Co., p. xlii.

² "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 678 *et seq.*

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Europe are in danger of being crushed by the surrounding countries of our continent. . . . Everything must be directed towards frustrating this attempt. We intend to maintain our place in the sun; we intend not to allow ourselves to be squeezed out of the rank of the World Powers in spite of our closed-in position. . . . The predominance of Britain must be broken. . . . In this struggle against the British naval and world domination, we are fighting in the interests of the free intercourse of all nations," and so on.

Questions of material power, aims of domination, increased hostility on every side and immediate preparations for another war; such, according to our statesmen and philosophers, is the meaning and natural result of all wars. They are as delighted as children as long as we are the strongest. And although they maintain that the stronger is always in the right, they bewail the ill-success of their country's arms as a national shame and a crying wrong. They are incapable of discarding for a moment their narrow, nationalist conception of the world and of taking a wider view of the world's history. If they did so, they would be forced to recognise, in the first place, that the dream of power has been fatal to every nation (increase of material power has always involved both the preparation for fresh conflicts and also decadence); and, in the second place, that the military defeat of a nation is invariably followed by a progressive development in respect of freedom and culture, by means of which it recovers its former political significance. (France, after 1870, is the latest and most glorious example of this.) The fact that, in war, it is really not nations but only dynasties that are vanquished, and that *vanquished*

dynasties imply *victorious nations*, finds abundant proof in the world's history, but it has never been admitted by our scholars, and for very obvious reasons. For them war is, what it has always been for the dynasties, a duel between brutal appetites for power. Or if, like Professor Ostwald, they regard it as a duel between two Cultures, the word "culture" is used in such a revolting materialistic sense that those who respect human dignity and freedom are alarmed and distressed.

But only the mediocre intelligence can be content with such Central European ideas. No! the World War is not a question of the larder! It is not waged, as our Pan-Germanists and Social Democrats imagine, for the sake of a few thousand square miles of territory, for seaports, colonies, commercial outlets, or, in fact, for any material benefits. Like all wars, this one will result in alterations in the map and new commercial treaties. But these are only the most obvious among its *secondary* issues.

The World War of to-day is actually a struggle between two conceptions of the world. Dynasties, which always go to war with the secret intention of increasing their material and moral power, are, in reality, the puppets of the world's history. Against their wish and will, they invariably bring about the triumph or defeat of some conception of the world. The victorious nation gains a new or rejuvenated dynasty (with all its reactionary consequences); the vanquished nation gains a new liberty and a fairer human ideal. And this triumph or defeat of a conception of the world is the real meaning of wars and

their significance in relation to the progress and culture of mankind.

Not that we share the opinion of Bernhardt and Treitschke that war is one of the principal instruments in effecting human civilisation. On the contrary: since war brings reaction to the one and liberty to the other, its results are, from the point of view of world-citizenship, to promote strife and disunion and to hinder the progress of civilisation. During the last forty years there have existed, side by side, two powerful States, which, as a result of war, not only developed on diametrically opposite lines, but were in every sense hostile to one another: France and Germany. On the one side, liberty and progress; on the other, reaction and decadence in all the true human values. Sedan brought France liberty, it brought us reaction; and it was inevitable that this contrast should result in the present World War. Thus the culture gained as a result of war by the vanquished nation (that is to say, by the nation that has been freed from the yoke of its dynasty) is always intensely national and not universal. From the point of view of world-citizenship (and we emphatically repudiate any other) war is consequently the enemy of culture.

* * * * *

"The history of the world is the judgment of the world." This statement of Schiller is one of the few truths that our scholars and journalists have been energetic in popularising since the beginning of the war, and we unconditionally ourselves endorse it.

It seems to be a divine and undeviating law of the world that in every war victory falls to the protagonist possessing the higher right and the nobler culture.

Kant declares emphatically: "We see then that Nature is absolutely determined that right shall conquer in the end." And the history of the past century is a striking proof of the truth of these sayings of Schiller and Kant.

But what is Right? We have already compared the dynastic and the democratic conceptions of the world and we have seen that all civilised communities, with the exception of Germany, Austria, Russia, and Turkey, have developed in accordance with the democratic idea outlined by the great French Revolution. We may therefore assume that "Right" is where the majority of civilised mankind feel it to be, hence, in this case, undoubtedly, where the right of the nations to self-government is recognised, if only in theory. In like manner, the nobler culture must be sought for where this right to self-government, both within and without, is felt to be the unalterable basis (or, at all events, the ideal) of the modern State.

If we examine the results of the chief wars of the past century in relation to this question, we can easily prove that, in every case, dynastic and historical right has had to lay down its arms before the right of the nations to self-government.

The newly founded French Republic was victorious all along the line, against the coalition of the European dynasties. And why? It was defending the principle of the sovereignty of the people which it had itself proclaimed. Similarly, Napoleon remained victorious over his opponents so long as he remained the champion of the rights of humanity proclaimed by the Great Revolution; but as soon as he deserted the cause of freedom and scoffed openly at the new principle of

nationalities, the national sense of honour, both in Prussia and elsewhere, was stirred to such indignation that his fall became inevitable. In all the Balkan wars of the past century the principle of nationalities prevailed over the dynastic idea of absolutism. From 1827 down to 1912, the Turks were worsted in almost every campaign and forced to yield their independence to Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, and Roumanians in succession. Similarly, Prussia, in 1866 and 1870, found herself, as against Austria and France, playing the *rôle* of a champion of a national ideal. Granted that God be omniscient, He could scarcely have foreseen that the Prussian dynasty would subsequently take advantage of the German ideal of national unity in order to outrage the principle of nationalities; although Bismarck had, after 1866, presented us with a Reichstag, and from 1866 until 1870 ruled on fairly liberal lines. At that time, the Hohenzollern dynasty represented the higher right as against the craving for domination of the Hapsburgs and the Bonapartes; the latter had to succumb because they disputed this higher right.¹ Consider the military history of Russia. Why has she been vanquished in all the wars of the past century? Because, both within and without, she was revealed as the bitter foe of popular autonomy. And why was she

¹ We have already seen (pp. 112-4) to what extent the wars of 1864-1871 served "purely dynastic interests." The assertion that none the less, from the standpoint of the principle of nationalities, they had right on their side does not entail contradiction. It is, on the contrary, a striking illustration of what we have said above (p. 253) concerning the "dualism" of wars. If the German idea of unity was a deeply serious matter for the German races, for the German dynasty (as the events of 1848 prove) it was only a pretext for the furtherance of their ambitions by means of war.

victorious in 1877-78 over Turkey? Because, in this case, she chanced to come forward as the liberator of oppressed races and helped Bulgaria and Roumania to their independence.

Yes, the history of the world is the judgment of the world; and Kant's saying will remain eternally true.

Dear readers! We have seen what ideas and principles the German dynasty represents in this World War. They are manifestly not such as lie in the direction of the higher progress of mankind. He who stands face to the sun loses the battle. Alas! We Germans in this war stand face to the sun of international law and liberty. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey have, for the last forty years, held themselves aloof from the movement for popular self-government. From Armenia to Alsace-Lorraine, from Schleswig-Holstein to Bosnia-Herzegovina, they have, both at home and abroad, by word and by deed, opposed to the right of the nations to free self-government their divine rights and despotic principles, which are the very abnegation of all popular liberty. The good God may have been "our Ally of Rossbach and Dennewitz," and may love us dearly; but He cannot make any exception in our favour from the eternal laws of His world.

I, as both democrat and pacifist, must confess that I do not desire that He should. For what would happen if we Germans emerged victorious from this war? Our victory would only mean a strengthening of the dynastic principle of arbitrary power all along the line. Those of us who bewail the political backwardness of our Fatherland must realise that a "German" victory

would prolong this backward condition for centuries. And not only Germany but the whole of Europe would have to suffer the consequences. All the political liberties painfully achieved during two centuries would give way before the omnipotence of the victorious dynasty and only their shadow would remain. Our Polish policy, which even Professor Delbrück severely censured, would be extended to the newly conquered territories and in an even more brutal form. There would be in Europe only as much liberty of thought and of the Press as the German dynasty would allow; and we are well aware how little it does allow. The *Burgfrieden*, which has been developed into a systematic negation of all citizen rights, would (just like the Socialist law after 1871) become a permanent institution in the land of intellectual liberty. And, just as Professor Delbrück blessed Bismarck because he had known how to mutilate the Ems telegram in the interests of German unity, so now a hundred Delbrücks would rise up and glorify the man who invented Cossack invasions and bombs from aeroplanes in order to win popularity for this victorious war. The victor is not accountable to anybody; in his honour, new sciences and new codes of morals are invented, applauding nations wait upon his wishes, and whoever, amid this lofty enthusiasm, ventures a word as to the universal morality is at once outlawed and imprisoned.

To talk of a right of nations to self-government would be *lèse majesté*. States such as Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark would only with the greatest difficulty preserve their national independence, and, at most, for ten years. For a thousand learned professors, following in the footsteps of Treitschke and

Chamberlain, would perpetually demonstrate that the Dutch, the Swiss, the Danes, etc., are but "lost sons of the great Germanic family," until these unhappy nations would themselves believe in it at last, or be compelled "by the right of the sword" to believe in it.

All republican ideas would pale before the brilliancy of the divine dynasty now ruling in Europe. Europe would become a China (and not even a modern China), in which learned Mandarins, after the manner of Ostwald, would realise their "energetic imperative"—in other words, succeed in subordinating all human activities to the higher honour of the dynasty, in a kind of Taylorian theorem.

And all this glorious technical culture would be under the supervision of the noble officer, with his divine privileges. Whenever anyone dared open his mouth in the name of intellectual liberty and human dignity, as being outside the dynastic sphere, he would soon bring the "reptiles" to their senses and receive congratulatory telegrams and decorations from Berlin. What little Switzerland dared do in the 'eighties, namely, to reject forthwith Bismarck's insolent demands (the affair Wohlgemuth), she would now have to suffer for. And not only this "nest of democracy" (as Bismarck then called Switzerland) would be at once cleared out and lose all its independence; but all other European States in which "democratic intrigues" could be detected would have to expect a second Wohlgemuth or Prochaska affair, and, probably, an Ultimatum. Democracy would be dead in Europe, and any reference of it would be a crime.

Where would there be any check upon this dynasty

ruling from Antwerp to Bagdad absolutely, and from Haparanda to Gibraltar morally? Perhaps German Social Democracy? The very idea provokes a smile. The noisy champions of revolution have, owing to a few bombs from aeroplanes and inroads of Cossacks, become so submissive, that a dynasty returning triumphant from the war would not need a new Socialist law to keep them in subjection.

There would, in fact, be no longer checks upon the dynasty. France, to which, for a hundred years past, the nations have looked up with quiet hopes, would now be utterly crushed. England, the home of Liberalism, would be forced, in order not to lose her independence, to expend all her energies on armaments (that is to say, to renounce Liberalism). Neighbourly relations would be opened up with Russia, and the whole of Europe would be forced into a fresh, terrible armament policy (as foretold by Herr von Bülow). On the one hand, under England's leadership, the nations great and small (which are to-day neutral) which had been entirely or partially annexed, as well as the threatened States, would be thirsting for revenge, that is to say, for liberty; and, on the other, the new German World-power, which in another twenty years would be encompassed with so many fresh threats, intrigues, jealousies, and witches' cauldrons, that, once again, with a "clear conscience," she would be compelled to take the field in order to safeguard the world's peace.

And do you, dear reader, wish us to take this terrible backward step into the Middle Ages? You wish Napoleon's prophecy, "Europe will within a century be either democratic or Cossack," to be

realised in the sense of this latter possibility? Can we, as Germans, really desire that? But whether we wish it or not, the world's history takes its own inexorable course. And, since it is impossible that a Cossack Europe should form part of the design of the world's history, the German dynasty cannot and will not be victorious in this war. Europe will be democratic!

That the victory of democracy need not imply the annihilation of the German people and its future part in the world is also vouched for by the history of the world. Vanquished dynasties are not only not vanquished nations, but even emancipated nations. This was not only the case in England, France, Holland, and Switzerland, but even in China. Why should it not be equally the case in Germany? Is universal history to make an exception in our case? Are we more stupid than the Chinese?

And supposing we were: the world's history is remorseless; it would cut off our pigtails, however much Scheidemann and Südekum might bewail that our nation was being destroyed.

"It is the implacable will of Nature that right should finally prevail."

"The history of the world is the judgment of the world."

We should be interested to know whether all the gentlemen who at the commencement of the war triumphantly shouted this sentence will still testify to its truth when, as is inevitable, the German people, as the result of this war, will be found to have conquered not provinces but only liberties. Will they have the courage to admit that our dynasty could not

conquer because she was not defending the higher right and the nobler culture? Or will they have the effrontery to contest the logic of the world's history which they themselves only yesterday proclaimed, merely because the history of the world is, in fact, the judgment of the world?

VIII

ONWARD! TO DEMOCRACY!

DYNASTY OR HUMANITY?

TO THE GERMAN READER!

You may, for the first moment, feel that the freedom with which I have spoken of German conditions, and of the origin and meaning of the World War, shows a want of patriotism. And even if, as I know is bound to happen, your own investigation of the Constitution and politics of Germany completely confirms the above conclusions (for there can be no refutation of actual facts), yet you will perhaps still hesitate to give me your countenance. Our German Constitution is so wreathed about with democratic garlands, and, on the other hand, respect for the dynasty is so deeply rooted in the German spirit, that, although at bottom we have the same democratic yearnings as other nations, we instinctively oppose the logical establishment of the real truth.

This has been my own experience. That one should maintain, as the result of studies in history and constitutional law, that we really possess not a Fatherland but only a dynasty, and this at a time when millions

of Germans are bleeding and dying, weeping and wasting, for this supposed Fatherland? Is this not betrayal of the Fatherland? Is this justifiable in any German at the present time?

While I was still weighing this question in my mind, I thought of Bernhardt, Ostwald, Chamberlain, Schlidemann, Frymann, Liman, Harden, Georg Bernhard, Leimdorfer, Lasswitz, who are among the most famous people in Germany. I was even so lacking in modesty as to compare myself for a moment with these celebrities. I admired their patriotism, their deep understanding of culture, their style, in short, all their profoundly flaunted Germanism, and I began to lose confidence in myself. For to my shame I must admit that I am neither so learned nor yet of such exotic origin as they. For all these gentlemen are of Russian or Polish or English origin, and as it has become an established custom in our country that foreigners and Jews should represent pure and undefiled Germanism, I have really no right, under these circumstances, to speak as a German to Germans.

It is, then, to some extent an act of presumption if a German, who is neither Russian nor English nor Slav nor Jew, but a Prussian who in his youth excelled his schoolmates in the enumeration of the Prussian kings and their battles, should to-day present himself before his countrymen with the intention of speaking to them about Germany. The development of German culture has raised the intellectual charlatans and half-castes to such high consequence among us that, at the present day, in the German Fatherland, the true German wears a somewhat pitiable aspect.

It seems to me that here, more than anywhere, we

have indeed been "actually attacked"; attacked in our true Germanism, our most sacred feelings and traditions. And it was just because I felt that, from the standpoint of classical Germanism, we have to wage a sacred defensive war against the representatives of culture in present-day Germany, that the examination which I have made in this book—however revolutionary it may appear at the first glance—seemed to me necessary for the restoration to health of the German nation.

Is it necessary or possible or right that to-day, when the World War has slaughtered and crippled and ruined millions of men, and has destroyed innumerable cultural values, we should accord unconditional approval to the wisdom of these intellectual celebrities? Ought we to look upon this world-drama (the greatest in the history of the world) with that enforced respect for the dynasty which has been drilled into us? Must we give credence to the official description of a "maliciously attacked Germany," despite all the documentary evidence and the conduct and traditions of Prussia during the last decade? Is it right that, following the example of certain pacifists and socialists, we should explain the World War with learned phrases, merely in order to evade the painful necessity of calling the true cause of the war by its right name?

Our Government may possibly have succeeded, by the aid of its foreign and Jewish champions of culture, in breeding among our nation a kind of fetish belief in the dynasty; but we remain none the less a people who have learnt to think logically, and who, like all genuinely civilised nations, strive instinctively towards

democracy. In the end, as Napoleon said, the spirit always triumphs over the sword. And even supposing that our dynasty were to emerge completely victorious from this war, none the less it could not prevent inexorable logic from bringing us at last to the bitter recognition that in this war the dynasty set itself against our nation and against the whole of humanity.

Dynasty or Humanity? That is the question here. That is the meaning of the World War.

And being confronted with this question, we declare ourselves frankly for *Humanity*. For a dynasty is never more than an accident in the world's history. Even if it be descended from the gods, it is prone to error and to evil purposes. But Humanity is not an accident; Humanity too is descended from the gods, and with this advantage over the dynasties, that it can neither err nor fulfil evil purposes. Humanity is the meaning of the world; and, whatever Prussian Privy Councillors may say, Humanity is also the meaning of history.

The conscience of Humanity is eternal and infallible. Even for dynasties the fatal saying is true, that man is longer under the earth than on it. But this is not true of Humanity. A hundred dynasties, fatherlands, and nations pass away; Humanity remains. Untouched by catastrophes and individual purposes, it marches on. Slowly but surely, Humanity marches ever onwards and upwards, towards more light, freedom, happiness, and human dignity.

In the light of this truth, what are high treason, unpatriotic sentiments, and the like? Merely the conception of a moment, a crime in a space of a few square miles, the anger of a government of a few

years. Certainly it is our duty, as members of a fatherland, to serve it and obey its laws. But when, as here, our Fatherland obeys an alien will, thereby setting itself in opposition to the eternal laws of humanity, we have no longer the right to affront humanity with patriotic stubbornness.

The dynasties have, in fact, always set themselves against humanity. Every other page of the world's history furnishes proof of it. At the very beginning, when we were still half brutes, when you and I still instinctively fell upon one another, whenever we encountered each other at some turn of the road, the chiefs and the dynasties which sprang from them may have exercised a certain influence on humanity in the direction of order and civilisation. It is possible to go further and to say that (with the possible exception of the United States) national unity has in every case been due to the dynasties. The proudest French republicans admit that it was the Capets who made their Fatherland great, so that the Revolution was able to take it over from them on behalf of the people. Even though Switzerland was never actually ruled by a dynasty, its national unity was indirectly brought into being by dynasties.

But at the present day, when the national development has been, as it were, accomplished entirely, and when it is only a question of rounding off the national unities in accordance with the wishes of the people, and of securing their political independence? To-day, when throughout the civilised world we find organised administrative bodies? What higher meaning and function can the dynasties by divine right have in this modern world? In ancient times,

when they themselves, at the head of their tribe, were the first to go forth to battle and the last to come home, they might still, with some justification, claim the governing authority. For then they lived, fought, thought and spoke in the midst of their tribe; they had grown up with them, they knew their feelings and needs, and, in virtue of their spiritual and physical superiority, they had a natural right to leadership and authority. But the times have changed. Among the old Germans, leadership conferred upon the man not only dignity, but also an obligation; at the present day, on the contrary, it confers dignity on the man but relieves him from all obligation. The dynasty of the Hohenzollerns is a warrior dynasty of the first rank, yet every member of it has died in his bed. Your grandfather and mine perchance, though members of no warrior dynasty, have yet died a soldier's death. And although the World War is not yet ended, we know already that the Imperial family will have been the only family in all Germany who will have sent six sons to the field, and not have lost one of them at the conclusion of peace, unless, of course, through some unforeseen mishap. Progress and the resultant modernisation of war have brought it about that the members of the dynastic families no longer fight in person, and that their quarrels and ambitions have become national concerns. If, in former days, it was their duty and their ambition to fight at the head of their armies, in these stern days of ours it is their highest duty to preserve themselves for their peoples!

But not only on the field of battle has a new morality superseded the old. In other respects progress

has wrought important changes. In ancient days and in the Middle Ages it was easy for a dynasty to reign with absolute power. Their States were for the most part small, their subjects numerically inconsiderable, superstitious, maintained in serfdom, and indifferent to politics. The rulers had only to settle their affairs with the nobility and the priesthood, and governing was therefore a straightforward and humanly possible operation, which even now and then might bear good fruits, as in the case of Henry IV. in France, Henry I. in Germany, and the Great Elector in Brandenburg. In the meantime men and conditions developed. At the present day Germany alone contains as many inhabitants as the whole of Europe in the time of Charlemagne. The populations are no longer superstitious; they are no longer in a state of serfdom, and they are no longer indifferent to politics. Numerous discoveries have revolutionised our commerce, our ideas, and our needs, and have brought into being that which we describe collectively as culture. In such an age, with such States and ideas, the greatest genius of all the centuries would no longer have been capable of ruling and deciding absolutely in all things. We have been gratified to observe from the various speeches of William II. that he understands all things, and that all things are subject to his direction and rule! We have stood amazed before that proficiency both in peace and war which borders on universality! Yet we are compelled to recognise in his case also that which applies to every dynasty at the present day ruling by divine right: they live in a world completely separated from the nation at large; they are so hedged about with an artificial barrier that they are deprived of any

free outlook upon the world and mankind; and they are maintained by their advisers in a more or less complete ignorance of the spirit of the age and of the real needs and demands of humanity.

All our present-day science and technology is opposed to the idea of the divine and the arbitrary. In such a world, is it possible that a God-appointed dynasty should be the rational embodiment of the whole life of a great State?

To put this question is to answer it. In fact, the cultural development of humanity tends in all departments towards the elimination of arbitrary rule and of capricious divinity. Culture is the elimination of individual despotism, and the subduing and utilisation of the divine natural forces to the service of humanity. And we Germans, in particular, have rendered important service in this field. We have even, apart from politics, become one of the most democratic nations in the world. Our whole organisation in respect of justice, finance, local government, taxation, insurance, co-operation, is so democratic that it has, at any rate in part, become the model for other countries. No other nation (least of all France, the fatherland of democracy) can boast such a democratically organised income-tax as we. Nowhere, save in England, have the co-operative societies and the democratic organisation connected with them attained such proportions as in Germany. No one claims that our courts of justice are perfect, but everyone in Germany is of opinion that they afford the best guarantees against possible bias and arbitrariness on the part of the judges, and that they are one of the most excellent achievements of civilisation. Our German town councils are for

the most part organised on thoroughly democratic lines. None of my German readers would buy shares in a society unless he knew that it submitted every year a clear balance-sheet of its proceedings. None of my German readers would feel disposed to join an association which did not vouchsafe to its members at the least a voting right in return for their subscriptions, or whose managing committee were sedulous in inventing a whole philosophy respecting the stupidity of its members, and endeavoured to prove that they were empowered by God to make whatever use they might see fit of the funds of the society.

All these things we Germans treat as a matter of course. The most inveterate supporter of the monarchy would not have them otherwise. Now the State is, as it were, the biggest joint-stock company and the biggest association. We belong to it not of our choice and will, but because we were born in it. This State demands from us not only taxes, obedience, and patriotism, but also, in cases of necessity, our lives. It might have been imagined that, under these circumstances, the State would, as a matter of course, be subject to the control of its members, and that everything would be done to fulfil their wishes as far as possible. But, in fact, just the opposite is the case: the State recognises no duties whatever towards us. That which for the board of directors of a joint-stock company or the committee of management of an association is a matter of course, namely, the voting right acquired by the shareholders or members in virtue of their subscription, it is a crime on the part of the German citizen even to ask for. The dynasty,

which is the embodiment of the State, rules by divine right, that is to say, arbitrarily.

DYNASTIC POLITICS AND CULTURE

Dynasties which plead divine authority for the conduct of their political affairs and obstinately reject any popular control can have but one motive for their attitude, namely, that their interests are not coincident with those of the popular weal.

In fact, between "politics" as understood and desired by nations and politics as conceived by dynasties there is a deep gulf which apparently can in no way be bridged over.

Ever since Plato there has existed the idea of a polity based primarily upon justice and liberty and having as its supreme goal the attainment of the greatest possible general well-being for the greatest possible number of human beings. Since the days of ancient Greece there has existed in the world a conception of justice and liberty that is sufficient for all purposes and is the real criterion of civilisation. This conception is not dependent upon any political power; its blessings descend upon the just and the unjust; it is not bound to any time or to any circumstances, and ought not to be diminished or destroyed for the sake of any advantage or in the face of any peril. With the immortal proclamation of human and citizen rights, it again became the guiding motive of State-policy and was proclaimed to the nations as the goal of all political endeavour.

Were dynastic interests compatible with those of human welfare, the dynasties would have approved this conception of human dignity and international

right. But history teaches us that they always opposed it with all their power. Why? Because their divinely inherited right is really incompatible with this humanly created right, that is to say, because their whole existence was menaced. Therefore they stood on their defence and marred and interrupted the work of the Great Revolution. Even if, here and there, they had to make certain concessions, yet we have seen that their fundamental rights (and particularly in Germany) have remained entirely unaffected. These fundamental rights are, above all, a danger to *Peace*. Hitherto political life has been controlled by dynasties; the history of the world has been not the work of nations, but a "give and take, and hither and thither" of dynastic interests, and thus entirely the work of individuals. Wars are the "inevitable," that is to say, the entirely natural, consequences of this state of things. And they will remain so as long as European politics, instead of being directed with a view to the welfare of the nations, continues to serve only dynastic ambitions and intrigues.

The secret aims of all dynastic politics are its own aggrandisement or the prevention of the aggrandisement of a neighbouring dynasty. These aims are served by the military-political organisation of their States, by diplomacy and its continuation—war.

"Augustus drank, and Poland became drunk!" The history of the past century proves, alas! that the dynasties, in spite of all revolutions, have dipped deeper into their cups and have, moreover, kept their peoples in a state of intoxication. And in the case of us Germans they scored a success, in that we, like most drunken people, always maintained we were quite

sober. We have been told by a thousand professors that we are the freest people in the world because the dynasty was nowhere freer than it is with us.¹ But one must have long enjoyed freedom in order to understand and love freedom. 'Alas! the dynasties never gave us time to become sober and to attain a true perception of freedom. It is both their mission and their divine right to think only of continual aggrandisement, to keep the nations uneasy by a display of their power, and to wean them from their natural civilising occupations. What right, what liberty, what peace is possible, when the Fatherland is in danger and we have continuously to protect it, by incessant increase of armaments, against future attacks?

The dynasties oppose their ideal of a State based upon Power to the democratic ideal of a constitutional State. Whenever the nations dreamt for a moment of the solidarity of all human interests, of justice, peace, of a constitution and autonomy, straightway the dynasties, in the name of their eternally menaced Fatherland, replied with a demand for veneration of, blind obedience to, and confidence in the God-appointed rule. In the place of Constitutions, they gave us conquered provinces, thereby flattered our national vanity, and compelled us to look to the preservation of the conquered lands.

Despite all the achievements of the last century, they contrived in this way to keep alive among their peoples that sense of "enmity" which is a necessary

¹ "We feel ourselves," says Professor Ernst Tröltzsch, "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" (p. 71, Berlin, 1915), "in any event freer and more independent in many respects than the citizens of the great democracies." We? Professor Tröltzsch speaks, no doubt, in the name of his colleagues.

factor in their politics, but which, in our modern world, has no longer any natural foundation. The various nations exhibit differences of ideas, customs, temperaments, languages and religions, in the same way as they exhibit contrasting interests and aims. But it is only the dynasties who, with their primitive and mystic policy of force, have persuaded us that war must always be the natural consequence of this peaceful rivalry.¹

"Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi," so said Horace, and Heine has expressed it, in his own way, in German: "If princes itch, nations must scratch themselves." And, hitherto, the world's history has been nothing but an everlasting itching of dynasties and a scratching of the nations for their sake. Inter-

¹ How often have not our racial scientists and statesmen emphasised the natural enmity that is supposed to exist between Germans and Slavs, and is bound to culminate in war. This "natural hostility" between Germans and Slavs was nothing but a dogma of our racial science, and, when the World War broke out, it was declared in Germany (at all events at first) to be a crusade against "arrogant Panslavism." Compare with this the fact that it was German thinkers and poets who showed the deepest sympathy with the tragic fate of Poland. On the first division of Poland, Schubert, Zacharias Werner, and J. G. Seume lamented in inspired verse the sorrows of our Polish neighbours and found a grateful echo in the German people. In the 'thirties of last century, in consequence of the ill-starred Polish revolution, and its sequel, there sprang up in Germany a whole poetical literature on the subject of Poland: Grabbe, Holtei, Lenau, Platen, Hebbel (only to name the more important lyricists) wrote moving verses on Poland and its unhappy people. The whole of Germany applauded them, and some of these poems are, even to-day, popular in Germany. This German poetry in celebration of Poland is not merely a noble monument for the land of poets, but is likewise a striking proof that, despite the learned polemics and intrigues of dynastic State politics, *no* natural feeling of enmity exists between the peoples concerned.

national history was like a long-continued serial story of brigandage. In each part, for the furtherance of "higher aims," some crime was committed, and at the end of each part stood the words: "to be continued."

War engenders war. Until now almost every peace has been concluded in accordance with dynastic views, and therefore has contained within it the germ of a new war. If nations regarded and waged every war only as a step towards peace, dynasties, on the contrary, regarded it only as a step towards another war. In ancient days the exercise of power was limited to the duration of war; can we be surprised, therefore, that the leaders continued the wars as long as possible, and then used all the means at their disposal to conjure up fresh wars? Their rank and very existence were at stake. No war without leaders, no leaders without war. Dynasty and war: the one is inconceivable without the other. The world's history shows us on every page that not peace but war is the aim of dynasties. Peace is for them not an ideal, but only the natural intermediate stage before the next war.

A wolf cannot be expected to fill the part of shepherd. It is in the nature of sheep to keep the peace and to seek good feeding-ground. It is in the nature of wolves to keep the sheep in perpetual fear, and to devour them till they can devour no more. Civilised nations are, without exception, peace-loving, and even if they desire to protect their feeding-ground, they have, by the aid of international commerce, so organised the world that the feeding problem has long since been solved, and is no longer a motive for war enterprises. The much-talked of "craving for expan-

sion" of this or that people, even if it existed, would nowhere lead to war. But it does not exist; like the "enmity" between peoples, it is an artificial product of dynastic sophistry and politics. The most densely populated countries (China in Asia, and Belgium in Europe) have ever been the most peaceful.

But dynasties, by their very nature, have always been soldiers and conquerors. In the House of Hohenzollern, for example, royal princes are made lieutenants of the Guard on the completion of their tenth year.¹ Can it be marvelled at that all their later actions and thoughts are controlled by military conceptions? Men with such an education and habit of thought would of necessity feel themselves very superfluous in a world of unbroken peace. A world without war and adventure would necessarily seem to them an insipid and tedious world. One who is dubbed a soldier in his cradle and surrounded his whole life through by none but soldiers is led finally to believe that the whole world was only created for soldiers. And what is to become of soldiers, if matters are so arranged, that henceforth they will find no employment? A man who regards the organisation of armies and the elaboration of strategic plans as his life-work is naturally depressed at seeing all his work and genius become only

¹ Still more pronounced is the military tradition of the House of Hapsburg. One of the first orders issued by Emperor Charles I. of Austria on his recent accession to the throne was that of November 28th, 1916: "I desire that my first-born son, sent me by God's grace, shall from now be a member of my brave, heroic army, and I therefore make him honorary Colonel-in-Chief of my Infantry Regiment No. 17, which henceforth shall bear the title 'Crown Prince.'" This new Colonel-in-Chief was then but four years old.

of theoretical importance. "Heavens! If it were only the real thing!" exclaimed the German Crown Prince on the occasion of a sham cavalry charge. What else should he say? It must necessarily appear absurd to him that an army should always remain a plaything. How galling then it must be to generals and diplomats to see their splendid genius packed away as of no further practical use.

If the world were organised for peace, it would at length inquire, Why all these armies and generals? Why these manœuvres for the delight of Crown Princes? But the world is not organised for peace. "Should anyone attempt to assail or violate our good right, then strike out with the mailed fist! And, if God wills, wreath about your young brow with laurels, that no one in the German Empire will begrudge you." These were the words of William II. to his brother Henry on his expedition (December 15th, 1897) to East Asia. And God wills it always! The old German god has never allowed eternal peace to last eternally. Always there comes a day on which the dynasty is in the sad necessity of having to show that army and navy are in truth no playthings and that it has been summoned by God to wreath laurels round its brow. "Diplomacy is traffic in human flesh"; so said Bismarck, who must have known.

We are no Jacobins and fanatics. It would be absurd to reproach us with hating the monarchy *per se*. The lessons of history have not been lost on us.

And it was in fact a Hohenzollern who defined monarchy in a way that we democrats and pacifists would subscribe to with alacrity. Frederick II., named the Great, wrote in the year 1738: "Here lies

the error of most princes. They believe that God has created this multitude of men, whose welfare is committed to their charge, expressly and out of special consideration for their greatness, their happiness and their pride, and that their subjects are only destined to be the tools and servants of their lower passions. Since the principle from which one starts is itself false, all the consequences from it must also be unsound: for instance, the craving for false glory, the burning desire to conquer everything, the burdening of the people with crushing taxation, the sloth of the princes, their pride, their injustice, their inhumanity, their tyranny and all those other vices which degrade human nature. If princes would only be persuaded to emancipate themselves from such erroneous views and to recognise once again the purpose for which they were instituted, they would perceive that this office of which they are so proud, and their elevation to it, has been purely the *work of the peoples*; that these thousands of human beings committed to their charge by no means made themselves the slaves of a single man in order to make him more terrible and more powerful still! that they by no means subjected themselves to a *fellow citizen* in order to be the victims of his caprices and the plaything of his fantasy; but that they chose from their midst him whom they considered the most upright, to rule over them for their good, and to care for them like a father; him whom they deemed the most humane, that he should sympathise with and aid them in their afflictions; him whom they deemed the strongest, that he should protect them against their foes; him whom they deemed the shrewdest, that he might not *involve them*

*at a wrong time in destructive and ruinous wars; in short, the man whom they deemed fittest to represent the whole body politic, whose sovereign power should be a pillar of law and justice and not a means of committing crimes and practising tyranny with impunity."*¹ Thus wrote Frederick the Great 175 years ago. Let us now compare these truly kingly words of a Hohenzollern with the imperial words of another Hohenzollern and note that between the two lies a period of 150 years of democratic development:

"As he (William I.) thought, so do I also think and I see in the people and country which I have inherited a talent entrusted to me by God, which—as it is written in the Bible—it is my duty to increase, and concerning which I shall one day have to render account. I intend to devote all my energies to putting out this talent to such good usury that I shall add to it, I trust, many talents more. Those who desire to aid me in my task are heartily welcome, whoever they may be; but those who oppose me in this work I will crush" (Berlin, March 5th, 1890).

"I may remark, moreover, that the fact that we have been enabled to achieve what has been achieved is primarily due to the fact that in our House the tradition prevails, that *we regard ourselves as appointed by God*, to rein over the peoples whom we have been called to rule, and to guide them in accordance with their welfare and the furtherance of their

¹ "Königliche Gedanken und Aussprüche Friedrichs des Grossen," published by the Deutsche Bibliothek in Berlin, pp. 5 and 6.

material and spiritual interests" (Bremen, April 21st, 1890).

"I do not believe that the Mark of Brandenburg will hesitate to follow me on the paths I am treading. You know that I regard my whole position and my mission as one entrusted to me by God, and that I am called to execute the mandates of a Higher Being to whom I shall hereafter have to render account" (Berlin, February 20th, 1891).

"He (William I.) came forth from Coblenz, on ascending the throne, as a chosen vessel of the Lord, and as such he regarded himself. For us all, and especially for us Princes, he has once more lifted on high a jewel and endowed it with greater brilliancy, a jewel that we must keep high and holy; I mean, the *monarchy by God's grace*. The monarchy with its heavy duties, its never ending, ever continuing toil and labour, with its fearful *responsibility to the Creator alone*, from which no man, no minister, no house of deputies and no people can relieve its prince" (Coblenz, August 31st, 1897).

I do not believe that there are many Germans who, comparing these views of two Hohenzollerns, would be inclined to give the preference to that of William II. For, just because Frederick the Great regards the monarchy as the *work of the people* and the King as a *citizen among citizens*, he appears to us more human, greater and nobler than his imperial successor, who no longer speaks as the "first servant of the State" and as a man to his fellow-men, but convulsively clings to that divine authority so vigorously denounced by his great ancestor, belauds the monarchy as the work of Heaven, and speaks to us, on every occasion,

as the governor of the State, the ruler of his subjects.

To repeat: We are not Jacobins and demagogues. We are writing without hatred and passion, as upholders of free States and free peoples. We leave to the dynasties what belongs to dynasties. Frederick the Great found no imitators, least of all in his own house. For humanity, genius, and liberalism are, on thrones as elsewhere in life, only exceptions. The average intelligence of dynasties will always regard the monarch as the earthly representative of God and thus always choose out of two possible solutions the one that is the less liberal and the less well disposed towards the people. The limitations of human dynasties will always lead them to discover in Liberalism a direct menace to their existence. Kant says ironically: "It is not to be expected that kings should become philosophers or philosophers kings, nor is it to be wished; because the possession of power inevitably renders the mind incapable of free judgment." And Nietzsche adds (in reference to Germany and the Germans): "The cost of power is high; power destroys the intelligence."

The possession of power does actually rob dynasties of their free judgment, of a noble sense of justice, and of a rational regard for the interests of others. It is, accordingly, only what might have been expected if they recognise no limits and laws, in respect to the satisfaction of their own energies and ambitions, and if they view the world's history as merely a chain of glorious martial achievements, for the renewal of which they must constantly provide, inasmuch as they are the representatives of God and wars

are an element of the Divine ordering of the world.

In the eyes of dynasties a nation is a mere rude mass and chaos which God has placed in the world for their sole pleasure. Dynasties may have the best intentions, but they are and remain the prisoners of their origin and upbringing. Even Frederick II. is not styled "the Great" because he was a philosopher and poet, a friend of Voltaire and the author of the "Antimachiavell," but because, in spite of his philosophical and liberal ideas, he became a great strategist and the conqueror of new provinces. And, in our own times, we have the case of William II., which, like so many others, furnishes a striking proof of the fact that a dynasty, even where it regards peace as a good thing in principle, is none the less, as a result of its mystical, in some degree practical, but always profoundly traditional policy of armaments and provocations, finally driven into yet another war.

As long as there are dynasties endued with divine prerogatives, they will remain, what they must be from their very origin, adventurers and not statesmen. When their adventures are successful they become heroes; when they fail, they forfeit a portion or the whole of their power. But, in any event, their conception of the world and humanity will remain primitive, mystic, pagan and romantic. He who enjoys intercourse with the gods can claim a separate moral code for himself. Perfidy, deceit, treachery and brutality are the necessary accompaniments of all statecraft which serves dynastic interests. Military victory hallows everything. Guilt is here the necessary

condition of greatness; honour and truth a subject for mockery.

The craving for power knows no other limit than the power of another. In the realm of dynastic policy everything is a question of brute force. The theory of all dynastic policy is competition for the greater power, its practice—the butt-end of the musket. The question Who is the stronger, the more influential, the wealthier, you or I? dominates all. Popular weal and progress are merely a phrase and a pretext. Their true philosophy is the cannon, their right the right of the stronger, who remains a darling of the gods so long as he does not meet one stronger than himself. The right of the brigand too is divine, as long as he does not allow himself to be caught; he too can pose as a darling of the gods as long as he can defend himself successfully against the police.

Why should one blame dynasties for this? The thirst for power and riches is in all of us. It is a law of our existence, without which there would be no progress in the world. In order to keep this "will to power" within such bounds as are essential to civil order and security we established codes and courts of law. These set limits to the "will to power" in private life and create what we call "Culture," administration of justice, civilisation, morals, and so forth.

But, thanks to their divine origin and calling, dynasties stand beyond and above all legal control. For them, there are neither laws nor judges, and, even, in most cases not even critics. They prescribe laws for themselves, they alone control their actions and are only responsible to the "Almighty," to whom they will "one day" have to render account. Altogether,

a most envious position, from which, as they themselves say, "no Minister, no Parliament, no people" can release them. Hence, everything that they do is "done well," for all their acts are done in accordance with directions from above. Why then should it surprise us if the dynasties, in order to satisfy their craving for power, resort to means which we, in private life, should call criminal? The idea of guilt and crime does not exist for a dynasty, or, rather, only begins to exist when its vital interests are imperilled. If, for example, it is a crime to doubt the divinity of the dynasty, it is not a crime to violate, in the higher interests of the State, treaties that have been solemnly ratified, and to send hundreds of thousands of citizens to their death for a matter that in reality is of quite a different complexion from that in which it has been represented to them.

We must, once and for all, make clear to ourselves that the "dynasty by God's grace" is nothing else than lawlessness reduced to legal forms. What is prohibited to the citizen is enjoined upon the soldier; where the one is punished, the other is rewarded, and *vice versa*. The dynasty has the right to change the highest into the lowest, the common into the sacred, and lies into truth, without anyone having the right to protest. There is something of an adjuration in the words that Gustav Freytag used with regard to the Hohenzollerns—"To stand above others, as God of Battles and as the earthly Fate of hundreds of thousands, renders the best and noblest man at last susceptible to the hateful idea: I am the State!" Freytag forgets that this thought is never hateful to dynasties; it rather belongs to the logic of their

case, it is noble and God-ordained. For the "will to power" is a law of life that cannot disappear until the world ceases to be a world. It would be folly to attempt to deny or suppress this will to power. It is sufficient to reckon with its existence and to prescribe for it those limits that must be prescribed in the interest of the common weal.

Just as a servant girl who, by her good looks and coquetry, has come to dress in silk will at once want to become a countess, so a dynasty that, with wars and victories, has arrived at the purple will be at once possessed by the idea that it has not its due place in the sun. A dynasty without a dream of power would be as absurd as an artisan without the desire for increased wages. And every dynasty which has in part realised its dream of power has immediately transformed it into a dream of *world* power. And yet every dynasty has suffered shipwreck through this dream of world-domination; at last, the eagle is brought low by the arrow its own feathers have furnished.

All this is so logical that we, as psychologists and historians, have not the right to make it a reproach against the dynasties. At the most, it is the nations who deserve reproaches because they were not willing or able to perceive at the right time the "will to power" of their dynasties, and so to restrict it in accordance with the general ideas of justice that it could no longer menace the general weal. This restriction—wherever it has been carried into effect—has rarely been a free and voluntary act, dictated by deep philosophical or moral conviction, but, for the most part, the result of external circumstances and bitter

economic necessity. The curse of an avenging God seems to lie upon the nations. They must wade through a Red Sea of blood and tears before they can escape from the Pharaohs. In the days of Moses our Lord God mercifully divided the Red Sea for the benefit of the Israelites, so that they could cross on dry foot into the Promised Land, but to-day, alas! He no longer performs miracles. It appears to-day, as it did in the days of Napoleon, as if the nations of Europe would drown in the Red Sea. But this is only appearance. The nations will reach the further shore, and above the bloodstained and hideous fields of battle the sun of the Promised Land of Liberty will at length rise.

Every dynasty once dwelt in a fisherman's cottage and was, like Frau Ilsebill in Grimm's well-known fairy-tale, discontented with its fate. In the fisherman's hut she dreamt of ducal and royal thrones and ordered her husband to tell the flounder, which he had set at liberty, of her desire. And scarcely was it fulfilled when Frau Ilsebill in her new royal palace dreamt of an imperial palace. When she had procured this also from the flounder and had dreamt for some time of boundless realms on which the sun never set, she next wanted to become like the Lord God Himself, and demanded of the flounder that he should find her a place in Heaven. And so her husband had to go once again and beg the wrathful flounder to satisfy his wife's ambition, as otherwise his house would be a hell. And whenever Frau Ilsebill secured a higher rank, the sea surged high and became dark and violet and blood-red, until the wrathful flounder at length

caused the imperial and papal palace to be destroyed with thunder and lightning, and the good fisherman found his Frau Ilsebill once more back in the wretched fisherman's hut on the shore.

Thus it was in China and in Rome, in Persia and Spain, in Egypt and Mexico, in the Papal States and in France. Thus it was, has remained, and will always remain, as long as there are dynasties which enjoy direct intercourse with God and are served by an obliging fisherman who is always ready to defy the elements in order to satisfy his wife's vanity.

For, in contrast to the servant girl who wants to become a countess and thereby at the worst ruins a few lovers, the history of Frau Ilsebill is at the same time the history of nations; she does not dream her dream of power like other mortals at her own risk and peril, but for the use and delectation of her subjects. Almost twenty years of war and a Red Sea of human blood were necessary in order to extinguish the dream of power of the great Corsican and to bring him back again to the fisherman's hut whence he had come.

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We might now, when we consider the rise and the disastrous fall of every dynasty, say with Nietzsche that "history is an eternal repetition," and this would, at the close of our investigation, bring us back to the standpoint of the Treitschkes, Moltkes, and Bernhardis. That is to say, we should join with them in declaring war to be a law of nature and a civilising and educational force and in regarding its perpetual recurrence as a matter of course.

Fortunately, however, history can only remain an eternal repetition so long as the essential conditions

remain the same. Hitherto, as we have seen, dynasties have been an essential condition of the world's history. But are they to remain so in the future? We say frankly, No! The Revolutions in England, France, and elsewhere, the declaration of human and civic rights and their more or less successful application to politics, have furnished the proof that dynasties have long ceased to be an essential condition, but, on the contrary, are only an artificially fostered attribute of modern humanity. For example, the history of Germany during the past century may be taken as a proof that dynasties constantly force their peoples into opposition to the great aspirations of humanity, and are thus only a hindrance to the only progress of mankind that is desirable.

Destruction by lightning was an "eternal repetition" until the lightning-conductor was discovered. But man set a limit to the divine and absolute power of the lightning, and since then no one asserts any longer that destruction by lightning is inevitable, divine, and the will of Nature. The heated room and the fur cloak are, as it were, a protest against the Divine order, which intends that we shall feel cold in winter. We invented insurance companies as a protection against fires, damage by hail, disease, robberies, etc., all of which latter are also divine institutions. That is to say: Whenever mankind felt the eternal recurrence of certain events to be both painful and avoidable, it contrived to get rid of many divine institutions. Consider, for instance, the Plague, against which, in the Middle Ages, the only remedies were fast days and processions.

Though dynasties by God's grace are not the Plague,

they are, like the Plague, an eminently divine institution, the very existence of which is in direct antagonism to *everything* that modern humanity must demand for the security of its existence and liberty.

The present World War is in every sense so terrible that it is to be hoped that it has thoroughly disgusted nations with this "eternal repetition" of history. The desire for final emancipation from this scourge of mankind was never more general, more ardent, and more urgent than it is to-day. And therefore the nations will derive from this World War a sacred right to exclaim to the dynasties:

"Enough, more than enough! Your day is over. We need you no more. You are adventurers and not statesmen. We wish at length to be *ourselves*. Away with your divine rights! Away with all the sacred trumpery of bygone days! We wish, at length, to have a policy of our own choosing. For we, and not you, express the meaning of the world. We, and not you, are vessels of God's grace. Hitherto we have been your chattels. We believed that you meant well by us. We now perceive that (less out of malice than by instinct and tradition) you have remained as you were, that you can never possibly entertain that idea of general weal and culture that we must demand at the present day. That which increases your fame increases our unhappiness; that which seems to you an element of the divine order of things seems to us a crime against humanity and civilisation. You wish to make us happy by means of war? To-day we have other tasks. We are no longer barbarians, for whom war meant livelihood, glory and sport. We desire peace. If your lust for adventure can only be satisfied

by war, go to the Indians and the negroes. Europe is no longer an arena for swashbucklers and tyrants. The taxpaying *citizen*, pledged to military service, shall be, henceforth, the sole sovereign of Europe. Even if it were proved that all the wielders of divine prerogatives were men of genius (and the world's history shows the opposite to be the case), we will not and cannot trust ourselves any longer to their mercy."

THE PREREQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR A EUROPEAN PEACE

What, therefore, we ask in the name of the future peace and civilisation of Europe is, in general terms, the continuation, completion, and the widest possible application of the principles proclaimed by the great French Revolution. The World War must complete the work of that Revolution, which has been interrupted by the dynasties, or, at all events, it must open the way to mankind for the gradual realisation of these immortal human ideals.

And what we, in particular, ask of Germany is a general transformation of generally accepted ideas and institutions.

The first and the most general demand that we German democrats and pacifists urge is: *Germany for the Germans! German government by the German People.* And in order that this popular government shall not, as hitherto, be merely a comedy for the delectation of exalted personages, we make this second fundamental demand: *The German Army for the*

German People! The armed force must be the support and servant of the popular sovereignty!

Universal military service without popular sovereignty is political serfdom. That an army composed of all the citizens of the nation should take the oath to the person of the sovereign may be very well for a negro or Aztec State, but in the case of a great modern nation it is a scandal which at length must cease.

By the carrying out of these two fundamental reforms all the rest are achieved automatically: a thorough revision of the German Imperial Constitution, abolition of the Prussian "three class" franchise, reasonably proportioned electoral districts, Ministers selected from the Parliamentary body and responsible to it, the abolition of all the political privileges of the Junkers and officers; in short, a safeguarding of the sovereignty of the will of the German people in all departments.

How this new Constitution and popular assembly will deal with the monarchy (assuming that we are absolutely bound to have one) is a secondary matter. We shall be satisfied, in the first instance, with those fundamental reforms as a result of which the will of the German people shall be declared supreme in Germany and shall retain the effective political power. Whether the head of the State holds the title of President, King, or Emperor, whether his dignity is hereditary or not, matters not a jot. The most progressive European democracy (Denmark) is not a republic, but a kingdom. Italy, England, Sweden, Norway, to some extent also Spain, are republics under monarchical titles. We are not concerned with phrases and etiquette, but with

actualities. And the actuality to be achieved must be that the head of the German State shall no longer, by divine right, satisfy his personal craving for power above the heads of the people, but that he shall become the executive organ of the will of the German people, and that the actual political power, at home and abroad, shall be in the hands of the German people.

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The World War has proved that a radical change in all those political Constitutions that still concede to the dynasties divine rights and the supreme command of their armed might is no longer to-day merely a question of home politics for any people, but a *European necessity*.

The World War has brought about an exceptional state of things, which, in the interests of Europe, must be utilised in every State which maintains an army, for the purpose of altering the Constitution in such a way that, henceforth, the people and not a dynasty by divine right shall dispose of the army, which is both paid for by, and composed of, the people.

It may be that the creation of this exceptional state of things will prove the most important advantage which the nations of Europe will reap from this sacrifice of millions of lives. For that which, for the past century, could only exist as a vague theory, and, at The Hague and elsewhere, was openly scoffed at by high personages, namely, the idea of an understanding between the nations based upon international agreements, may now, after the war has inevitably led to a general discussion and settlement between the nations of Europe, be easily realised. Although the formation of a League of Nations for the securing of

the world's peace, advocated by Kant and all serious pacifists, has hitherto been wrecked on the divine rights of dynasties, the World War has now seen to it that this resistance shall not only cease, but shall be recognised as the chief cause of modern wars.

A hundred years ago Kant demanded: that (a) the inhabitants of a State, in virtue of their citizen-right; (b) the States in their mutual relations, in virtue of international law; and (c) men and States in their mutual relations, in virtue of cosmopolitan law, may be "regarded as citizens of one world State," and he adds: "This classification is not an arbitrary one, but is essential in reference to the idea of eternal peace. For, if even one of these were in a position physically to influence another and were yet in a natural state, then a state of war would be implied, from which we desire to emancipate ourselves."¹

And as Kant insisted a hundred years ago, it is no longer a question of putting an end to one war, but to all wars. Since almost all the European nations are engaged in this World War, they will all, without exception, be agreed with regard to "the enforcement of Kant's first definite article of perpetual peace," which states clearly and positively: "The Civil Constitution of every State must be republican."

We therefore demand that the exceptional conditions resulting from this war shall be utilised for the realisation of this fundamental reform in Europe, a reform equally applicable to, equally desired by, and equally efficacious for all countries and peoples, and

¹ Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden," published by Reclam (Leipzig), note to p. 12.

without which no really sound state of peace can be brought to pass.

All that respect for and belief in the authority of God-appointed dynasties, which has been bequeathed to us from the past, must give way before this fundamental reform. And, especially in the case of Germany, there can be no "ifs" and "buts." The foolish chatter of German professors about all that has "become historic" must cease, for it is only that which is in process of "becoming historic" that must influence us.

If, as we sincerely hope, the statesmen of the Western Democracies will have to speak the decisive word in the peace negotiations, then they will employ the power that they have won through the war to formulate and insist upon the satisfaction of demands expressed somewhat as follows, and applicable to and binding upon all nations and States.

1. The Civil Constitution in every State shall be republican. That is to say: no State shall, hereafter, be governed by divine rights and arbitrary principles. The chief command of the armed forces and the decision as to war and peace shall, henceforth, in all States reside in Parliaments formed on a basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, and endowed with responsible Ministers.

2. So soon as in any State a coup d'etat is threatened or put into effect, which might in any way limit or even abolish these supreme powers of the Parliament, the other States shall, in the name of the world's peace, have a right to protest against and, if

necessary, to frustrate by force of arms any attempt to restore personal despotism.

This last condition is of the most vital importance. The coming peace must reckon, once and for all, with the *invariable existence of the will to power*; it must treat it as a law of nature, deeply rooted in the human heart, and therefore keep a tight rein on it, in that sphere in which it might become dangerous to the welfare of Europe, namely, in politics.

States must, therefore, possess the common right to frustrate the warlike ambitions of individuals. The history of France, during a period of less than fifty years, displays two painful instances of the sorcery that gifted men with warlike ambitions are able to exercise upon the popular mind. Twice were the republican institutions of the country overruled by a Napoleon, and twice did the consequences of these *coups d'état* bring Europe to desperation. It may happen, in fact we may confidently predict that it will happen, that in the future also warlike "supermen" will rise up, and that a nation will prove too weak to resist the force and fascination of their personality. We earnestly trust that the men who will presently be called upon to secure for Europe a lasting peace will do their work *completely*, and contrive to secure Europe against the possibility of new wars in the future.

International politics have been called "a concert of the Great Powers." If anyone makes a disturbance in a concert-hall he will probably, in the interests of the rest of the audience, be turned out. But if in the sphere of international politics some disturber of the peace has at his disposal such a powerful army that

he can hope to pit his strength successfully against the rest, it is not sufficient merely to turn him into the street; he must be brought to reason by means of war. In order that the concert of the Great Powers may at length become harmonious and contribute to the happiness of the nations, care must be taken that any disturbers of the peace are henceforth deprived of the opportunity of making an interruption. Attacks upon the parliamentary *régime* of a State are attacks upon its peace. Anyone who endangers the Republican Constitution of the State endangers (even though at first only indirectly and instinctively) the peace and security of the nations, and must, in case of need, be prevented from carrying out his designs by the intervention of the neighbouring States.

For, as we have said, peace does not depend so much upon the foreign policy as upon the internal Constitution of the States. If the Constitution is mediæval, militarist, and generally autocratic, then sooner or later the foreign policy of the State will tend towards war.

All the nations will be in favour of an arrangement of this kind; the German nation more than any; for no nation has suffered more from this war and no nation desired it less than the German nation.

* * * *

The speech of the German Imperial Chancellor on November 9th, 1916, compels me to make a digression.

In this speech, for the first time in Prusso-German history, a German statesman expressed himself, in the name of the German Government, in favour of an idea which, as we have seen, has hitherto been strictly for-

bidden in the Fatherland of Kant. That which Kant and his disciples proposed, and which Prussian Ministers and diplomatists have lustily abused in the Reichstag and in the Press and systematically thwarted at all the Hague Conferences, namely, the formation of a general League of Nations for the safeguarding of the world's peace, has now finally become the aim of the German Government. The Imperial Chancellor said: "If, when the war is ended, this terrible destruction of property and life is at length fully realised by the world, then throughout the whole world a cry will go up for peaceful settlements and for Constitutions which, as far as lies in human power, shall prevent the recurrence of such monstrous calamities. This cry will be so strong and so justifiable that it is bound to lead to this result: that Germany will honestly co-operate in considering any attempt to find a practical solution and in working for its realisation. All the more so if the war, as we confidently expect, produces political conditions which will further the free development of all nations, great and small."

Golden words, which had they been only spoken ten years earlier and been accompanied by corresponding acts would have prevented this World War. But, unfortunately, they were not spoken until after twenty-seven months of the most hopeless war that the German Government has ever waged. And, unfortunately also, they are in absolute contradiction with the speeches which the same statesman delivered on December 9th, 1915, and April 5th, 1916, when the military situation of Germany was more favourable than it is to-day.

And instead of showing by wise moderation that he is in earnest about this idea, the Imperial Chancellor immediately falls into the exaggerations typical of the newly converted, who by their obtrusive zeal give rise to the suspicion that they discarded their errors of yesterday only under compulsion. In fact, he not only answers for Germany's willingness to co-operate in creating this League of Nations, but he also at the same time demands that Germany should preside over it: "Germany is willing at any time to join this League of Nations. Yes, and even place herself at the head of a League of Nations which would keep disturbers of the peace in check."

That is too much of a good thing, Your Excellency: one does not immediately make a bishop of a converted heathen. It would be ridiculous in peace time to place Germany "über alles" after having prevented her at the cost of enormous sacrifices from becoming "über alles" by means of war.

The pacifist ideal is still so unfamiliar to the leaders of the German State, that they view it from a military standpoint, as they do everything else, that is to say, they claim a controlling and commanding position in it. As if in the League of Nations dreamed of by Kant and his disciples there could ever be such a thing as a leader!

But how lamentably far the leaders of Germany are from a true understanding of pacifist ideas and practice is apparent not only from these turns of phrase, not only from the military traditions and mode of thought of our dynasty, but, above all, from their actions in the present unhappy time. Four days before this beautiful pacifist speech was delivered, Wil-

liam II. proclaimed the "autonomy" of Poland without consulting the people interested, that is, with deliberate disregard of that international law the strict observance of which must be an essential condition for the formation of such a League of Nations. And at the same moment that the Imperial Chancellor was proclaiming this new ideal of peace to the nations of Europe, thousands of "lazy" Belgians were being deported to Germany, in open mockery of The Hague Conventions (which had been subscribed to by the German Emperor), to do forced labour. What confidence can the world have in a man who at the beginning of the war called treaties "scraps of paper," and at the very moment when he is inviting the nations to enter into new treaties is still treating them as scraps of paper?

We must ask the same question when we consider the attitude of the German Government relative to its own nation. The German Reichstag has during the course of this World War frequently and emphatically put forward various democratic demands. It is true that, in its humility, it did not dare to begin at the beginning, that is to say, to demand the responsibility of Ministers, redistribution of electoral divisions, and parliamentary control over the army. But, with surprising unanimity, it demanded the control of foreign policy by the Reichstag, the abolition of the disgraceful state of "siege," of the precautionary supervision and censorship, the exemption of princes from taxation, the special privileges of the nobility, etc. The German Government either abruptly refused these demands, or, with pompous speeches, phrases, and promises, postponed them for later consideration.

A paltry inscription over the doorway of the Reichstag Palace and a few trifling reforms: this is all that the war, which in Russia has already brought about a sort of parliamentary *régime*, has done for Germany as yet.

And is this Government, which before the war did everything in its power to discredit the ideals of pacifism, and which, since the beginning of the war, has, both at home and abroad, systematically trampled under foot any treaties and constitutional guarantees that happened to be inconvenient, now to be considered eligible for co-operating in the creation of a League of Nations, and even for presiding over its activities? This illusion can only be entertained by those "scientific pacifists" who, like Dr. Fried, still continue to imagine that the European peace-omelette can be made of hard-boiled feudal eggs.

The rest of us know only too well that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a representative of God's grace to pass through the portals of a democratic temple of international rights. If we tried to explain to the German Imperial Chancellor upon what conditions those "peaceful agreements and Constitutions" must necessarily be based, if they are really "as far as lies in human power" to safeguard peace, he would probably be highly indignant, and at once declare that this was not the meaning of his words. Then we should have to reply to him:

Is your Excellency, in the name of His Majesty, in favour of the creation of a League of Nations for the safeguarding of the world's peace? Your Excellency has read Kant and, as we are delighted to ob-

serve, understood him better than those scientific pacifists who are not democrats; otherwise, Your Excellency would not have used the significant word "Constitutions" in your speech. Kant, in fact, realised 125 years ago that international conventions without democratic national governments are a trick, which can ensnare only arch-revolutionists like Scheidemann, or peace specialists like Fried. The first thing, therefore, that Your Excellency ought to do, if the Government of Germany desires honestly to establish a League of Nations for safeguarding the peace of the world, is to lay before the Reichstag to-morrow, in the name of the German Emperor and the Federal Council, a draft of a Constitution which would completely transform the German political system. Therefore, enough of those trifling reforms and inscriptions with which you have hitherto delighted men like Scheidemann for whom revolution is merely a subject for oratory; but concede to the German people what they have most ardently desired for decades past: a parliamentary *régime*, reconstruction of the electoral districts, abolition of the supreme command of the army by the monarch, and so forth.

What? Your Excellency thinks these demands "revolutionary" in the highest degree, "dangerous to the State"? That seems a proof that you are afraid to think out Kant's idea to its logical conclusion. For these demands are only the logical and necessary conditions for the League of Nations that Your Excellency so heartily desires. If this League of Nations were not based on these democratic reforms, it would be only "a Holy Alliance" which once again would be subject to the pleasure of our God-appointed rulers

and would in a few days be annulled in accordance with the will of God. The fundamental idea of a monarchy by God's grace is in the most flagrant contradiction with the fundamental idea of the proposed League of Nations. Anyone who should attempt to reconcile these two opposites, that is to say, to make out of one who executes divine laws a representative of earthly reason, would be only acting a farce, even if he were unconscious of the fact. And, therefore, in the phrase "League of Nations" we lay the emphasis upon the last word.

Your Excellency is perhaps of opinion that this international League of Peace can have nothing to do with the internal affairs of Germany, but that later we may be able to arrange something? No! Your Excellency, it must be *now*! At this very moment! Immediate peace is to be had at this price. Your Excellency knows the true war aim of the Allied Western Powers just as well as we do. They are fighting for the democratising of Germany and—based upon this—the realisation of the plans for disarmament and a court of arbitration which Germany frustrated at The Hague, whatever Scheidemann and his like may say. Your Excellency has in your heart, as we know, the same sympathy with these Don Quixotes as we have. For your Excellency knows positively that the Entente is only an "Entente" because in Germany the monarchy by God's grace rules with absolute rights over war and peace. The Entente wants what Kant wanted! So do the German people! So does the whole of Europe! And Europe has learnt, with supreme satisfaction, that at the bottom of your heart Your Excellency wants the same!

But begin to be serious about it, Your Excellency! Begin *now*! Europe is bleeding to death! Peace can be concluded to-morrow if Your Excellency would take the first step towards the promised League of Nations by proclaiming the rights of the German people.

A hundred years of Prusso-German history have taught us (apart from a few Scheidemanns) some wisdom. Whenever the storm has rattled the Palace windows we have received abundant promises of heavenly and earthly blessing, of Constitutions and liberties; but when the storm had passed, not a word of all these promises was ever kept, and anti-democracy and divine rights flourished even more vigorously than before. The German people is not made up of Scheidemanns. The latter preached revolution and then became an enthusiastic champion of Emperor and Empire, when Tsarism began to be supreme in Germany. The German people is less ridiculous and more democratic. It has devoted itself with courage and in good faith to the defence of the Fatherland, and all the thanks it has got for it is absolute rule enforced by the sword, and this absolutism has been mitigated neither as a result of the fair promises of the Government nor yet by the economic distress prevailing to-day in Germany.

The German people is democratic in the real sense of the term. And, therefore, Your Excellency cannot expect that the German people will for all time be content with democracy in the shape of inscriptions and promises. Set to work in earnest, Your Excellency! An immediate and an honourable peace is possible if you will prove to the German people (and at the same

time to the world at large) by democratic actions that the German Government from this day onward swears allegiance to the international principles of pacifism. This is the only way.

* * * * *

Accordingly, it is a question first of all of the creation and of the putting into operation of democratic republican Constitutions in all countries, and, secondly, of the appointment of an international police who shall not obtrude themselves in normal times but shall be constantly ready to check any threatened violation of these Constitutions. As the desire for war of a single individual suffices to force twelve desirous of peace to make war, it must be seen to that individuals who have an inclination towards war do not attain a position of supreme authority. Europe will not and dare not any longer tolerate an irresponsible dynastic policy of force. Every attempt of this kind must be stifled at the outset by common endeavour. Any recurrence of a Napoleon or a Bismarck must be made absolutely impossible. Humanity asks only for legislators, statesmen, philosophers, poets, and not for conquerors.

And even if the Bernhardis, Rohrbachs, Reventlows, Hardens, Keims, Delbrücks, Limans, Frymanns, Scheidemanns and their like are beside themselves with anger, that does not trouble us. Those among them who possess a conscience will understand that the days of the policy of force, when a few had a divine right over all others and when the fate of millions was callously settled behind closed doors are at last at an end. The rest will doubtless continue from time to time to favour us with their scribblings in the cause of bloodshed. But, firstly, they will be talking

in the name of a principle that has become impotent; and secondly, we shall, after this war, have a right to laugh at them openly until they are ashamed of themselves, and finally spare us their dreams of world-power.

THE ERRORS AND ADVANTAGES OF DEMOCRACY

Only from this starting-point do the paths open out to further reforms. For only when the democratisation of the Constitutions of all the States has been achieved can those further demands that have been already put forward by pacifists and socialists be discussed and gradually realised—an international court of arbitration for the adjustment of all conflicts arising between nations, special legislation against the bellicose tendencies of the so-called national Press, nationalisation of armament industries, conversion of standing armies into national militia, the publicity and parliamentary control of diplomacy, the opening of an era of free trade, and, finally, even, the abolition of that defence of country which is ingenuously condemned outright by our present-day “anti-militarists” as being “militarism” and which is alleged to be the cause of the war.

Whoever demands these and similar guarantees of peace without previously demanding that the expression of the dynastic will-to-power should be eliminated from the Constitutions of the various States is like one preaching in a desert,¹ and is either a Utopian or

¹For instance, a neutral (Nos. 1459 and 1633 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 1916) made quite a rational proposal to create an international Fund, in which all States should join and in which each should deposit a considerable sum in minted gold.

an intellectual coward. The political liberty of citizens is the liberty of liberties. The sovereignty of the peoples is and remains the indispensable condition for all earnest culture and guarantees of peace. Anyone proposing to reform society without giving society beforehand its indisputable right to autonomy is not proposing a reform, but only a mockery.

If, then, we are looking for a rock upon which we can build a lasting and reasonable peace, let us take the popular will. The sovereignty of the popular will expressed in a democratic form of government must after this war become the ruler of Europe. Just as dynasties are born of war, have through wars arrived at the zenith of their power, and can only continue their existence by means of further wars, so, on the other hand, is democracy born from the will-to-peace of nations, develops its power in peace, and is destined to fulfil its most sublime purposes in internal peace. The existence and the conception of culture of the dynasty are inseparable from the employment of

If a State declares war, and the universal opinion is that it has acted rashly and culpably, then its contribution will be confiscated, and so forth. The control of the fund shall be entrusted to neutral delegates, whose special task it will be to see that no more secret treaties are concluded, etc. The significant word in this proposal is the word "control." This control can only exist in States having a republican Constitution; States with dynastic Constitutions have always from time immemorial rejected any control over their actions (*cf.* the speeches of William II). Accordingly, if any such proposals are to be rendered practicable, Kant's fundamental demand must first of all be satisfied, and this, unfortunately, has not been mentioned in these and similar proposals. All the world feels the "control" of politics to be the sole effectual guarantee of the future peace of the world, but no one says *who* it is that has always obstinately and dogmatically opposed it.

military force. The existence and the conception of culture of democracy are, on the other hand, based upon the furthering and the safeguarding of the popular weal.

We modern democrats and pacifists are not romanticists, or Utopians, or metaphysicians. We are, in truth, further than any from regarding democracy as a paradise. No one knows the weakness of democratic government better than we do. As far as I am concerned, I think that in my book, "Die französische Demokratie" (Leipzig, 1914), I have shown up these weaknesses better than many whose aim has been to attack democracy on principle.

We know as well as our opponents do that the popular will, even with the best electoral system in the world, is never quite accurately expressed; that a great proportion of citizens will always remain politically indifferent and will not go to the poll, so that the parliamentary *régime* is, strictly speaking, a delusion. We perfectly understand that it may be a danger to a country if only one party rules, and that this party with its petty interests may hamper the establishment and development of great human principles.

German scholars and politicians are not a little proud of the "stability" of the German Government and its independence of party groupings; they contrast it favourably with the instability of democratic party government, as a result of which a party that has arrived at power often completely annihilates the work of its predecessor.

But for us, this instability of the democratic *régime* is also a guarantee for the prevention of war. It is true that the party government and nepotism of a

democracy may, here and there, corrupt a Minister and bring about a scandal, and, for a time, plunge the nation into such violent party feuds that it may seem as if the whole political system were entirely out of gear. But what are these evils in comparison with those born of the "stability" of absolutism? In the first case, a Dreyfus or Rochette affair, which concerns only the French; in the second case, the Kruger telegram, the *Daily Telegraph* interview, the jeers at The Hague Conferences—that is to say, things that are felt far beyond the black-white-and-red boundary posts, that alarm our neighbours, and necessarily appear to them a menace to the world's peace. In the first case, a Panama scandal, a mutiny of soldiers, a railway strike, which our official representatives of culture regard with pity, as though they would say: Lord, we thank Thee that we are not like these decadent communities! In Germany, on the other hand, we see official theories of State and international law of a mediæval nature, description of treaties as scraps of paper, systematic disregard of all guarantees of justice and liberty both at home and abroad. Hence, that which, in the more loosely constructed democracy, attacks (or apparently attacks) the foundation of the nation, in a monarchy by divine right, thanks to its "stability," attacks and disintegrates the whole of human civilisation. On the one hand, the "corruption" of a political system, on the other, the "corruption" of an ideal of humanity. We have the less hesitation in giving preference to the former, in that it is for the most part only superficial. For who would deny that we, with our much-boasted "stability," did not at the same time possess a very flourishing

corruption within our frontiers? (Only read what the "Pessimist" in his book "Unser Kaiser und sein Volk" had to say about it as early as 1906). The only difference between us and France is that in our case scandals come to light solely by chance, and are at once suppressed, whereas their detection and discussion (thanks to the rivalry for political power) belongs, as it were, to the system of democratic government. And as we are by no means all angels, a modern political system inevitably exhibits a certain amount of corruption. Let there be no illusion on this head. But, here too, publicity is the best guarantee for a gradual improvement.

The boastful eloquence of German professors concerning the stability of a monarchical government is very strikingly refuted by the judgments of a man who, because he himself was an absolute monarch, was certainly more qualified to judge of such matters than all our Privy Councillors taken together. Frederick the Great wrote as early as 1747-8 as follows:

"In monarchies the sole basis of government is the sovereign power of the ruler. Laws, military systems, industry, commerce, and all other component parts of the State are subjected to the arbitrary power of a single individual, among whose successors not a single one resembles the other. It follows that, as a rule, with the accession of each new prince the State is governed according to new principles. And that is the disadvantage of this form of government. Unity resides in the aims that republics place before themselves and in the means which they employ towards their attainment. Hence it ensues that they rarely miss their aims. In monarchies, on the other hand,

an ambitious prince is succeeded in turn by an idler, a pietist, a warrior, a scholar, a voluptuary. And whilst Fortune's shifting stage is ever displaying some new scene, the mind of the people, dazzled by the variety of the spectacle, takes no definite shape."¹

From this it is clear that we republicans and pacifists, in our views concerning the best form of State, are in very good company. We can, it is clear, refute the present-day panegyrists of the Hohenzollerns by the aid of the Hohenzollerns themselves, and Professor Delbrück would have some difficulty in reconciling his respect for the hereditary dynasty with insistence on the correctness of his "stability" theories.

Nothing is perfect in this world. We human beings are everywhere compelled to choose the lesser of two evils. The finest democracy in the world is a poor affair compared with the grand ideal that great spirits have framed for it. But anyone who seriously aspires to free modern humanity at length from the scourge of war (and that is to-day the supreme task) must judge the worst democracy to be infinitely better than the best feudal monarchy.

"Eternal peace" is not a decree. It must, like everything else, be won step by step. And if even the best democracy in the world does not furnish any absolute protection against war, we must humbly confess that absolute protection against war is impossible in this imperfect world. The main point is that we finally recognise that without a will-to-war no wars are possible, and that this will-to-war can only be dangerous

¹ "Königliche Gedanken und Aussprüche Friedrichs des Grossen," Deutsche Bibliothek in Berlin, pp. 46-7.

when it is backed up by a political Constitution; and that after we have clearly recognised this, we seek for and establish that form of State and government in which the satisfaction of this craving for war is rendered as difficult as possible.

This form of political government is beyond all doubt the sovereignty of the popular will, that is to say, *democracy*. For, whilst in all dynastic forms of government the will-to-war is, and will remain, a command of God, that is to say, a necessary condition of human life, on the other hand, in democratic forms of government, the will-to-peace is a command of the people—that is to say, a necessary element of the State itself.

No philosopher ever made a more absurd remark than Hegel when he said: "The people is that portion of the State that does not know what it wants!" All history from the time when it first began to be written recounts the continuous conflict between people and dynasty. The existence of this conflict is a proof of the fact that peoples do, in fact, always know exactly what they want. I think that I have in this work, by a few examples, proved beyond contradiction that this was particularly the case in Prusso-Germany during the last century. We Germans (whatever the Chauvinists across the Vosges and across the Channel may say to the contrary) are a nation like any other; we are subject to the same historical laws and necessities, we have the same ideals of humanity, and we are fighting against the same obstacles to true progress as other nations.

The people, each and every people, has always and everywhere a will. It may cry "Hurrah!" and applaud

military parades and the pomp of the head of the State, and this in the age of universal military service and of a settled code of law and morals, but it will never support a war of conquest. If it is ready, unanimously and resolutely, to protect its country, the home of its ancestors, and the treasures of its culture until the last drop of blood, yet it will never for the sake of a world-policy plunge into adventures and contend for spheres of influence in Further India or for railways in Patagonia. The question is to discover a form of government in which conquest can no longer be represented as an act of self-defence and the violation of solemn treaties as necessary for the safety of the country.

This form of government is democracy.

The will of all peoples to defend their fatherland and to reject every idea of conquest is universal. It is the same from Lisbon to Yokohama, from Melbourne to Stockholm. Let us, therefore, in full confidence commit the peace of Europe to the sovereignty of the popular will. It alone can be the basis of the era of true and peaceful culture now dawning in Europe.

* * * * *

That a German at the beginning of this twentieth century had to write this book (yes: had to!), and that his mode of thought should appear so terribly revolutionary, is certainly no proof of the pre-eminence of German culture. For what does this book contain? It contains a description of conditions that existed in England and France 150 years ago. It contains a demand for reforms which in all the civilised countries of the world have for decades past appeared to

the dullest peasant an understood thing. In fact, what I here demand for Germany has been possessed by the English, French, Americans, and Swiss for the past 150 years, by the Italians, Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Serbs, Bulgarians, Roumanians, Greeks, etc., etc., for some decades, and by the Chinese since quite recently. Only think of it! The Chinese!

The storm-wind of history will and must finally bring political emancipation to Germany also. The romanticism of the revolutionary periods of 1789 and 1848; the period of "storm and stress"; the categorical imperative of self-emancipation; these will and must be the fruits of this World War for Germany.

Right, Right, and again Right: that is the foundation of a humanity ready for peaceful culture. Whoever says "Right" says equality; the divine, traditional, and mystic special prerogatives of dynasties, States, and castes are mockeries of Right.

Divine right in the sense of pomp, parade, phrase, and fiction? As much as you like, if you cannot exist without images of saints, incense, and ermine. But divine right as the supreme and guiding principle of European politics? Divine right in the sense of a right of possession over the individual members, the fate, the will, and the destiny of the nations, and the right to decide concerning war and peace? A million fists would clench and threaten the slavish souls who, after the catastrophe of these days, would still answer yes!

No half-measures, no lamentations, no cowardly compromise, no subtleties, no putting off till later! That would be treachery to our fallen brothers. No! All the high things must be brought low, all the

earthly divinities be swept away, all exceptions banished and all special prerogatives abolished root and branch, and for all time! The earth for human beings, the heavens for the gods! Thus and only thus will the hunger of the nations for justice and peace at last be appeased. Only in this way will humanity be able to justify this massacre of millions before the tribunal of history.

And, therefore, Germany has to begin to-day where the English, French, Americans, Swiss, etc., began 250 and 125 years ago. and where the German classicists and champions of liberty broke down helplessly.

That is in truth the great lesson which the World War imperatively demands that we should learn to-day.

We have not been called barbarians, Boches, and Huns because our soldiers in Belgium and elsewhere are alleged to have wrought such devastation as did Attila's hordes. No; our political serfdom, our apparently servile adherence to mediæval theories of the State, our barbarous religion of the sanctity and beauty of wars, our eminently un-German reliance upon discipline by force and our emphatic reiteration that "Might overrules Right"—all this together with the ferocious scholarship and the servility of our Privy Councillors of the Ostwald stamp, has won for us the name of "barbarians"! A great, vigorous, and highly gifted people like ours can only play its true part in the world when it is its own master and proudly shapes its own destinies. But if, as was the case with us, it entrusts the public weal both at home and abroad to a handful of soldiers and learned mandarins, then it will be diverted from its true path, and will become a danger to the world and an offence against civilisation.

If Bismarck was not Germany's blunder, then he was Germany's fate. In these days, no fatherland can be cemented by "blood and iron." Blood and iron can only be renewed and maintained by yet more blood and iron. Bismarck was our glory and our fate.

Away from Bismarck! that is the lesson of this World War for Germany. Justice and liberty, not blood and iron, are the cement of modern fatherlands.

Let us take up again the threads of classic Germanism. Let us remember our intellectual heroes of the age of Schiller and Goethe, of our democratic national poets of the 'forties of last century. Only with their help, and only in their spirit, can the German problem be finally solved to the blessing of Germany and the world.

Let us break with the development of the last century. The World War signifies the collapse of a system and a spirit of culture that were thoroughly un-German, that is, thoroughly Prussian. Let us join hands with the other civilised nations of the world as peaceable, equally privileged, and equally efficient labourers in the field of culture. Let us begin by creating that quite new, quite free, quite democratic culture the direction of which was indicated to us by Herder and Kant, by Lessing and Humboldt, by Goethe and Schiller. No longer "Deutschland über alles," but Germany with and by the side of all. Only so shall we be able to fulfil our true mission in the world.

Onward! . . . to Democracy.

Democracy, in the world as it is to-day, is the only possible, the only desirable basis of any genuine cul-

ture. It is only this mother that is able to bear all the beautiful, promising children of whom we Germans spoke all too soon: socialism, a true law of nations, intellectual liberty, and, possibly, complete disarmament. Without democracy these things will continue to be what they have been hitherto: caricatures and abortions.

Onward! . . . to Democracy.

Democracy is the only possible, only enduring basis of the future peace of nations. A peace concluded without a realisation of Kant's fundamental demand would be only patchwork and self-deception.

Onward! . . . to Democracy.

This will and must to-morrow be the battle-cry of Europe in general, and of Germany in particular.

Away from Bismarck! Germany for the Germans.

Let that be the fruit of this terrible World War for Germany.

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